External Imbalances as an Explanation for Growth Rate Differences across Time and Space: An Econometric Exploration by Workie Tiruneh, Menbere
  
 
Inaugural-Dissertation 
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec.publ.) 
an der Ludwig-MaximiliansUniversität München 
 
 
 
 
External Imbalances as an Explanation for Growth 
Rate Differences across Time and Space:  
An Econometric Exploration 
 
 
 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
Menbere Workie Tiruneh 
 
Oktober 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Referent:                                       Prof. Stephan Klasen, Ph.D. 
Korreferent:                                  Prof. Dr. Dalia Marin 
Promotionsabschlussberatung:     11. Februar 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 II
External Imbalances as an Explanation for Growth 
Rate Differences across Time and Space:  
An Econometric Exploration 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
Menbere Workie Tiruneh 
 
 
 
Submitted to the Department of Economics 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor oeconomiae publicae (Dr. oec. Publ.) 
 
at the  
 
Ludwig Maximilians University, Munich 
 
 
2003 
 
 
 
 
Thesis Supervisor:                      Prof. Stephan Klasen, Ph.D. 
Thesis Co-Supervisor:                Prof. Dr. Dalia Marin 
Final Committee Consultation:     11. Februar 2004 
 
 
 
 I
Table of Contents 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION........................................................................................ 1 
I. GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE ACROSS TIME AND SPACE: NEW 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR AN OLD DEBATE.................................................... 7 
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 9 
2. THE SOLOW-SWAN MODEL AND THE CONVERGENCE DEBATE: A THEORETICAL REVIEW
....................................................................................................................................... 11 
2.1. The absolute and relative convergence hypotheses ............................................ 13 
2.2. Empirical specifications...................................................................................... 18 
2.3. Review of previous empirical research ............................................................... 21 
2.4. Data description and samples ............................................................................. 24 
2.5. Results for cross-section regression and discussion........................................... 26 
2.6. Conclusion........................................................................................................... 27 
3. THE AUGMENTED SOLOW MODEL AND THE CONDITIONAL CONVERGENCE DEBATE: 
REVISITING MANKIW, ROMER AND WEIL (1992) ........................................................... 28 
3.1. The Textbook Solow Model ................................................................................. 30 
3.2. The augmented Solow model and its empirical specification ............................. 31 
3.3. Previous empirical studies on conditional convergence..................................... 34 
3.4. Data description, results of the regression and discussion................................. 36 
3.5. Conclusion and the policy implications .............................................................. 41 
Bibliography............................................................................................................... 43 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I. ............................................................................................... 46 
II. AN EMPIRICAL EXPLORATION INTO THE DETERMINANTS OF 
EXTERNAL INDEBTEDNESS .................................................................................... 75 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 77 
2. WHY INDEBTED COUNTRIES GOT INDEBTED IN THE FIRST PLACE? A THEORETICAL 
EXPLANATION ................................................................................................................. 79 
2.1. What went wrong with the magnitude and structure of developing countries’ 
external debt? Some stylized facts.............................................................................. 87 
 II
2.2. Why HIPCs become HIPCs? Revisiting Easterly (2002).................................... 90 
2.3. A further empirical exploration into the causes of LDCs external indebtedness in 
the 1980s and 1990s................................................................................................. 104 
3. CONCLUSION AND THE POLICY IMPLICATION OF THIS STUDY .................................... 113 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 115 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II............................................................................................. 119 
III. FACTORS AFFECTING THE DEBT-REPAYMENT CAPACITY OF 
INDEBTED COUNTRIES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION......................... 151 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 153 
2. FACTORS AFFECTING DEBT-REPAYMENT CAPACITY: A THEORETICAL REVIEW ......... 155 
3. A SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES ........................................................ 158 
4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION AND DATA DESCRIPTION ........................................... 160 
5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLES............................................................................ 163 
6. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION AND DISCUSSION........................................................ 163 
7. CONCLUSION AND THE POLICY IMPLICATION OF THIS STUDY .................................... 166 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 168 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III. .......................................................................................... 170 
IV. DEBT OVERHANG, CAPITAL FLIGHT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A 
PANEL DATA APPROACH....................................................................................... 179 
1. INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 181 
2. THE EXTERNAL IMBALANCES-GROWTH NEXUS: A THEORETICAL REVIEW .............. 183 
2. 1.  A formal theoretical model of the debt overhang hypothesis.......................... 186 
2.2. Capital flight, external debt and growth ........................................................... 190 
2.3. The external imbalances-growth nexus: An extended empirical examination.. 194 
2. 4. The Augmented Solow model: Revisiting Hadjimiachael and Ghura (1995) .. 196 
3. A SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL STUDIES........................................................ 201 
4. SPECIFICATION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA DESCRIPTION ......................... 203 
4.1. The advantages of a panel data over a simple cross-sectional approach ........ 203 
4.2. A Formal specification of the empirical model................................................. 205 
5. DATA DESCRIPTION AND SAMPLES............................................................................ 206 
 III 
6. REGRESSION RESULTS AND THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THIS STUDY..................... 208 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................. 215 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IV. .......................................................................................... 220 
 
 IV
List of Tables, Graphs and Figures 
Chapter I 
 
List of text tables 
 
3. Economic growth, capital accumulation and population growth (1960-2000)..........................................36 
 
List of text figures 
 
1. Absolute convergence hypothesis .............................................................................................................15 
2. Conditional convergence hypothesis .........................................................................................................17 
3. Absolute and conditional convergence hypotheses ...................................................................................20 
4. Evolving distribution, tending towards bimodal........................................................................................23 
 
List of Appendix tables 
 
A. Tables for cross-section results 1960-2000 (all observations) 
 
1. Definitions of the variables and their sources ...........................................................................................47 
2. Descriptive statistics of all observations ...................................................................................................48 
3. Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita ...............................................................................................48 
4. Regression results ( β -convergence) ........................................................................................................49 
5. Variance of real GDP per capita (σ -convergence) ..................................................................................50 
6. Regression results (1960-69) .....................................................................................................................51 
7. Regression results (1970-79) .....................................................................................................................51 
8. Regression results (1980-89) .....................................................................................................................52 
9. Regression results (1990-2000) .................................................................................................................52 
10. Regression results (1960-2000) ...............................................................................................................53 
11. Regression results (1970-2000) ...............................................................................................................53 
12. Regression results (1980-2000) ...............................................................................................................54 
 
B. Table for panel data results 1960-2000 (all observations) 
 
13. Descriptive statistics (1960-2000) ...........................................................................................................54 
14. Cross-section pooled results (1960-2000) ...............................................................................................55 
15. Random and fixed effects results (1960-2000)........................................................................................56 
 
C. Tables for cross-section results for developing countries alone (1960-2000) 
 
16. Descriptive statistics (1960-2000) ...........................................................................................................57 
17. Regression results (1960-2000) ...............................................................................................................58 
18. Regression results (1970-2000) ...............................................................................................................58 
19. Regression results (1980-2000) ...............................................................................................................59 
20. Regression results (1990-2000) ...............................................................................................................59 
21. Regression results (1960-69) ...................................................................................................................60 
22. Regression results (1970-79) ...................................................................................................................60 
23. Regression results (1980-89) ...................................................................................................................61 
 
D. Tables for panel data regression results for developing countries alone (1960-2000) 
 
24. Descriptive statistics (1960-2000) ...........................................................................................................62 
25. Cross-section pooled regression results (1960-2000) ..............................................................................62 
26. Random and fixed effects regressions results (1960-2000) .....................................................................63 
 V
 
E. Tables for panel regressions for HIPCs alone (1960-2000) 
 
27. Descriptive statistics (1960-2000) ...........................................................................................................64 
28. Cross-section pooled regression results (1960-2000) ..............................................................................64 
29. Random and fixed effects regressions results (1960-2000) .....................................................................65 
 
30. List of all countries included in the regressions ......................................................................................66 
 
 
List of Appendix Graphs (growth of rates of real GDP per capita against log of 
initial real GDP per capita levels) 
 
Graphs (A1) to (A7) are for all observations 
 
A1. Regression line (1960-69) ......................................................................................................................67 
A2. Regression line (1970-79) ......................................................................................................................67 
A3. Regression line (1980-89) ......................................................................................................................68 
A4. Regression line (1990-2000)...................................................................................................................68 
A5. Regression line (1960-2000)...................................................................................................................69 
A6. Regression line (1970-2000)...................................................................................................................69 
A7. Regression line (1980-2000)...................................................................................................................70 
 
Graphs (A8) to (A12) are only for developing countries 
 
A8. Regression line (1960-2000)...................................................................................................................70 
A9. Regression line (1970-2000)...................................................................................................................71 
A10. Regression line (1980-2000).................................................................................................................71 
A11. Regression line (1990-2000).................................................................................................................72 
 
Graphs (A13) to (A15) are for OECD countries (1960-2000) 
 
A12. Regression line (1960-2000).................................................................................................................72 
A13. Regression line (1970-2000).................................................................................................................73 
A14. Regression line (1980-2000..................................................................................................................73 
 
 
Chapter II 
 
List of text tables  
 
1.1. Some economic and social indicators for HIPCs and non-HIPCs (1980-98) .........................................81 
2.1. Definitions of variables in the HIPC’s regression ..................................................................................93 
2.2. Macroeconomic policy, financing, and external shocks: A comparison  
                   between HIPCs and non-HIPCs (1982-99).................................................................................94 
 
List of text figure 
 
3. The recycling of the petrodollar scheme ...................................................................................................84 
 
Text graphs 
 
1. Gross domestic savings and investment to GDP ratio of HIPCs (1970-99) ..............................................97 
2. Resource balance to GDP ratio of HIPCs (1970-99).................................................................................97 
 VI
Appendix tables  
 
1. Tables for HIPC’s indebtedness (cross-section) (1982-99) 
 
2.3. Definitions of variables and their sources ............................................................................................109 
2.4. List of countries included in the regressio............................................................................................120 
2.5. Descriptive statistics (cross-section data).............................................................................................121 
2.6. Descriptive statistics (panel data) .........................................................................................................121 
2.7-2.19. Cross-section regression results ........................................................................................... 122-125 
2.20-2.36.panel regression results ...................................................................................................... 125-128 
2.37. Easterly (2002) results ................................................................................................................ 129-130 
 
2. Tables for the regression results on the determinants of external indebtedness Annual cross-section 
(1982-99) 
 
2.38. Annual cross-section results (all observations) ..................................................................................131 
2.39. Annual cross-section results (all observations) ..................................................................................132 
 
2.1. Tables for the regression results (Panel data) 
 
2.40a. Descriptive statistics (all observations) ............................................................................................133 
2.40b. Correlation matrix (all observations)................................................................................................133 
2.40c. Correlation matrix (all observations) ................................................................................................134 
2.41a. Random and fixed effects results (all observations) .........................................................................135 
2.41b. Random and fixed effects results (all observations) .........................................................................136 
2.42. Cross-section pooled results (all observations) ..................................................................................137 
2.43. Differences in variables between HIPCs and non-HIPCs...................................................................138 
2.44. Impact of variables on indebtedness...................................................................................................138 
 
 
2.2. Determinants of indebtedness (HIPCs alone)-Panel data 
 
2.45a. Descriptive statistics .........................................................................................................................139 
2.45b. Correlation matrix ............................................................................................................................139 
2.45c. Correlation matrix.............................................................................................................................140 
2.46a. Regression results .............................................................................................................................140 
2.46b. Regression results.............................................................................................................................141 
 
Tables for the magnitude and structure of external debt 
 
A. The magnitude of external debt  
 
A1. Total external debt stock (mil. USD)....................................................................................................142 
A2. Share of each group in total developing countries’ external debt (%)..................................................142 
A3. Total debt to GDP ratio (%)..................................................................................................................143 
A4. Total debt to exports ratio (%)..............................................................................................................143 
 
B. The cost of external debt 
 
B1. Total debt service to exports ratio (%)..................................................................................................144 
B2. Interest payments to exports ratio (%) ..................................................................................................144 
B3. Interest payments to GNP ratio (%)......................................................................................................145 
 
C. The structure of external debt  
 
C1. The share of short term debt in total debt (%) ......................................................................................145 
 VII
C2. Total concessional debt (mil. USD)......................................................................................................146 
C3. Concessional debt to total debt ratio (%) ..............................................................................................146 
C4. Share of multilateral debt in total debt (%)...........................................................................................147 
 
D. Other indicators of external balance sustainability 
 
D1. Reserves to total external debt (%) .......................................................................................................147 
D2. External balance on goods and services (%GNP).................................................................................148 
D3. Share of each group (region) in total portfolio equity inflows (%).......................................................148 
D4. Gross domestic savings (% of GDP) ....................................................................................................149 
D5. Gross domestic investment (% of GDP)...............................................................................................149 
D6. Net resource flows and transfers for HIPCs and others ........................................................................150 
 
 
Chapter III 
 
List of text tables 
 
3.1. Arrears and rescheduling (% of total external debt and GNP) .............................................................154 
 
 
List of appendix tables 
 
3.2. Definitions of variables and their sources ............................................................................................171 
3.3. List of countries included in the study..................................................................................................172 
3.4. Descriptive statistics ............................................................................................................................173 
3.5. Correlation matrix ...............................................................................................................................173 
3.6. Regression results for cross-section pooled probit and logit models....................................................174 
3.7. Regression results for the cross-pooled probit and logit models ..........................................................175 
3.8. Regression results for the fixed effects logit model .............................................................................176 
3.9. Regression results for the fixed effects logit model .............................................................................177 
3.10. Marginal effects of the covariates ......................................................................................................178 
 
 
 
 
Chapter IV 
 
List of text figures 
 
1. The debt Laffer curve ..............................................................................................................................185 
2. The link between capital flight, external debt, and growth......................................................................194 
 
List of appendix tables 
 
1. List of countries in the regression according to regional classifications .................................................221 
2. List of countries in the regression according to debt classifications........................................................222 
3. Definitions of the variables and their sources.................................................................................. 223-225 
4. Descriptive statistics................................................................................................................................226 
 
A. Random and fixed effects regressions results 
 
5. Total debt stock and economic growth....................................................................................................227 
6. Short term and long term debts and economic growth ............................................................................228 
 VIII
7. Concessional and non-concessional debts and economic growth............................................................229 
8. Private debt and public debts and economic growth ...............................................................................230 
9. Debts from the World Bank, IDA and IMF and economic growth .........................................................231 
10. Bilateral and multilateral debts and economic growth ..........................................................................232 
B. Cross-section pooled regression results 
 
11. Total debt stock and economic growth..................................................................................................233 
12. Short term and long term debts and economic growth ..........................................................................234 
13. Private debt and public debts and economic growth .............................................................................235 
14. Concessional and non-concessional debts and economic growth..........................................................236 
15. Debts from the World Bank, IDA and IMF and economic growth .......................................................237 
16. Bilateral and multilateral debts and economic growth ..........................................................................238 
17. Impacts of variables on growth .............................................................................................................239 
18-23. correlation matrices.................................................................................................................. 240-245 
 IX
Acknowledgements 
 
A doctoral thesis is seldom only one man’s work. First and for most, I am grateful to 
Almighty God for the opportunities and the marvelous people he has prepared for me 
during the course of my study in Germany. On Earth, Professor Stephan Klasen is left 
without competition. In fact, this work would neither have started nor ended without 
Professor Klasen’s professional guidance, direction, enthusiasm, encouragements, and his 
personal involvement in all dimensions of my accommodation in Germany. I have learnt 
a lot from our discussions. Moreover, I treasure his balanced judgment and would love to 
thank him for standing by my side during the hardest personal crisis in my life. This is 
hardly forgetable. In short, I remain to him a heavily indebted poor person. May 
Almighty God bless him and his family! 
 
I have also benefited from other members of the department. I am particularly thankful to 
Dr. Wolff for his friendship and valuable comments and suggestions. I thank Carola and 
Parvati for their friendship, concern on the progress of the work and for proof reading and 
other technical help. I also appreciate Mrs. Seidl and Mrs. Moufid for their help in the 
administrative matters. Katarina, Mark, Peter, and Andreas deserve my acknowledgement 
for their friendship and help in searching for the relevant literature. 
 
My gratitude and respect go to my mother, W/ro Sewnet Bezabih, for her love, endurance 
and commitment in raising six of us alone after the sudden loss of our father, His 
Eminence, Mergeta Workie Tiruneh, during our early ages. In the context a poor country 
like my own, this must have been a nerve wrecking task. Thank you, Etalem.  
 
I would also like to express my hearty gratitude to other excellent friends and relatives of 
mine, too numerous to be mentioned here, for their prayers, words of encouragements, 
and help during my stay in Munich. Thank you all for sharing my burdens and stresses. 
I appreciate a 15 months scholarship from the GraduiertenKolegg in Postcolonial studies.  
 
Nevertheless, I admit that all the errors and omissions in this work are purely mine 
 1
General Introduction 
 
 
During the period 1960-73, growth in Africa was more rapid than in the first half of the century…Since 1980, 
aggregate per capita GDP in sub-Saharan Africa has declined at almost 1 percent per annum. The decline has 
been widespread: 32 countries are poorer now than in 1980. Today, sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest income 
region in the world” (Collier and Gunning, 1999, p. 3) 
 
“The debt crisis can be studied as a problem in epidemiology. A powerful virus, high world interest rate, hit the 
population of capital importing developing countries in the 1980s. Some countries succumbed to the virus, 
having to reschedule their debt on an emergency basis, while others did not. And of those countries that arrived 
for emergency treatment, some recovered sufficiently to enter the period of quiet convalescence, while others are 
still suffering from febrile seizures in the IMF’s intensive care unit”, Sachs and Berg  (1988, p. 1). 
 
“LDC (Less developed country) capital outflows have to be tackled as part of the solution to the debt problem, 
not as something that needs to be addressed only later. If capital flight is given a free ride in the caboose of LDC 
debt train, the train has little hope of making the station” (Morgan Guaranty (1986): in Lessard and Williamson, 
1987, p. 244). 
 
The failure of developing countries, notably those in the sub-Saharan Africa, to manage 
narrowing their income per capita gap with the developed and other developing nations is one 
of the most serious challenges of the new millennium. Several empirical studies indicate the 
phenomena of divergence in real income per capita across the world economy at large in the 
past four decades. This implies that while richer countries continued to grow richer, the poor 
counterparts continued to grow poorer, eventually increasing the dispersion of income per 
capita across countries and over time. Such studies also point out that the magnitude of 
divergence in income per capita was worst in the past two decades compared with the 1960s 
and 1970s. 
 
The income per capita divergence of sub-Saharan Africa from the rest of the world is 
particularly alarming. The average growth in real per capita income that was around 2% in the 
1960s, declined to nearly 1% in the 1970s, to nearly 0% in the 1980s and 1990s. The figures 
turned even worse when one takes a longer time horizon. The average growth in real income 
per capita during 1970-2000 and 1980-2000 were indeed negative. This is in contrast to the 
average growth for the whole world of nearly 3% in the 1960s, 2% in the 1970s, 1% in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
Studies also indicate that during the past two decades SSA has virtually been outrun in all 
essential economic and social indicators by other developing regions. This sluggish growth 
performance has naturally been translated into high rate of poverty, poor education standard, 
poor health conditions, political instability and civil wars, poor investment environment, poor 
subsequent economic growth, and further internal and external imbalances. The joint impacts 
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of all these are stagnation in economic growth and development, creating a vicious circle or 
self-reinforcing mechanism. The vicious circle is so strong and the elements that created the 
circle are so interlinked to each other that breaking it at a single point has proved to be very 
difficult in the past two decades. 
 
While there is a widespread consensus on Africa’s marginalization and divergence, there are 
differences when it comes to identifying the factors that may have accounted for the region’s 
poor growth record. The mis-performance of Sub-Saharan Africa or „Africa‘s growth 
tragedy“ as Easterly and Levine (2000) rightly put it, has been explained from various fronts. 
The potential factors range from bad policies and external shocks (Hadjimichael and Ghura, 
1995; and Rodrik, 1999, among others), to ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 
2000), to gender inequality in education (Klasen, 2002), and to geographic location (Sachs 
and Warner, 1998), among others.  
 
The justifications include that since Africa has failed to adopt and implement sound policies, 
it is suffering from a subsequent stagnation in economic growth and development compared 
to countries that exercised more friendly policies (Hadjimichael and Ghura, 1995, among 
others). Others argue that by the virtue of Africa’s diversity in terms of ethnic structure, it is 
hard to reach any consensus on the long-term development doctrines for countries in this part 
of the world compared to countries in other regions with lower ethnic diversity (Easterly and 
Levine, 2000). Therefore, countries that are ethnically more diverse tend to have distorted 
policies compared with those that are ethnically less fragmented. 
 
On the education front, Klasen (2002) argues that the growth rate of developing countries is 
mainly attributed to gender inequality in education that retards intergenerational transmission 
of knowledge, among other disadvantages, eventually punishes growth. His results indicate 
that growth was higher in countries with low gender inequality and lower in countries with 
higher gender inequality in education. From a different perspective, Sachs and Warner (1998) 
blame the extraordinarily unfriendliness of nature to Africa compared to other developing 
regions. They argue that most countries in Africa are landlocked, which does not allow them 
to easily integrate into the global trade. Moreover, most of the countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa are located in the tropics, a fabulous environment for diseases to flourish and dramatic 
soil deterioration. These are all potential explanations for growth rate differences across 
various groups of developing countries.  
 3
The above explanations and others notwithstanding, there are, nonetheless, questions that 
remained unanswered. The first problem in this respect is the negative and significant dummy 
for Africa in most of the growth regressions, which virtually left Africa’s slow growth 
problems unexplained. Second, Africa’s ethnic structure has not dramatically changed in the 
1980s and 1990s compared to the decades earlier. Third, Sub-Saharan Africa is in the same 
tropics today as it had been in the 1960s and 1970s and yet has much lower economic 
performance. Fourth, Africa does not seem to be particularly suffering from gender inequality 
problem compared to other developing regions and previous decades. Fifth, there had been no 
dramatic migration of African inhabitants towards or away from the coast in the past two 
decades to blame the density of the population as an explanation for poor growth performance 
in the past two decades. Moreover, with the exception of a few countries, like Ethiopia, the 
countries that are landlocked today had also been landlocked in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Furthermore, there are many countries on earth that are landlocked but have enjoyed 
sustainable long-run economic growth record. 
 
In this dissertation I try to relate the “Africa’s growth crisis” to the debt crisis of the 1980s 
and 1990s. There are several reasons behind linking Africa’s mis-performance to the debt 
crisis.  
 
First, the fact that the growth rate of the region has become much worse in the last two 
decades, which are the decades of the debt crisis, may imply that the timing cannot be taken 
as a mere coincidence. Rather, there is a legitimate suspect for the growth crisis to be strongly 
linked to the debt crisis. Second, the cruel reality that 33 of the 41 countries classified by the 
World Bank and IMF as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) are located in this region 
must provoke one to link the debt crisis to the economic growth crisis of Africa. For 
illustration, HIPCs total external debt to GNP that was around 72% in 1984, jumped to 115% 
in 1998 (Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM)). This huge external debt has been 
accompanied by a large transfer of resources from this group to the developed world in the 
form of debt service payments, which accounted 21% of their exports in 1982, though 
dropped to 16% in 1998. 
 
High external debt through the debt overhang, crowding out and destabilizing effects may 
hamper economic growth and leads to low level of investment, and poor subsequent economic 
growth. This seriously limits the indebted poor nations’ debt repayment capacity and may 
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increase the demand for further external debt and rescheduling. This may serve against the 
creditworthiness of the indebted poor nations and prevent them from generating non-debt 
creating resources in order to finance their investment projects. As Edwards (1986, p. 570) 
concludes, “the level of the country risk premium increases with the level of foreign 
indebtedness (i.e., debt-GNP ratio)”. Today, almost all the heavily indebted poor nations are 
virtually cut off from the international financial markets and are instead heavily dependent on 
the multinational financial institutions. That is why the IMF is often called the “watch dog” 
and the “gate-keeper” of the international debt management (Nafziger W., 1993). 
 
Third, apart from the above bottlenecks of a high external debt, there is additional impediment 
of external debt on the growth of indebted poor nations via the capital flight. As Dooley and 
Kletzer (1994) point out, “in the aftermath of the 1982 debt crisis economists were surprised 
to learn that a large part of the borrowing of developing countries from international 
commercial banks was not matched by unrecorded net imports of goods and services but 
instead was matched by unrecorded private capital outflows from developing countries (p. 2). 
In this respect, despite persisting measurement problems, the estimated capital flight from 
Africa was around 39% of the private wealth of the region in 1990 compared to 14% for other 
developing countries (Collier and Gunning, p. 7). 
 
Finally, the fact that Africa’s growth performance continued to deteriorate despite two 
decades of structural adjustment may indicate the region’s being caught in a poverty trap: 
High external debt accompanied by capital flight and high debt service payments generating 
low growth and more divergence, higher demand for external financing and rescheduling of 
past contractual debt obligations. This is in fact, what has come to be known as ‘circular 
financing’, where indebted poor nations are borrowing new loans from overseas at higher 
interest rates to pay back old ones at lower interest rates, leaving the circle closed and poor 
nations poor for ever. 
 
To discuss the above issues, this dissertation has been split into four chapters: 
 
The first chapter revisits the convergence debate using the recent Penn World Table database, 
ranging from 1960-2000 and a panel data approach. Particular emphasis is given to the 
position of the heavily indebted poor countries to account for the role of external debt in the 
process of convergence (divergence). 
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In the second chapter, this dissertation empirically explores the causes of indebtedness. The 
main motive is that the causes of the external indebtedness of developing countries and their 
subsequent failure to meet their contractual debt obligations have been one of the heated 
debates both in the academic circles, policy makers, and the broader international community 
since the outset of the debt crisis in 1982. Using the World Banks’ Global Development 
Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) and the World Development Indicators, 2001 (CD-ROM) 
databases, and employing both cross-section, cross-section pooled and random and fixed 
effects approaches, this part investigates the determinants of external debt.  
 
The third chapter, using cross-section pooled logit, probit and fixed effects logit models, 
empirically explores the factors behind the debt repayment problems of the developing 
nations in general and HIPCs in particular in the past two decades. From the viewpoint of 
empirical strategy, the application of a panel data approach seems to be highly preferable, as it 
allows to control for time-specific events that are linked to overseas borrowing, particularly 
given the rapid changes in the global macroeconomic environment in the past years. 
Moreover, this strategy helps to produce a more robust explanation by allowing to incorporate 
country-specific factors as developing countries themselves are heterogeneous in terms of 
their colonial heritages, geopolitical and strategic significance, and creditworthiness, all 
affecting the level of indebtedness and the potential bargaining power to manage the 
subsequent debt crisis. 
 
The last chapter looks at whether external imbalances could be potential explanations for 
growth rate differences across the developing world. Although there is a wide-ranging of 
theoretical literature on this issue, there are only few empirical studies that show that there is 
an inverse relationship between growth and external imbalances. Moreover, all empirical 
studies on this area have focused on the impact of total external debt stock on growth of real 
GDP per capita, controlling for the traditional factors that appear in all growth regression in 
the framework of the augmented Solow model. The critical innovation of this dissertation is 
the premise that total external debt stock is uninformative and rather masks important 
information, and therefore, should be decomposed according to maturity and source 
structures.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Growth and Convergence across Time and 
Space: New Empirical Evidence for an Old Debate 
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Abstract 
 
This paper contributes to the ongoing convergence debate in several ways: First, using the recent 
Penn World Table’s database (PWT 6.1), it shows the absence of the so-called absolute 
convergence across the world economy at large in the past four decades. While the decade- by- 
decade regressions indicate similar results, things seem to have worsened in the 1980s and 1990s. 
One primary suspect in this regard is the debt crisis, which kicked off in 1982 after Mexico’s 
official announcement in the same year that it was quitting to service its external debt. From this 
time on, things started falling apart in developing countries and the debt crisis quickly turned into 
a development crisis. 
 
A separate regression for developing countries alone indicates the absence of unconditional 
convergence across this group of countries. But, once we split countries into groups with similar 
political, economic and institutional parameters (OECD, for instance), it appears that there is 
evidence for unconditional convergence.  
 
Third, turning to the conditional convergence debate, where both physical and human capital 
accumulations are incorporated into cross-country regressions, the results seem to suggest that, 
countries have experienced conditional convergence, hence poorer ones growing faster than their 
richer counterparts. However, the cross-section strategy is concluded as insufficient for 
international comparison of growth as it does not allow to control for time-specific and country-
specific factors, which leads to omitted variable problem, among other things. Therefore, using 
random effects model and fixed effects model and cross-section pooled time series strategy, this 
paper further investigates the growth-rate difference across countries and over time. The results 
suggest that once we control for decade-specific and country-specific factors and the traditional 
variables that always appear in the augmented Solow growth framework, the regressions 
generate more plausible and robust results.The cooefficient on intial GDP per per capita become 
larger and highly significant, reflecting, amonmg other things, that once we control for time 
specific and country specific factors and the tradionional determinants of growth, it seems to 
suggest that countries are close to their own steady states. Moreover, these strategies help to 
control for the indebtedness dummy to control for the impact of external debt on the speed of 
convergence.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Economists have always been concerned with variations in income and living standards 
across time and space. One way of measuring the speed at which countries are moving 
not only towards their own steady states but also towards the income per capita of other 
countries goes back to Solow’s (1956) growth framework. In this framework, countries 
with high savings rate and low population growth are predicted to experience higher per 
capita income than those in the opposite camp (Solow, 1956), ceteris paribus. This 
seminal work was quickly picked up by other economists and has therefore been the 
subject of constant extension. 
 
In general convergence in the context of economic growth is said to occur in a cross – 
section of economies, if there is a negative relationship between the growth rate of 
income and the initial level of income (Barro, 1991; Sala-i-Martin, 1994 and 1996a and 
1996b, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). In other words, convergence takes places, in a 
cross-section of economies, if poor economies tend to grow faster than wealthy ones, 
implying that the poorer the economy the more quickly it will tend to grow over a long 
time horizon, and vice versa. Similarly, Baumol (1994) defines convergence as a 
tantamount diminishing in the degree of economic inequality among countries. Though 
the above definitions remain valid throughout this paper, it turns out that there are 
significant disputes among growth scientists regarding the theory of economic growth 
and convergence.1  
 
Although economists have been interested in investigating whether poor economies 
remain poor for many years, while rich countries remain rich for generations, this was 
hampered by absence of long-run time series data until the mid-1980s that the 
convergence debate drew the attention of not only mainstream macroeconomic theorists 
but also econometricians. There are mainly two reasons for the growing concern in the 
convergence debate (Sala-i-Martin, 1996b, pp. 1019): 
                                                           
1
 Advocates of the endogenous growth model and other development economists in fact reject the 
hypothesis of converegnce. 
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• First, the existence of convergence across economies was proposed as the main 
test of the validity of modern theorists of economic growth. Moreover, estimates 
of the speeds of convergence across economies were thought to provide 
information on one of the core parameters of growth theory: the share of capital in 
the production function, 
• Second, in the mid-1980s a data set  on internationally comparable GDP levels for 
a large number of countries (the Penn World Tables) became available and this 
new data set enabled empirical economists to compare GDP level across time and 
space. 
 
The convergence debate is also vital as it is concerned with the gaps in living standards 
between countries, i.e, whether these gaps are narrowing or rather widening across 
countries and over time (Pritchett, 1996). Sala-i-Martin (1996), and Barro and Sal-i-
Martin (1995), using β -convergence and σ -convergence concepts, elaborate the 
convergence debate more broadly.2 Sala-i-Martin (1996, pp. 1025) points out that the 
lack of convergence means that the degree of cross-country income inequality not only 
fails to disappear, but rather tends to increase overtime (σ -divergence); and that 
economies (nations) which are predicted to be richer a few decades from now are the 
same countries (nations) that are rich today ( β -divergence).3 Moreover, despite the 
persisting disputes among economists on the determinants of long-run growth, the 
convergence debate has also enormous policy implications for policy makers both in the 
developed and developing countries. One of the key questions in this regard is to what 
extent external aid and debt helped countries to achieve accelerated economic growth, 
hence allowing them manage  narrowing the living standard gaps between the richest and 
poorest part of the world.  
 
                                                           
2
 β -convergence occurs if economies that are poorer are predicted to grow faster that richer ones. On the 
other hand, σ -convergence occurs if the disperision of  income per capita across countries declines 
overtime. The two concepts are broadly discussed  later in the paper. 
3
 See, Sala-i-Martin, (1994, 1996), and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for the detailed distinguishing 
between sigma and beta convergence. 
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The objective of this paper is to empirically test whether the income gap between poor 
and rich countries of the world has narrowed or rather widened in the past four decades. 
Particular attention will be paid to the position of the heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) in the process of convergence (divergence) in the past four decades, with 
especial emphasis on the last two decades, which capture the periods of debt and 
financial crises and other spill over effects of the process of globalization. To translate 
this aim into reality, I used both the absolute and conditional convergence hypotheses and 
a fresh international data set (The Pen World Tables (PWT 6.1)) by A. Heston, R. 
Summers, and B. Aten covering the period 1960 to 2000. The remainder of the paper is 
organized as follows: part 2 presents the summary of the neoclassical production function 
and the distincion between the absolute and conditional convergence hypotheses. Using 
the PWT 6.1 data set, this section presents empirical evidence for absolute convergence. 
Part three discusses the augmented Solow model and its empirical specifications. This 
will be followed by data description and empirical results. The very last sub-section of 
this part will present results and the policy implications of this study. 
 
2. The Solow-Swan model and the convergence debate: A theoretical 
review 
 
Almost all recent empirical researches on economic growth kick off from the Solow 
growth framework. This paper will also first summarize the basic model before an 
empirical counterpart to it is presented. 
 
The Solow model is a closed economy framework, where output (Y) is a function of 
input variables, such as labor (L) and capital (K). This can formally be written as: 
 
( )LKFY ,=                                                                    (1) 
There are three basic assumptions that are linked to this model: 
1. the production function in eq. (1) assumes positive and marginal products with 
respect to each input variables. 
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Equation (1.1) indicates that while each input variable contributes positively towards 
boosting the output that is produced, its marginal productivity falls over time as more and 
more of it is added, ceteris paribus. 
2. the production function exhibits constant returns to scale, indicating a 
proportionate increase in output as the result of changes in all input variables. 
This can formally be written as: 
 
( ) ( )LKFLKF ,., λλλ = , for all 0λ                                (1.2)   
3. the third assumption is referred to as the so called ‘Inada conditions’. 
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The Inada conditions expressed in eq.(1.3) state that while production with the absence of 
input variables is impossible, their excess abundance also make their marginal product 
diminished over time, ceteris paribus. The assumption of constant returns to scale in eq. 
(1.2) is also consistent with the balanced growth path along which capital and effective 
labour grow at the same rate. It is also helpful to rewrite the production function in eq.(1) 
in its intensive form:   
( ) ( )kLf
L
KLLKFY =





== 1,,                                           (1.4) 
where, 
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L
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capital –labour ratio; and 
                      ==
L
Yy  per capita income 
 
Now, the production function in eq.(1) can be written in its intensive form: 
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( )kfy =                                                                              (1.5) 
 
The change in the capital stock with a constant savings rate: 
( ) KtLKFsKIK δδ −=−=• ,,.                                           (1.6) 
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( ) ( )knkfsk .. δ+−=•                                                          (1.8) 
 
Finally, the growth rate of k can be approximated as: 
                                       
( ) ( )δγ +−==
•
nkkfs
k
k
k /.                                   (1.9) 
 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, pp. 22), the long-run growth rates in the 
Solow-Swan model are determined entirely by exogenous factors. The fundamental 
conclusion about long-run growth, therefore, is negative, simply because the long term 
growth rates are independent of the savings rates and the level of the production function.  
Nevertheless, the model is very important in providing us with sound information about 
the transitional dynamics of growth, which indicates the per capita convergence of an 
economy towards its own stead-state value or to the per capita incomes of a cross-section 
of economies (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995).  
 
2.1. The absolute and relative convergence hypotheses 
 
2.1.1. The absolute (unconditional) convergence 
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Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), eq. (1.9) implies that the derivative of Kγ  
with respect to k is negative: 
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This implies that, ceteris paribus, smaller values of k are linked to larger values of its 
corresponding growth ( Kγ ). This suggests (provided that countries have similar rate of 
savings (s), growth of population (n), rate of depreciation (δ ) and production function) 
that all economies have the same steady state values of k* and y*. Then, if the only 
difference across countries is the initial capital per capita (k), the model predicts that 
countries with less capital per capita tend to grow faster than those with relatively higher 
level of capital per capita. Therefore, the hypothesis that nations with lower capital per 
capita tend to grow faster than those with higher capital per capita without putting any 
restriction is referred to as absolute (unconditional) convergence (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 1995).  
 
To show eq. (1.8) in the context of absolute and conditional convergence, the diagram 
may be used to make the argument more readable. (See, figure 1). There are basically two 
equations in eq. (1.8): While the horizontal function line (δ + n) represents the curve for 
the rates of depreciation and growth rate of the population, the downward slopping curve 
attached to s.f(k)/k, represents the savings curve. From eq. (1.8) and diagram (1), it 
implies that the growth rate is rewarded by the savings rate while it is punished by the 
elements that constitute the depreciation curve. Assumption (1.1) discussed earlier also 
indicates that the saving curve is downward slopping, whereas, the Inada conditions 
(equation (1.3)) ensure that the saving curve is vertical at k = 0 and it approaches the 
horizontal axis as k tends to infinity. 
 
Diagram (1) shows the absolute (unconditional) β-convergence hypothesis. The 
assumption is that countries or economies under consideration are moving to the same 
steady states (k*). If the only difference among these countries is the initial capital stock 
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(real GDP per capita), then poor regions are predicted to grow faster than rich economies 
(∆kpoor >∆krich ). In other words, the growth rate of the poor towards the steady state is 
predicted to be faster than the growth rate of the rich.  
 
s.f(k)/k, (δ + n) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (1). Absolute (unconditional) convergence 
Source: Sala-i-Martin (1996, pp. 1343: in Menbere, 2000) 
 
Reasons in favour of the absolute convergence hypothesis include (Menbere, 2000): 
• the first reason is that introduced by Baumol (1986), where he argues that there is 
a common-force mechanism which assumes that at some stage circumstances 
inherent in the growth process, a set of variables influences a number of 
economies and drives them all in the same general direction. ”It is as though a 
common terminal point (the steady state) is equipped with something analogous 
to a magnet that draws toward itself all economies whose histories it affects”. 
Following Baumol (1994),”the unusual thing about this magnet is that it exerts 
the greatest force not on the economies closest to the terminal point but on those 
that are farthest from it”. Hence, convergence occurs- the economies initially 
farthest from the terminal (kpoor) are derived to move toward it most rapidly, 
Growth Rate of Kpoor 
Growth Rate of Krich 
(n + δ) 
Kpoor Krich K* Kt 
s.f(k)/k 
(Saving 
curve) 
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which is a defining characteristics of a convergence hypothesis (in Baumol’s 
terminology, a common-force convergence); 
• since kpoor  has lower level of initial capital (capital-labor ratio), any additional 
investment would quickly push these economies towards the steady state, and  
• although the above two reasons are based on the assumption that all economies 
have similar economic parameters but different initial capital stock, there is a 
third reason without the underlying assumption: The contagion model of 
convergence predicts that because of contagion (say, imitation of production), the 
laggards tend to grow faster than those in advanced stage of economic 
development.4  
 
Some arguments against the absolute β- convergence hypothesis: 
The core assumption of the absolute convergence hypothesis is that the sole difference 
between nations is their initial levels of capital. The real world shows, however, that this 
is just not the case. In fact, nations are different in so many other things, including the 
level of technology, the propensity to save and natural endowments, among other things. 
This is what has come to be known as the “absolute convergence fallacy”.  
 
2.1.2 The relative (Conditional) Convergence hypothesis 
 
The absence of broader empirical evidence in favor of absolute convergence across 
economies makes the traditional absolute convergence hypothesis fruitless in terms of 
measuring the speed of transition towards the steady state. Therefore, the idea of 
conditional convergence has been introduced.5 As depicted in diagram (2) just below, if a 
rich economy has higher saving rate relative to a poor economy (an assumption more 
realistic than the previous one), then the rich economy might be proportionately further 
from its steady state position. Under such circumstances, it should be the rich rather than 
the poor economy that is predicted to grow faster towards its own steady state.  
                                                           
4
 William Baumol, et al. (1994) ”Convergence of Productivity: Cross-National Evidence” Oxford Press Inc. 
5
 Conditional β-convergence exists if  the partial correlation between growth and initial income is negative. 
In contrast, a set of economies displays absolute β-convergence if the coefficient on initial income is 
negative in univariate regression (Sala-i-Martin,1996, p. 1330),. 
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s.f(k)/k, (δ + n) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (2). Conditional (relative) Convergence 
Source: Sala-i-Martin and Barro (1995: in Menbere, 2000) 
 
There are some more additional reasons against the absolute convergence hypothesis (or 
in favour of the conditional convergence hypothesis) (Menbere, 2000): 
• Poor economies have lower savings rate (due to lower income) compared to rich 
ones and therefore, have lower rate of investment, and poor subsequent economic 
growth, 
• Rich countries as opposed to their poor counterparts have high growth rates, 
despite their high initial capital-to-labor ratio, due to innovation, 
• Ccapital is not moving from economies where it is abundant to those where it is 
scarce, as was predicted by the contagion model of  convergence, due mainly to 
risk and uncertainty in most poor nations, and  
(n+δ) 
Kt 
Growth  
Rate of Kpoor 
Growth Rate of  
Krich 
Kpoor K
*
poor Krich K*rich 
s.f(k)/k 
(Saving curve) 
sf(k)/k 
(Saving curve) 
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• Finally, scarce qualified human capital  in poor countries caused by both lack of 
education as well as human capital flight (brain drain) makes the possible transfer 
of technology and know-how from rich to poor countries slow and difficult. 
 
2.2. Empirical specifications 
 
The β-Convergence hypothesis 
 
The Solow-Swan growth model that allows measuring the coefficient of β, whose value 
determines weather or not convergence has occurred in a cross-section of economies, 
could be summarized as follows (see, Sala-i-Martin, 1996, p. 1334): 
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Where, 
α and β -  are constants, 
10  β , and  µi, t  is the error term with, and is assumed to have mean zero, same 
variance    ( 2µσ ) for all economies and is independent over time and across economies. 
Then convergence occurs if β>0 and is statistically significant, as this implies the inverse 
relationship between the annual growth rate ln (Yi,t/Yi, t-1) and the initial level of real per 
capita income ln (Yi, t-1). Following Sala-i-Martin (1996), the coefficient on the initial per 
capita level (1-e-βT)/T, which is the slope of the initial GDP per capita level, is an 
expression that declines with the length of the time interval T for a given β. In other 
words, if the linear relation between the growth rate of real GDP per capita and the initial 
GDP per capita level are estimated, then the coefficient is predicted to be smaller the 
longer the time period over which the growth rate is averaged. The reason is that the 
growth rate declines as income increases.  To calculate the β- coefficient from the 
regression, one may linearize the model as follows: 
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The implied β  that measures the speed of convergence may then be computed using the 
following approximation (eq. 1.11b): 
 
( )
T
bT+
−=
1lnβ                                                           (1.11b) 
 
 
The σ- convergence hypothesis 
 
The second model has been developed to measure the cross-sectional dispersion of 
income using sample variance of the log of income (σ- convergence) 
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Where, 
tµ - the sample mean of log of (Yi, t), and tiY ,  is the log of GDP per capita level of 
country i at time period t. The main argument here is that if countries are converging in 
terms of income per capita, the cross-sectional dispersion of their income should fall over 
time. 
 
At the outset of the empirical test for the convergence hypothesis, there was a heated 
debate regarding the relationship between β-convergence and σ-convergence (apparently 
first introduced by Sal-i-Martin). The central point of controversy was the presumption 
that β- convergence be a necessary prerequisite for σ- convergence. The intuition behind 
is that if there is convergence, the growth rate should fall over time (because when an 
economy is getting richer, the predicted growth rate to be much smaller and vice versa).  
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However, later it was acknowledged that β- convergence is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for σ- convergence to take place. This is either because of overtaking 
or divergence. The first panel of diagram 3 indicates the absence of both β-convergence 
and σ-convergence across economies, which implies that countries are diverging in terms 
of their income per capita gap and this gap is increasing over time. In the second panel, it 
is possible to notice that there is a decline in the income per capita gap between countries 
and this was accompanied by a decline in the dispersion of income per capita across-
countries and overtime. The last panel seems to suggest overtaking or polarization, in 
which case the middle class may vanish as Quah (1996) argues (more in a moment). 
 
Absolute versus Relative Convergence in the Solow-Swan Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Absolute and relative convergence 
Source: Xavier Sala-i-Martin (1996b), The Economic Journal, 106, pp. 1021 
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2.3. Review of previous empirical research 
 
Baumol (1986) has been the first growth economist to examine convergence across 16 
industrialized countries (1870-1979) using Madison’s 1982 data. The results of the 
regression suggest that there were perfect convergence across these groups of economies, 
especially after World War II. De Long (1988) and Romer (1986) (in Sala-i-Martin, 
1996b) demonstrate, however, that Baumol’s attempt in measuring convergence was 
downplayed due mainly to the following: 
• the first dispute is related to sample selection whereby historical data are 
constructed retrospectively, the economies that have long data series are naturally 
those that are more industrialized, 
• Secondly, following the first reason, Baumol has been accused of biasedness. For 
example, Quah (1996) criticizes the traditional empirical analysis growth and 
convergence for overemphasizing physical capital and de-emphasizing 
endogenous technological progress and externalities that are main determinants of 
growth and convergence. 
Similarly, Sala-i-Martin (1994, and 1996a), shows that β -convergence across the U.S, 
Japan, and five European nations is strikingly similar (about 2 % per year).6 Based on the 
above results, the author reaches two conclusions: 
• Ffirst, the speeds of convergence are surprisingly similar across data sets, and 
• Second, as the result of the first conclusion, since the degree to which national 
governments use regional cohesion policies is very different, and the fact that the 
speeds of convergence are very similar across countries implying that public 
                                                           
6
 The results for 48 U.S. states from 1880-1920 indicate that dispersion of per capita personal income net of 
transfers declined from 0.54 in 1880 to 0.33 in 1920, then rose to 0.40 in 1930 due to the adverse shock to 
agriculture in 1920´s. The dispersion continued declining to 0.35 in 1940 and to 0.24 in 1960, to 0.17 in 
1970 and 0.14 in 1976. The same observation for 47 Japanese prefectures for the period (1955-1987) of per 
capita income, shows that the dispersion of personal income increased from 0.47 in 1930’s to 0.63 in the 
1940’s which was caused by explosion in military expenditure during that period. The cross-prefectual 
dispersion has decreased substantially since 1940: It fell to 0.29 by 1950, to 0.25 in 1960, 0.23 in 1970 and 
it hit a minimum of 0.12 in 1978. However, income dispersion was observed to constant since then (Sala-i-
Martin 1996, pp. 1338). 
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policy plays a very small role in the overall process of regional convergence. This 
has obvious been  the subject of criticism by development economists and others 
 
Nevertheless, as it is usual in economics, there is an ongoing serious dispute to the whole 
debate of both the absolute and conditional convergences hypotheses. One of the most 
serious criticisms comes from Danny T. Quah. Quah (1996a) interprets the neoclassical 
definition of convergence as a “basic empirical issue, one that reflects - among other 
things - polarization, income distribution, and inequality” (pp.1354). In an oversimplified 
way, Quah links the convergence debate to the question of whether poor economies are 
incipiently catching up with those already richer or instead they are caught in poverty 
trap. In this regard, there are criticisms against the traditional convergence hypothesis, 
which concludes that there exists a surprisingly similar 2% annual rate of convergence 
across different countries.  
 
Quah (1996a) argues that β -convergence is uninformative as it is interested only in 
comparison of mean growth across countries but not in income distribution, and that 
cross-section regressions can represent only average behaviour, not the behaviour of the 
entire distribution (p. 1365). Moreover, Quah is concerned about the overall mission of 
the convergence debate, according to him, as it fails to inform for instance “if the poorest 
10% of the world are catching up with the richest 10% of the world”. He added that 
studying an average economy or representative one gives little insight into the empirical 
behaviour of the entire cross-section. He believes that for such cross-section dynamics to 
be interpretable, one needs a theoretical model that makes predicitions on them (p. 1368). 
His model then makes predictions on cross-section dynamics by taking three observations 
(p. 1368): Countries endogenously select themselves into groups, and thus, do not act in 
isolation; specialization in production allows exploiting economies scale; and ideas are an 
important engine of growth. 
 
From Quah’s hypothesis, two key results emerged: First, coalitions (convergence clubs) - 
form endogenously - the model delivers prediction on coalition membership across the 
entire cross-section of economies, and secondly, different convergence dynamics are 
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generated depending on the initial distribution of characteristics across countries. In this 
potential dynamics explicit convergence clubs can be characterized as (Quah 1996, p. 
1368): Polarization - the rich getting richer while the poor getting poorer and the middle 
class vanishing (see also figure 4 below); stratification - when more than two coalition 
form (multiple modes in the income distribution across countries); and overtaking and 
divergence- two economies initially on roughly equal footing, separated over time so that 
one eventually becomes wealthier than the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Evolving distributions, tending towards bimodal 
Source: Danny T. Quah (1996), European Economic Review 40 (p.1369), Numbers (1-4)  
            added for explanation purposes. 
 
Figure (4) provides the following interpretation of convergence:  
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• Number (1) and (2) show how countries that were poor at time T0 remain poor at 
time T1, while those that were rich at time T0 get even richer at time T1. This 
shows the poverty trap or what Quah calls ‘polarization’. 
• Number (3) and number (4) indicate how the middle class get vanished: Those 
who are lucky moving towards the rich (3), while those who are unlucky rushing 
deep down to join the poor (4). 
 
Galor (1996), in his part, argues in the same line with Quah. He classifies convergence 
into three groups: The absolute convergence hypothesis, which is convergence of per 
capita income across countries regardless of their initial conditions; the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, which assumes convergence in per capita income across 
countries with identical structural parameters and regardless of their initial situation; and 
finally the ‘club convergence hypothesis’ (predicts polarization, persistent poverty, and 
clustering), in which case there is per capita income convergence across countries with 
identical structural parameters provided that these countries also have similar initial 
conditions (p.1056).  
 
Bernard and Jones (1996) also dispute the current convergence debate on the ground that 
it neglects to take into account the role of technology in the process of convergence.7 
Although there are plenty of essential points addressed by those who dispute the 
convergence debate, particularly regarding the claim of the ‘magic 2%’ convergence, 
there is a bulk of empirical literature that proved the existence of conditional convergence 
in a cross-section of economies, controlling for other factors that determine long-run 
economic growth. 
 
2.4. Data description and samples 
 
No researcher on empirical issues on developing countries can ever enjoy the luxury of 
choosing the number of countries he wishes to investigate. The number of countries is 
                                                           
7
 There cross-country analysis on dispersion of labour productivity and dipersion in technology for 14 
OECD countries indicates that: First, countries are heterogenous in their level of technology, and secondly, 
the change in the dispersion of labour productivity overtime matches with closely with the disperison of 
technology (p. 1041) 
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rather dictated by data availability. This also holds perfectly in this paper. The number of 
countries ranges from 86 to 108, with their number varying from decade to decade and 
variable to variable. The most troublesome variable is the Barro-Lee education data set, 
where data is missing for a significant number of countries. I, therefore, used the log of 
initial life expectancy alternatively. Since most HIPCs’ data on education is missing, 
cross-country analysis was not possible. I, therefore, run a cross-section pooled time 
series data using log of initial life expectancy for this group.  The data for GDP per capita 
and investment to GDP ratio were taken from the Penn World Table (PWT 6.1), an 
expanded set of international comparisons, 1960-2000. Following the authors, “this data 
displays a set of national accounts economic time series covering many countries. Its 
expenditure entries are denominated in a common set of prices and in a common currency 
(USD) so that real quantity comparison can be made, both between countries and over 
time”. Data for life expectancy and population was taken from the World Development 
Indicators (2001, CD-ROM). More information about the definitions and sources of the 
variables that are used in the regression are in table (1). Table (2) presents the descriptive 
statistics for the cross-sections of all observations. Table (13) presents descriptive 
statistics for the panel data of all observations. Tables (16) and (24) present descriptive 
statistics for cross-section and panel data regressions, respectively, for developing 
countries alone. Table (27) show the descriptive statistics for HIPC’s pooled data. 
Finally, table (30) shows the list of all countries that are included in the regression, 
depending on data availability. In the decade-by-decade analysis, the averages were 
calculated in a non-overlapping way: 1960-69, 1970-79, 1980-89, and 1990-2000. 
 
Figures A1 to A15 in the appendix also show the regression lines that show the 
correlation between log of GDP per capita growth and log of its initial value. Graphs A1 
to A8 show the divergence (absence of absolute convergence) across all countries in the 
world on decade-by-decade basis. Graphs A9 to A12 show the existence of rather 
divergence across developing countries themselves. Graphs A13 to A15 show the 
presence of absolute convergence across OECD members. While linear regression lines 
indicate divergence (richer countries at the initial period experiencing higher average 
economic growth), the inverse relations indicate convergence (those who were poorer at 
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the beginning of the observation period enjoying higher average economic growth). The 
figures capture both for decade average regressions, the long-period averages, and across 
different groups. 
2.5. Results for cross-section regression and discussion 
 
The results of the regression for absolute β -convergence are summarized in Tables (4). 
The results for σ -convergence are in table (5). Table (3) presents annual growth rate of 
real GDP per capital. The regression results in table (4) suggest that there was a 
substantial divergence across the world economy at large in all the periods under 
consideration when all countries were included in the regression (the values of  β being 
negative and statistically significant) indicating that there is a linear relationship between 
Log of GDP per capita growth and initial Log of GDP per capita). In other words, 
countries that were already rich in each initial period had also high annual growth rate 
over the period in which it is averaged. This is consistent with the results of other 
empirical studies including Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1996a and 1996b) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995), among others. Moreover, there is an evidence for σ -divergence (the 
dispersion of income per capita increasing over time) during all the decades under 
consideration. When all countries are included, the variance of income per capita 
captured by σ 2 increased from 0.778 in 1960 to 0.948 in 1970; to 1.253 in 1980; to 1.483 
in 1990; and to 1.704 in 2000. (See table (5)). When SSA countries were excluded from 
the regression, the implied β-convergence become positive (except for the 1970-2000 
period) though remains statistically insignificant, an indication of the absence of drastic 
divergence across other developing countries relative to OECD countries.  As one would 
expect, Asia seems to have done quite well in narrowing the income gap with OECD, 
though the situation worsened in the period 1990-2000, which obviously is linked to the 
financial crisis many of the countries in the region have experienced during this period 
This can also be seen from statistically significant coefficient of β, though things 
worsened in the 1990s, and slightly declining dispersion in income per capita (σ -
convergence). 
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In contrast, there is a magnificent income divergence between SSA and OECD with the 
strongest statistically significant values for β in all the periods that have been 
investigated in this study. This is also supported by the poorest annual growth 
performance of SSA (table 3) and high and increasing variance in income (an evidence 
for σ-divergence). The income dispersion across OECD and SSA is drastic: the variance 
of per capita income increased from 1.164 in 1960 to 1.416 in 1970; to 1.916 in 1980s; to 
2.315 in 1990; and to 2.679 in 2000.   
 
Though Latin America is slightly better than SSA, it has not either managed to 
substantially narrow its income gap relative to OECD.  The regression results for 
developing countries alone suggest that there was divergence of per capita income 
particularly in the last two periods (1980-2000 and 1990-2000). (See, graphs A9 to A12). 
This is mainly attributed to the presence of outliers (East Asian countries) on the one 
hand, and the severe external shocks Latin America and SSA have experienced during 
these periods, on the other hand. As one would expect, there was a substantial progress in 
narrowing the income gap across OECD countries, though the situation worsened during 
the period (1980-2000). This again is linked to the recessions in most OECD countries in 
the 1980s and the 1990s (see, graphs A13 to A15 in the appendix). 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
The empirical results so far indicate the following conclusions:  
 
• Although there are disputes among economists regarding the measurement of the 
speed at which the growth rates of different economies are approaching to each 
other, there is no doubt that convergence has been a real world phenomenon in 
regional groups with similar economic, institutional and political conditions and 
convergence criteria (OECD and EU).  
• The intensified divergence of the developing nations, notably those in Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin America and South Asia may imply the failure of the 
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process of globalization to generate a proportionate benefit both for poor and rich 
countries in the past two decades. 
• The divergence of Sub-Saharan Africa implies, among other things, that since 33 
of the 41 countries characterized by the World Bank and IMF as HIPCs are in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, this may also suggest that the external shocks negatively 
impacted on the region’s long term economic growth and overall development. 
Having said that, however, since the quality of data for Sub-Saharan Africa has 
been ranked by Alan Heston and Robert Summers as poor, the results of the 
regression should be interpreted with caution.  
• Finally, although the neo-classical growth model predicts convergence in the 
sense that countries with lower initial capital-labor ratio are predicted to have 
higher growth rates, it appears that this is only valid for moderately backward 
countries that belong to a relatively advanced convergence club (poorer members 
of OECD and EU) or for those countries that are well integrated into the global 
economy through foreign trade and investment (East Asia). 
 
3. The augmented Solow model and the conditional convergence debate: 
Revisiting Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) 
 
The previous empirical investigation using the concepts of beta and sigma convergences 
(see, tables (4) and (3)) clearly demonstrate interesting findings in the past four decades. 
First, there was divergence in the cross-sections of the world economy at large 
( )divergence−β and the per capita income dispersion across countries was increasing 
overtime ( )divergence−σ . Second, there is an empirical evidence of income per capita 
convergence across countries with relatively homogenous economic, political and 
institutional parameters (OECD, for example), an empirical confirmation for the validity 
of unconditional convergence. Third, the empirical results for developing countries alone 
suggest that there was no absolute convergence across this group of countries despite 
their heterogeneity in terms of per capita income. In contrast, rather there was a profound 
degree of divergence particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. The greater degree of 
divergence across developing countries in the past two decades is by no means a mere 
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coincidence, but could be the result of the debt crisis and other external shocks. This is 
not, however, to discount the impacts of poor domestic policies and overall 
mismanagement across the developing world. 
 
Though there are seeds of truth in the previous analyses, there are some caveats that need 
to be addressed to check the robustness of the results and the subsequent conclusion. The 
first shortcoming of the previously discussed analyses is linked to selection biasedness 
where countries are apriori chosen and put into groups based on similarities in their 
economic, political and institutional parameters. The second caveat has something to do 
with the empirical strategy that is employed in the convergence debate, which is based on 
a cross-section analysis, which does not allow to control either for country-specific 
events or time-specific factors that may affect countries’ growth performance and the 
subsequent rate of convergence.8  
 
To find a modest remedy to this issue, I have run several regressions, which include but 
not limited to the following: 
 
• The first attempt is to check conditional convergence in the spirit of the 
augmented Solow model during the period 1960-2000, the longest period for 
which data is available for the larger number of countries.  
• Second, like in other similar studies, instead of apriori classifying countries into 
groups, I incorporated initial life expectancy and education, alternatively, and  
investment to GDP ratio to control both for human and physical capital 
accumulations and initial GDP per capita to capture the conditional convergence 
effect. 
• Third, in the context of the above point, to check how the growth rate of 
economies behaved during different decades, I decomposed the entire period into 
decade averages. This has been done for the entire sample, developing countries, 
and for HIPCs alone. The reason is that factors that affect developing countries 
growth performance might differ from those that affect developed ones. 
                                                           
8
 such issues have been broadly discussed by Islam (1995), Hoeffler (2000), among others. 
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• Fourth, switching to a panel data approach, I run both pooled cross-section time 
series and random and fixed effects models. The main reason is that endogeneity 
and omitted variable problems can not be solved in the cross-section framework. 
The fixed effects model allows researchers on growth to control for time-specific 
factors (decade-specific factors in this case) and country-specific factors that are 
peculiar to the sample countries. Moreover, since the HIPCs dummy has always 
been negative and significant in the cross-section approach, the model did not 
explain the factors that account for HIPCs poor growth performance. As one of 
the reasons for this to happen may be linked to the missing variables that may 
determine the growth rate of this group but are not included, the fixed effects 
model is used to take care of this problem.  
 
3.1. The Textbook Solow Model 
 
 ( ) ( ) αα −= 1)()( tLtAtKY                                                                              
 (1.12) 
                               10 α  
 
Where, Y, K, A, L, and α  stand for output, capital, the level of technology, labour, and 
the share of capital in the production function, respectively. The model assumes that both 
the growth rates of population and technology are exogenously determined. Therefore, 
the level of technology and labor are expected to grow in the following ways: 
 
gteAtA )0()( =                                                                                             
       (1.12a) 
nteLtL )0()( =
                                                                                                        (1.12b)
 
ε+= aA )0ln(                                                                                                        (1.12c) 
 
The model also assumes that the number of effective units of labor, A(t)L(t), grows at 
rate gn + .     
 
Now, defining  
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   AL
Yy =   is output per effective labour  
AL
Kk =  is capital per effective labour     
The evolution of k is determined by: 
 
( ) ( )δ++−=• gnsytk                                                    (1.13) 
 
    = ( ) ( ) ( )tkgntsk δα ++−                                            (1.14) 

The steady state value of capital per effective labor,  
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Substituting equation (1.15) into the production function and taking logs, they arrived at 
the steady state income per capita:  
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g+δ = assumed as constant across countries 
A(0) = resource endowments, climate, institutions, etc. 
lnA(0) = α + ε, where α and ε are a constant and country specific shocks respectively. 
 
3.2. The augmented Solow model and its empirical specification 
 
The augmented Solow model considers Cobb-Douglas production function, where output 
(Y) is a function of both physical and human capital.   
 

βαβα −−
=
1)(ALHKY 

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Defining
AL
Hh = , and leaving y and k as defined above, the production function in 
intensive form can be written as:  
 
βα hky = 
 
The evolution of k and h, therefore, take the following form: 
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In the steady state, the levels of physical and human capital per effective labour are 
constant. Thus, setting (1.2a) and (1.2b) to zero and solving the resulting equation gives 
the following steady state values: 
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Substituting (1.2c and 1.2d) into the production function (1.2/) and taking logs produces:  
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Measuring the speed of convergence  
 
Following Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), the Solow model makes quantitative 
predictions about the speed of convergence to the steady state. Taking y* as the steady-
state level of income per effective worker given by equations (1.2c and 1.2d), and let y(t) 
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be the actual value at time t. Approximating around the steady state, the speed of 
convergence is given by the following relationship: 

[ ]))(ln()ln())(ln( * tyy
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)1)(( βαδλ −−++= gn                                                      (1.5) 
 
From equation (1.4), they move to a regression equation that measures the speed of 
convergence. 
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Subtracting y(0) from both sides, 
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An empirical counterpart to (1.8) is given as:  
 
))0(ln(.)ln(4.)ln(3.)ln(2.1))0(ln())(ln( ygnssyty hk ϕδβϕβϕβϕβ −++−++=−       
(1.11) 
where: te λϕ −−= 1  
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     Where, [ ] ϕβ *)0(ln1 A=  
 
The Hausman specification test for the random and fixed effects model 
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The Hausman specification test helps to decide whether it is the random effects model or 
the fixed effects one that is more appropriate to be used. STATA provides with the 
computed hausman for 
∧
REβ (random effects model) and 
∧
FEβ  (fixed effects model), 
where 
∧
REβ and 
∧
FEβ are consitent under the null hypothesis ( ) 0,:0 =itit XEH ε but this is 
not happening if the null hypothesis does not hold. The 
∧
FEβ is consistent regardless of the 
null hypothesis. The 
∧
REβ is BLUE, consistent and asymptotically efficient under the null 
hypothesis, turn into inconsistent if the null hypotheisis fails to be true. 
 
The Hausman test statistics is based on the differences between the estimated coefficients 
on the two models (
∧
REβ and 
∧
FEβ ), whereby both models are equally specified. Then, the 
Hausman test can be written as follows (Greene, 2003, among others): 
 
(
∧
FEβ -
∧
REβ )/ [
∧
V {
∧
}FEβ -
∧
V {
∧
REβ }]-1(
∧
FEβ -
∧
REβ ) 
 
This under the null hypothesis is asymptotically distributed as 2Kχ , where K stands for 
the degrees of freedom. STATA provides both the 2Kχ  and its probability based on which 
one can either opt for the random or fixed effects model. 
 
 
3.3. Previous empirical studies on conditional convergence 
 
Despite the disputes among economists, there is a bulk of empirical evidence on 
conditional convergence across countries once the variables that affect the steady state 
are controlled for. Barro (1991) is one the first in this regard, where using data for 98 
countries in the period 1960-85, he shows that initial capital is negatively correlated with 
the growth rate of GDP per capita, controlling for both human and physical capital 
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accumulation, and other policy variables. Human capital is believed to play a key role in 
achieving accelerated economic growth from various fronts (Barro, 1991, p. 409).9  
 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) tested the absolute convergence hypothesis using a 
sample of 98 non-oil exporting countries, 75 intermediated countries and 22 OECD 
countries in the period 1960-85. Their results indicate that the log of GDP per working-
age population is correlated positively with the investment and negatively with 
population growth. Next, adding human capital accumulation to their model, while 
population continues to have a negative impact on GDP per working-age person in 1985, 
education and investment are positively correlated with GDP.  
 
Here it is important to note two points: First, after controlling for education, the impact of 
investment is now in line with the predictions. Second, once education is incorporated 
into the regression, the explanation power of the model has jumped from 59% to 78% for 
non-oil exporting countries. The jump in the R2 is quite high for the other groups as well. 
Turning to the log difference in GDP per working-age (1960-85) as a dependent variable, 
while they find an evidence for unconditional convergence across OECD, the remaining 
groups have not demonstrated unconditional convergence. Finally, turning to the 
augmented Solow framework, where schooling (a proxy for human capital accumulation) 
was added, all groups have demonstrated conditional convergence and the overall 
explanatory power of the model has improved substantially. Tsangarides (2000) using a 
sample of 22 OECD and 42 African countries in the period 1960-90, indicates that while 
                                                           
9
 Following Romer (1980, in Barro 1991), it is a fundamental input into the research sector, which is 
indispensable for technological progress. The empirical evidence also seems to suggest that countries with 
higher stock of human capital have a greater tendency to grow faster. As argued by Nelson and Phelps (in: 
Barro, 1991, p. 409), a larger stock of human capital also makes it easier for nations to imitate new ideas 
developed elsewhere. This gives the country that is a follower an enormous advantage to catch up relatively 
quickly towards those that are advanced. However, it appears that it is not only total education that matters for 
log-run economic growth. The quantity-quality trade offs and the distribution of education among men and 
women are issues that are on the agenda in recent empirical studies on economic growth and development. It 
seems that high total education if accompanied by gender inequality may not be extremely helpful for long-
run economic growth. Klasen (2002) empirically shows that lower gender inequality may enhance economic 
growth through its direct externality effects (by feeding the economy with more educated labor force), and 
through its indirect externality effects, operating through demographic effects, lower gender inequality means 
higher education for women increasing the opportunity cost of women not to work and this leads to  lower 
rate of fertility, which ultimately downsizes the population growth rate and increases capital deepening and 
growth, among other things. 
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there was an empirical evidence for unconditional convergence across  OECD countries, 
he finds unconditional convergence for Africa only in the fixed effects model.10 
3.4. Data description, results of the regression and discussion 
 
Table (3.1) 
Economic growth, capital accumulation, and population growth (1960-2000) 
  Heavily   indebted   poor   countries      Non-Heavily  Indebted   countries 
Variables 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-2000 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-2000 
GDPG1 1.5 0.56 -0.75 -0.45 3.08 3.02 1.42 2.13 
Log (INV)2 2 2.3 2.54 2.73 2.17 2.77 3.2 3.13 
Log 
(SCHL)3 0.38 0.46 0.57 0.81 0.75 0.92 1.27 1.38 
Log 
(LIFE)4 3.56 3.65 3.73 3.77 3.68 3.76 3.83 4.03 
 Log 
(POPG)5 2.5 2.65 2.74 2.66 2.34 2.09 2.1 1.82 
1. the growth rate of log of real GDP per capita 
2. the log of average investment to GDP ratio 
3. the log of education (initial period value for each decade) 
4. the log of total life expectancy at birth (the initial period of each decade) 
5. the log of the growth rate of the population +0.05  
 
Source: own calculations based data from the PWT 6.1, and the World Development  
       Indicators, 2001 CD-ROM 
 
The results of the cross-section regressions of the entire sample are in tables (6-12). 
Tables (4 and 5) present variables used in the regressions and their descriptive statistics. 
Tables (14 and 15) present the cross-section pooled time series and random and fixed 
effects models, respectively for the entire sample of observations. The corresponding 
descriptive statistics are presented in table (13). Tables (17) and (23) present the cross-
section regression for developing countries alone, while table (16) presents the 
descriptive statistics for the data. Tables (25 and 26) present the cross-section pooled time 
series and random and fixed effects models, respectively for developing countries alone; 
and the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in table (24). Table (27) 
presents descriptive statistics for HIPCs panel data and  tables (28) and (29) present 
                                                           
10
 Hoeffler, (2000) using the augmented Solow growth framework and taking a sample of 85 countries (in 
most cases) during the period from 1960-89, with the panel data of four-year non-overlapping averages 
indicates several problems linked to both the OLS approach and the African dummy. Hoeffler (2000) 
concludes that using the first difference GMM model is appropriate for in international growth comparison.   
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regression results for cross-section pooled time series and random and fixed effects 
models, respectively for HIPCs. Finally Table (30) contains the list of countries that are 
considered in the convergence analysis in this work.  
 
Table (3.1) shows the differences in growth, investment, schooling, life expectancy, and 
the growth rate of the population between HIPCs and non-HIPCs. The differences are 
strikingly significant: The growth rate for HIPCs in the 1960s was about 1.5% compared 
to around 3% for non-HIPCs counterparts. During this decade, HIPCs had quite 
comparable figures in all the indicators in table (3.1). Although the growth rate failed to 
0.56% in the 1970s, it seems that the worst was about to come. In fact, HIPCs, on 
average, had negative growth rates throughout the 1980s and 1990s. What is even more 
puzzling is that the deterioration in growth occurred despite improvements in investment 
ratios, which puts both the quality of the data and investment under serious suspicion.  
 
Now, turning to the results themselves, in regressions (6-12), while the average 
investment to GDP ratio and initial education and initial life expectancy at birth, boost 
income per capita growth; in contrast, the average growth rate of population, in most 
cases, punishes it. The initial GDP per capita is inversely correlated with that of the 
growth of GDP per capita, an indication of conditional convergence, holding investment, 
education (life expectancy) and population growth rate constant. The results here are 
generally consistent with the findings of most previous empirical studies.  
 
My attempt in the framework of a cross-section regression was to figure out the extent to 
which heavily indebted poor countries’  (HIPCs) growth performance had been deviating 
from the other group of countries in the sample. In the first decade (1960-69, see, table 
6), the HIPCs dummy was negative and significant perhaps indicating that this group of 
countries had a relatively poorer growth performance during the decade while there was 
a wide-spread growth across the world. Moving to the 1970s and 1980s (tables 7 and 8), 
now HIPCs’  dummy became negative and relatively significant. In the 1990s, the 
coefficient for this dummy was the highest in all the preceding decades and highly 
statistically significant, reflecting among other things, the impact of the debt crisis to this 
group during this decade. To capture the turbulence period of the 1980s and 1990s, I ran 
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the (1980-2000) log of GDP per capita growth against the 1980 log of real GDP per 
capita, controlling for investment and education. The results indicate that this period was 
in particular unfavorable to this group of countries. The coefficient on the initial log of 
GDP per capita is also the lowest among all the other regressions. The longest period 
(1960-2000, presented in table 10) also indicates the deviation of this group from the rest 
of the countries in the sample. 
 
HIPCs’  dummy did not change substantially even when I run separate regressions for 
developing countries alone. In the first decade (1960-69), for instance, HIPCs did not 
deviate too much from the rest of the developing world (table 21). While the 1970s and 
1980s were quite unfavorable for this group, the 1990s seem to be even worse for HIPCs 
as a whole, where there is an indication of a dramatic lag in terms of economic growth 
(table 20). The longest period regression (1960-2000) also indicates that this group of 
countries, on average, has the lowest economic growth relative to the rest of the world 
during the entire past 40 years. 
  
Switching to the panel data analysis, the first attempt was to run a cross-section pooled 
time series regression for all observations (see table 14). The result now indicates that 
while all the variables remain as in the previously discussed cross-section regressions, 
HIPCs continues to have experienced a more sluggish economic growth as opposed to the 
rest of the countries under investigation in this study. It is also interesting to note the 
coefficients on the decade dummies included to capture decade-specific factors that may 
hinder economic growth. The results seem to suggest that while the 1960s is the most 
favorable decade, followed by the 1970s, the remaining two decades, the 1980s and 
1990s were very poor ones for growth performance. It is also equally important to note 
that the whole explanatory power of the regression has now increased after the inclusion 
of the HIPCs’  and decades’  dummies relative to the simple cross-section regression that 
was discussed earlier. The R2 in every regression where HIPCs dummy is included is 
higher than when it has dropped. 
 
Similarly, staying further in the spirit of the panel data approach, while the random 
effects model generates almost similar results as that of the cross-section pooled time 
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series regression, the fixed effects model results confirm that the 1980s were harsh for 
HIPCs.11 Isolating developing countries from the developed ones, the cross-section 
pooled time series regression (table 25) indicates that while they all were doing well in 
the 1960s and 1970s, things had changed for the worse in the 1980s, which got even 
worse in the 1990s. Moreover, HIPCs themselves have experienced a drastic 
deterioration in economic growth during these decades (see also table 3.3). The fixed 
effects model again confirms that the 1980s were in fact the worst period for developing 
countries as a whole.  
 
The fact that the HIPCs dummy was always significant and negative does indicate the 
problem of the augmented Solow model in explaining why some countries remain poor 
while others remain rich. Other empirical researchers have often encountered similar 
problems in empirical studies based on cross-section or panel of a large sample of 
countries. As   Hoeffler (2000, p. 32) puts it,” the coefficient on the Africa dummy is 
significant and negative. This confirms the commonly found result in the literature when 
unobserved country specific effects and endogeneity are not accounted for, i.e, the Solow 
growth model appears to be unable to account for the growth experience of African 
economies” .12 
 
My final attempt was to run a separate cross-section pooled time series and random and 
fixed effects models for HIPCs alone. The objective here is to empirically explore to 
what extent the growth rate of these economies were converging towards themselves or 
rather diverging from each other. The results for cross-section pooled time series 
                                                           
11
 The theoretical justification for using a fixed effects model to study the convergence hypothesis is linked 
to several explanation. First, it is not possible to control for all variations across countries in the cross-
section framework, which gives rise to the omitted variable problem, among other things. Secondly, since 
the HIPCs dummy has always carried a negative coefficient, this may imply the failure of the augmented 
model to explain the factors that account for the growth-rate differences of this group. This may be due to 
missing important factors that affect the growth rate of this group, but are not included in the regression. 
Thirdly, endogeneity problem (the possibility that some of the covariates may be correlated to each other 
and leads to biased estimators). The fixed efects model should helo to control for country-specific factors 
that affect the determinants of long-run growth.  
12
 See, Englebert (2000) for the discussion of the ‚mystery‘ of the African dummy. 
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regressions are presented in table (28).13 The first attempt was to check if there is an 
empirical evidence for absolute convergence. The results in column 1 of table (28) 
indicate that there is, in fact, a per capita income convergence across these countries, 
controlling for investment and population growth rate. This may seem to suggest that 
these countries have all moved towards poor growth path, which may be in line with what 
Quah called ‘polarization’  in his “ twin peaks”  analysis. Then, moving to the conditional 
convergence hypothesis, I added the log of initial life expectancy index, now the 
coefficient on the initial GDP per capita decreases and the explanatory power of the 
model improves, though very marginally. The last attempt is to control for decade 
dummies as the global macroeconomic fluctuations during different decades did not 
benefit or hurt all developing countries equally. This time, while the coefficient on log of 
initial per capita income increases, the life expectancy index, which was negative 
previously, now turned into positive, though remain insignificant.14 The signs on decade 
dummies are as one would expect: While HIPCs on average enjoyed economic growth 
during the 1960s (also called the “ Golden age” ), and to a great extent also in the 1970s, 
things dramatically changed for worse in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
Since country-specific factors, that may affect economic growth are not incorporated. I 
finally shifted to the fixed effects model, that allows to overcome the problem of omitted 
variable, and other bottlenecks that the cross-section framework is suffering from (the 
results are in table 29). The results for the random effects model are similar to that of the 
cross-section pooled time series model that was discussed. The results in the fixed effects 
model, which allows to control for country-specific effects, in addition to the traditional 
covariates suggest that there is a significant indication of conditional convergence across 
HIPCs, which may again imply convergence towards a poverty trap rather than to a 
standard steady state. The decade dummies also indicate the worst period for the 1980s, 
though larger coefficients for the constant term, which also capture the decade dummy 
                                                           
13
 Since data on education for those HIPCs that are included in the regresion is missing, cross-section 
analysis was unlikely, though it may have been helpful. 
14
 The negative sign on life expectancy does not mean that human capital hurts economic growth. Hoeffler 
(2000), using Barro-Lee data set for education also found a negative coefficient on education. Tsangarides 
(2000) who also found an insignificant coefficient on education variable argues that this does not mean 
human capital accumulation does not help African economies but it might be rather due largely to 
multicollinearity or simply measurement error.   
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for the 1990s that was left out, is a bit puzzling. One possible explanation for such a high 
constant term in the fixed effects model may be that countries had a very high growth at 
the beginning of the 1960s which was turned down as the result of the debt crisis in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
3.5. Conclusion and the policy implications  
 
The objective of this paper was to figure out the extent to which the growth rate 
difference in real income per capita across countries has improved in the past four 
decades. The availability of the fresh international data set (the Penn World table 6.1) 
makes it possible to carry out the empirical analysis across countries and over time. The 
first attempt was to find an empirical evidence for the unconditional convergence 
hypothesis. The results seem to suggest that there was no absolute (unconditional) 
convergence across the world economy at large in the past four decades. In contrast, the 
gap between poor and rich countries increased over time, perhaps reaching its climax in 
the 1980s and 1990s. From the analysis it also implies that SSA, on average, comes out to 
be the most affected region in terms of its degree of divergence from the rest of the 
world. In fact, this region, on average, has virtually been outrun by all developing regions 
in all essential economic and social indicators in the 1980s in particular. Since 33 of the 
41 countries characterized by the World Bank as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) 
are located in this region, the primary legitimate suspect in this regard is the debt crisis of 
the 1980s that drove many of the poor nations into a deeper vicious circle of poverty.  
 
On the contrary, there was a magnificent degree of unconditional convergence across 
countries with similar economic, political and institutional parameters and convergence 
criteria (OECD). This may suggest that unconditional convergence is an exception rather 
than a rule and that poverty is not a guarantee for convergence. In other words, 
unconditional convergence is purely a phenomena to moderately backward countries that 
are lucky to join an advanced economic club or to those that are well integrated into the 
global economy through trade and foreign investment (South East Asia, for instance). 
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Turning to the conditional convergence debate, the results are quite consistent with the 
predictions of the augmented Solow model. First, the results suggest that while 
investment in human and physical capital enhances growth of per capita income, the 
growth rate of the population, in most cases, harms it. Second, controlling for human and 
physical capital accumulations, and population growth rate, there is an evidence for 
conditional convergence across countries in the past four decades. The HIPCs dummy 
that was included to control for the impact of indebtedness, indicates that HIPCs growth 
performance had indeed been terribly worse relative to non-HIPCs. Finally, the decade 
dummies incorporated to control for decade-specific effects suggest that the 1980s and 
1990s were indeed the worst decades in terms of income per capita convergence 
 
The Policy implications of this paper 
 
The policy implication from this study is quite apparent. The first policy implication is 
that poor countries should invest scarce resources into education and capital formation if 
long-run growth that could lead to accelerated convergence is to be achieved. Second, the 
fact that heavily indebted poor countries did not grow despite huge foreign debt build up 
and substantial foreign aid transfers may imply that either these resources had been 
virtually eaten up, deposited in foreign banks in the form of capital flight, and /or 
invested in projects that were totally ineffective. In fact, the past inherited external debt 
of poor nations has become a chronic development bottleneck and a factor of instability 
rather than a growth accelerator. This calls for a radical policy change that encompasses 
governments’  accountability, the role of the international financial institutions, donor 
governments and the broader international community. The situations in many poor 
countries indicate that they are converging to such unbearable phase of poverty that many 
of them are on the verge of collapse as nations, which may have fatal spill-over effects in 
terms of both regional and global peace and security in the decades ahead. An ancient 
wisdom “ you can’ t sleep in peace unless your neighbour does so”  is a case in point here. 
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Table (1) 
Definitions of variables and sources 
Variables  Definitions Sources 
GDPG Growth rate of the logarithm of 
GDP per capita (PPP-adjusted) 
The Penn World Tables 6.1 
Alan Heston and Robert 
Summers 
LGDP The logarithm of GDP per capita 
(PPP-adjusted) (initial period 
value) 
The Penn World Tables 6.1 
Alan Heston and Robert 
Summers 
INV The logarithm of the average level 
of investment to GDP ratio 
The Penn World Table     
(PWT, 6.1) 
LLIFE The logarithm of the index of life 
expectancy (initial period value) 
The World Development 
Indicators, 2001, The World 
Bank 
LSCHOOL Percentage of the total population 
aged 15 and above who have at 
least some secondary school 
education  (which is the sum of 
“ secondary school attained, 
secondary school complete, higher 
school attained, and higher school 
complete” ) 
Barro-Lee education data set 
(2000) 
Ln (n+g+ )δ  The average growth rate of the 
population and the rate of 
depreciation 
The World Development 
Indicators, 2001, The World 
Bank 
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Table (2) 
Descriptive statistics for all observations (1960-2000) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LGDP60 113 7.714 0.882 5.948 9.607 
LGDP70 114 8.008 0.973 5.811 9.924 
LGDP80 114 8.180 1.119 4.018 10.192 
LGDP90 114 8.268 1.218 3.614 10.630 
GDPG6069 113 2.835 2.268 -3.163 8.881 
GDPG7079 113 2.252 2.776 -6.296 10.772 
GDPG8089 114 0.909 2.554 -4.412 10.489 
GDPG902000 114 1.356 2.541 -7.056 10.012 
GDPG602000 113 1.688 2.058 -10.483 6.131 
GDPG702000 114 1.319 2.447 14.987 6.105 
GDPG802000 114 1.117 2.016 -4.655 6.257 
LLIFE60 109 3.928 0.247 3.45 4.3 
LLIFE70 109 4.006 0.218 3.54 4.31 
LLIFE80 109 4.069 0.205 3.57 4.34 
LLIFE90 111 4.128 0.194 3.56 4.37 
LSHOOL60 90 2.533 1.179 -0.1053 4.5705 
LSCHOOL70 92 2.844 1.154 0.0953 4.6643 
LSCHOOL80 96 3.265 1.053 0.1823 5.0530 
LSCHOOL90 98 3.548 0.960 0.8329 4.9530 
LINV6069 114 2.7928 0.9410 0.001 4.011 
LINV7079 112 2.9865 0.8272 0.177 4.438 
LINV8089 114 2.8742 0.6780 0.815 4.369 
LINV6099 112 2.6443 0.6633 0.706 3.888 
LINV7099 112 2.6701 0.6461 0.771 4.01 
LINV8099 114 2.6515 0.6389 1.068 4.018 
LINV9099 114 2.7221 0.7355 0.707 4.103 
Source: see table (1) 
 
Table (3) 
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita  
Region (group) 1960-69 70-79 80-89 90-2000 60-2000 70-2000 80-2000 
All countries 2.83 2.25 0.90 1.35 1.68 1.31 1.11 
OECD+SSA 2.73 1.66 0.69 0.72 1.13 0.74 0.65 
OECD+ASIA 3.66 3.18 2.36 2.31 2.90 2.63 2.40 
OECD+LA1 3.14 2.51 0.77 1.92 2.11 1.76 1.40 
AFR+ASIA+LA 2.45 2.09 0.50 1.23 1.39 1.04 0.83 
OECD 3.82 2.48 1.91 1.84 2.52 2.19 1.96 
SSA 1.94 1.13 0.05 0.04 0.41 -0.07 -0.05 
HIPCs2 1.50 0.56 -0.75 -0.45 -0.25 -0.80 -0.67 
Source: own calculations based on PWT 6.1 
1. LA = Latin Amrica. 2. Hevily indebted poor  countries 
 49
Table (4) 
Regression results for cross-sections of countries 
Countries Period No. Obs. βa R2 t-valueb Probability 
All 1960-2000 113 -0.06 0.026 1.75 0.08 
  1970-2000 113 -0.08 0.023 1.65 0.10 
  1980-2000 114 -0.12 0.100 3.57 0.00 
  1990-2000 114 -0.18 0.063 2.75 0.00 
OECD 1960-2000 75 0.04 0.008 -0.91 0.36 
and 1970-2000 75 -0.04 0.007 -0.22 0.29 
Non-SSA 1980-2000 75 0.11 0.005 -0.59 0.59 
  1990-2000 75 0.07 0.024 -1.64 0.10 
        
OECD 1960-2000 62 -0.08 0.059 2.45 0.00 
and 1970-2000 63 -0.10 0.082 2.10 0.03 
SSA 1980-2000 63 -0.14 0.252 4.71 0.00 
  1990-2000 63 -0.20 0.143 3.09 0.00 
        
OECD 1960-2000 40 0.06 0.064 -1.61 0.11 
and 1970-2000 41 0.07 0.070 -1.99 0.05 
ASIA 1980-2000 41 0.09 0.125 -2.28 0.02 
  1990-2000 41 0.11 0.107 -2.11 0.04 
        
OECD 1960-2000 42 -0.07 0.041 1.46 0.15 
and 1970-2000 43 -0.07 0.034 1.29 0.20 
Latin America 1980-2000 43 -0.02 0.143 2.73 0.00 
  1990-2000 43 0.21 0.021 -1.08 0.28 
        
AFRICA, 1960-2000 89 -0.01 0.001 0.38 0.70 
ASIA, 1970-2000 89 -0.03 0.002 0.46 0.64 
and  1980-2000 89 -0.12 0.061 2.54 0.01 
L.America 1990-2000 89 -0.21 0.070 2.61 0.01 
        
OECD 1960-2000 23 0.10 0.631 -5.49 0.00 
  1970-2000 24 0.17 0.325 -3.08 0.00 
  1980-2000 24 0.15 0.149 -1.82 0.08 
  1990-2000 24 0.30 0.249 -2.58 0.01 
 
Note: Heteroskedasticity has been corrected using the White direct method for correcting  
          heteroscedasticity, which is available in E-Views package. 
a. β  has been computed from the OLS regression coefficient on initial GDP per capita using the    
    following formula: 
( )
T
bT+
−=
1lnβ , where b is the coefficient on the initial GDP per capita and T is 
the time period over which the growth rate is averaged. 
b.the t-values represent for the coefficient on the initial GDP per capita (LGDPI), which is “ b” , which has 
not been reported here for space consumption reasons. 
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Table (5) 
Variance of GDP per capita (σ- convergence) 
Regions Years Variance ( 2σ ) Regions Years Variance ( 2σ ) 
  GDP60 0.7788   GDP60 0.6345 
  GDP69 0.9117   GDP69 0.7093 
  GDP70 0.9480 OECD & GDP70 0.7227 
All GDP79 1.0574 Non-SSA GDP79 0.7462 
  GDP80 1.2532 
  
GDP80 0.7755 
  GDP89 1.4259 
  
GDP89 0.8322 
  GDP90 1.4839 
  
GDP90 0.8556 
  GDP2000 1.7045 
  
GDP2000 0.8752 
  GDP60 1.1649 
  
GDP60 0.3520 
  GDP69 1.3679 
  
GDP69 0.4008 
  GDP70 1.4160 
  
GDP70 0.4256 
OECD&SSA GDP79 1.5798 SSA GDP79 0.4598 
  
GDP80 1.9168 
  
GDP80 0.7107 
  
GDP89 2.2139 
  
GDP89 0.8618 
  
GDP90 2.3153 
  
GDP90 0.9022 
  
GDP2000 2.6796 
  
GDP2000 1.1105 
  
GDP60 0.9051 
  
GDP60 0.4377 
  
GDP69 0.9756 
  
GDP69 0.5239 
  
GDP70 0.9748 
  
GDP70 0.5497 
OECD and  GDP79 0.9548 AFRICA, ASIA,  GDP79 0.6565 
 ASIA GDP80 0.9887 and GDP80 0.8414 
  
GDP89 0.9569 
 L. America (LA) GDP89 0.9557 
  
GDP90 0.9816 
  
GDP90 0.9945 
  
GDP2000 0.9267 
  
GDP2000 1.2208 
  
GDP60 0.5102 
  
GDP60 0.1502 
  
GDP69 0.6282 
  
GDP69 0.0824 
  
GDP70 0.6265 
  
GDP70 0.0725 
OECD and GDP79 0.6398 OECD GDP79 0.0499 
L. America GDP80 0.6734   GDP80 0.0614 
  GDP89 0.8465   GDP89 0.0540 
  GDP90 0.8865   GDP90 0.0702 
  GDP2000 0.8739   GDP2000 0.0532 
 
Source: Own calculations using the PWT  (6.1) data base 
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Conditional convergence 
A. Results for cross-section regression for all  
 
Table (6) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1960-69) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 3.489 
(1.32) 
4.971* 
(1.84) 
-6.534* 
(-1.71) 
-4.884 
(-1.14) 
LGDP60 -0.429 
(-1.18) 
-0.569 
(-1.56) 
-0.647* 
(-1.91) 
-0.670** 
(-1.97) 
LINV6069 1.084*** 
(5.0) 
0.994*** 
(4.56) 
0.927*** 
(3.9) 
0.903 
(3.77) 
LSCHL60 0.332 
(1.37) 
0.336 
(1.42) 
  
LLIFE60   3.219** 
(2.39) 
2.894** 
(2.06) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.537*** 
(-2.57) 
-0.515** 
(-2.50) 
-0.393* 
(-1.84) 
-0.398* 
(-1.86) 
HIPCs  -1.001* 
(-1.97) 
 -0.433 
(-0.85) 
No. of Observation 88 88 107 107 
R2 0.37 0.40 0.33 0.34 
 
For all regression results , the asterisks *, **, and *** indicate significance leveles at 10%, 5% and 1% , 
respectively. 
 
 
Table (7) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1970-79) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 4.725 
(1.35) 
8.105** 
(2.34) 
-20.018*** 
(-3.57) 
-16.261*** 
(-2.72) 
LGDP70 -1.301*** 
(-2.77) 
-1.55*** 
(-3.44) 
-1.374*** 
(-3.89) 
-1.414*** 
(-4.03) 
LINV7079 1.901*** 
(5.42) 
1.623*** 
(4.74) 
1.555*** 
(4.67) 
1.448*** 
(4.31) 
LSCHL70 0.824** 
(2.46) 
0.792** 
(2.5) 
  
LLIFE70   6.918*** 
(3.93) 
6.192*** 
(3.45) 
Log (n+g+δ ) 0.053 
(0.17) 
0.038 
(0.13) 
0.392* 
(1.73) 
0.414* 
(1.84) 
HIPCs  -2.144 
(0.13) 
 -0.998* 
(-1.68) 
No. of Observation 88 88 105 105 
R2 0.33 0.41 0.44 0.46 
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Table (8) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1980-89) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 4.339 
(1.52) 
6.625** 
(2.14) 
-0.871 
(-0.14) 
3.522 
(0.53) 
LGDP80 -0.972** 
(-2.51) 
-1.097*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.980*** 
(-3.23) 
-1.128*** 
(-3.66) 
LINV8089 1.956*** 
(4.65) 
1.705*** 
(3.88) 
1.958*** 
(4.57) 
1.735*** 
(3.97) 
LSCHL80 0.175 
(0.56) 
0.107 
(0.35) 
  
LLIFE80   1.44 
(0.77) 
0.915 
(0.49) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.843*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.863*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.857*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.90*** 
(-3.58) 
HIPCs  -1.149* 
(-1.78) 
 -1.218** 
(-2.03) 
No. of Observation 95 95 108 108 
R2 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.40 
 
 
Table (9) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1990-2000) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 4.706 
(1.58) 
8.587*** 
(2.84) 
-13.762* 
(-1.8) 
-4.593 
(-0.57) 
LGDP90 -0.908** 
(-2.23) 
-1.131*** 
(-2.9) 
-0.980*** 
(-2.69) 
-1.061*** 
(-3.0) 
LINV902000 1.273*** 
(3.12) 
0.987** 
(2.51) 
1.215*** 
(2.87) 
0.973** 
(2.32) 
LSCHL90 0.683* 
(1.88) 
0.448 
(1.28) 
  
LLIFE90   5.071 
(2.26) 
3.285 
(1.45) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.876 
(-2.57) 
-0.794** 
(-2.46) 
-0.547* 
(-1.71) 
-0.531* 
(-1.71) 
HIPCs  -2.304*** 
(-3.48) 
 -1.897*** 
(-2.78) 
No. of Observation 97 97 110 110 
R2 0.24 0.33 0.23 0.29 
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Table (10) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1960-2000) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 7.642*** 
(3.91) 
10.07*** 
(5.51) 
-10.702*** 
(-2.75) 
-6.779* 
(-1.81) 
LGDP60 -1.221*** 
(-4.85) 
-1.386*** 
(-6.09) 
-1.503*** 
(-5.87) 
-1.621*** 
(-6.77) 
LINV6099 1.546*** 
(6.96) 
1.162*** 
(5.39) 
1.23 
(4.28) 
0.845*** 
(2.99) 
LSCHL60 0.441*** 
(2.73) 
0.490*** 
(3.38) 
  
LLIFE60   5.473*** 
(4.56) 
5.056*** 
(4.51) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.711*** 
(-4.04) 
-0.676*** 
(-4.29) 
-0.376* 
(-1.64) 
-0.356* 
(-1.68) 
HIPCs  -1.582*** 
(-4.62) 
 -1.563*** 
(-4.08) 
No. of Observation 86 86 105 105 
R2 0.55 0.64 0.54 0.60 
 
 
Table (11) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1970-2000) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 9.409** 
(4.18) 
11.928*** 
(5.63) 
-16.421*** 
(-2.78) 
-11.256* 
(-1.91) 
LGDP70 -1.626*** 
(-5.57) 
-1.781*** 
(-6.57) 
-1.806*** 
(-6.25) 
-1.889*** 
(-6.79) 
LINV7099 1.876*** 
(6.85) 
1.413*** 
(5.24) 
1.614*** 
(4.25) 
1.24*** 
(3.28) 
LSCHL70 0.652*** 
(3.2) 
0.655*** 
(3.55) 
  
LLIFE70   7.190*** 
(4.25) 
6.414*** 
(3.9) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.804*** 
(-3.8) 
-0.768*** 
(-4.0) 
-0.469* 
(-1.64) 
-0.469* 
(-1.71) 
HIPCs  -1.761*** 
(-4.38) 
 -1.564*** 
(-3.13) 
No. of Observation 89 89 106 106 
R2 0.51 0.60 0.51 0.56 
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Table (12) 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of real GDP per capita (1980-2000) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 6.644*** 
(3.06) 
9.759*** 
(4.47) 
-1.746 
(-0.35) 
2.814 
(0.58) 
LGDP80 -1.153*** 
(-4.06) 
-1.328*** 
(-4.94) 
-0.748*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.907*** 
(-4.09) 
LINV8099 1.781*** 
(5.44) 
1.401*** 
(4.37) 
1.679*** 
(4.74) 
1.293*** 
(3.7) 
LSCHL80 0.374 
(1.60) 
0.287 
(1.31) 
  
LLIFE80   1.485 
(1.04) 
1.032 
(0.76) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -1.00*** 
(-4.4) 
-0.990*** 
(-4.65) 
-0.784*** 
(-3.51) 
-0.772*** 
(-3.66) 
HIPCs  -1.729*** 
(-3.83) 
 -1.618*** 
(-3.71) 
No. of Observation 95 95 108 108 
R2 0.43 0.51 0.43 0.50 
 
 
B. Regression results for panel data (decade averages (1960-2000) -All 
 
Table (13) 
Descriptive statistics for panel data (1960-2000)-All 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GDPG 454 1.8354 2.6428 -7.0562 10.7724 
LGDPI 455 1.8354 1.074 3.6144 10.6306 
LLIFE 438 4.0336 0.2291 3.45 4.37 
SCHOOL 358 1.1944 1.1302 0.001 5.742 
INV 359 3.3196 0.3956 1.98 4.32 
Ln(n+g+δ ) 452 2.0253 1.061 -3.634 5.9592 
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Table  (14) 
Cross-section pooled time series (1960-2000)-All 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 5.157*** 
(3.47) 
8.176*** 
(5.37) 
7.429*** 
(5.06) 
-2.321 
(-0.87) 
2.167 
(0.77) 
-5.529* 
(-1.79) 
LGDPI -1.039*** 
(-5.04) 
-1.247*** 
(-6.19) 
-1.212*** 
(-6.3) 
-0.912*** 
(-5.24) 
-1.028*** 
(-5.97) 
-1.013*** 
(-6.17) 
LINV 1.907*** 
(10.5) 
1.594*** 
(8.72) 
1.409*** 
(7.72) 
1.878*** 
(10.52) 
1.686*** 
(9.37) 
1.415*** 
(7.73) 
LSCHL 0.272* 
(1.77) 
0.253* 
(1.71) 
0.482*** 
(3.2) 
   
LLIFE    1.678** 
(2.02) 
1.02 
(1.23) 
2.95*** 
(3.36) 
LPOPG -0.592*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.574*** 
(-4.18) 
-0.574*** 
(-4.37) 
-0.328** 
(-2.51) 
-0.325*** 
(-2.54) 
-0.257*** 
(-2.10) 
HIPCs  -1.825*** 
(-5.69) 
-1.621*** 
(-5.25). 
 -1.385*** 
(-4.46) 
-1.101*** 
(-3.68) 
1960s   1.164*** 
(3.66) 
  1.444* 
(4.48) 
1970s   0.609** 
(1.96) 
  0.552* 
(1.79) 
1980s   -0.622** 
(-2.18) 
  -0.572** 
(-1.99) 
No. Obser. 372 372 372 430 430 430 
R2 0.28 0.34 0.40 0.28 0.31 0.38 
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Table (15) 
Regression results for panel data (1960-2000)  
 
                           Random Effects Model                               Fixed Effects Model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Const. 6.372*** 
(3.64) 
9.329*** 
(5.32) 
8.065*** 
(4.74) 
-5.301 
(-1.61) 
19.03*** 
(6.28) 
19.03*** 
(6.28) 
16.701*** 
(4.56) 
9.487 
(1.17) 
LGDPI -1.246*** 
(-5.34) 
-1.427*** 
(-6.36) 
-1.337*** 
(-6.21) 
-1.063*** 
(-6.12) 
-2.662*** 
(-7.57) 
-2.662*** 
(-7,57) 
-2.416*** 
(-6.00) 
-1.738*** 
(-5.69) 
LINV 2.089*** 
(10.31) 
1.743*** 
(8.68) 
1.542*** 
(7.58) 
1.492*** 
(7.71) 
1.537*** 
(5.09) 
1.537*** 
(5.09) 
1.701*** 
(5.56) 
1.906*** 
(6.4) 
LSCHL 0.226 
(1.38) 
0.209 
(1.34) 
0.487*** 
(2.99) 
 0.187 
(0.97) 
0.187 
(0.97) 
0.232 
(0.99) 
 
LLIFE    2.935*** 
(3.17) 
   0.279 
(0.16 
Log 
(n+g+δ ) 
-0.563*** 
(-3.31) 
-0.547*** 
(-3.45) 
-0.551*** 
(-3.62) 
-0.236* 
(-1.84) 
-0.226 
(-0.87) 
-0.226 
(-0.87) 
-0.22 
(-0.84) 
-0.046 
(-0.25) 
HIPCs  -2.053*** 
(-5.17) 
-1.717*** 
(-4.44) 
-1.123*** 
(-3.34) 
    
1960s   1.068*** 
(3.54) 
1.397*** 
(4.42) 
  -0.062 
(-0.14) 
0.386 
(0.79) 
1970s   0.521* 
(1.8) 
0.504* 
(1.69) 
  -0.203 
(-0.57) 
-0.159 
(-0.43) 
1980s   -0.666*** 
(-4.44) 
-0.593** 
(-2.16) 
  -0.956*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.903*** 
(-3.12) 
No. Obser. 372 372 372 430 372 372 372 430 
R2 0.20 0.23 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.31 
Prob(Chi2)1 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.031     
1
. The hausman test for column 3 and 4 accepts the Ho, so I opt for the random effects model, while column 
1 and 2 rejects it, therefore I opt for the fixed effects model 
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C. Cross-section results for developing countries’   
     convergence 
 
Table (16) 
Descriptive statistics for developing countries (1960-2000) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LGDP60 91 7.421 0.689 5.948 9.016 
LGDP70 91 7.678 0.772 5.811 9.333 
LGDP80 91 7.833 0.950 4.018 9.727 
LGDP90 91 7.898 1.038 3.614 9.944 
GDPG6069 91 2.576 2.296 -3.163 8.606 
GDPG7079 91 2.236 3.021 -6.296 10.772 
GDPG8089 91 0.728 2.769 -4.412 10.489 
      
GDPG602000 91 1.308 2.735 -7.056 10.129 
GDPG702000 91 1.170 2.647 -14.978 6.105 
GDPG802000 91 0.976 2.138 -4.655 6.105 
GDPG902000 91 1.308 2.735 -7.056 10.012 
      
LSCHL60 68 2.1544 1.001 -0.1053 4.0377 
LSCHL70 70 2.4782 1.0309 0.0953 4.5261 
LSCHL80 74 2.9634 0.9643 0.1823 4.5261 
LSCHL90 76 2.9634 0.9643 0.1823 4.8434 
      
LLIFE60 86 3.851 0.211 3.45 4.3 
LLIFE70 86 3.944 0.195 3.54 4.31 
LLIFE80 86 4.014 0.188 3.57 4.33 
LLIFE90 88 4.081 0.185 3.56 4.35 
      
INV6069 91 2.607 0.8814 0.482 3.935 
INV7079 88 2.8049 0.8351 0.177 4.438 
INV8089 90 2.709 0.661 0.815 4.369 
INV6099 88 2.4821 0.6426 0.706 3.888 
INV7099 88 2.5059 0.6241 0.771 4.01 
INV8099 90 2.491 0.6095 1.068 4.018 
INV902000 90 2.5436 0.715 0.707 4.103 
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Table (17) 
Cross-section results for developing countries (1960-2000)  
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 7.266*** 
(2.99) 
10.347*** 
(4.51) 
-11.206** 
(-2.46) 
-6.548 
(-1.48) 
LGDP60 -1.147*** 
(-3.54) 
-1.424*** 
(-4.8) 
-1.489*** 
(-4.69) 
-1.726*** 
(-5.72) 
LINV6099 1.621*** 
(6.18) 
1.190*** 
(4.63) 
1.303*** 
(4.01) 
0.881*** 
(2.72) 
LSCHL60 0.446** 
(2.09) 
0.538*** 
(2.81) 
  
LLIFE60   5.612*** 
(4.15) 
5.193*** 
(4.11) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.846 
(-3.6) 
-0.741*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.485* 
(-1.64) 
-0.378 
(-1.37) 
HIPCs  -1.551*** 
(-4.04) 
 -1.578*** 
(-3.63) 
No. of Observation 64 64 82 82 
R2 0.55 0.65 0.53 0.60 
 
 
Table (18) 
Cross-section results for developing  countries(1970-2000)  
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 8.991*** 
(3.34) 
12.155*** 
(4.71) 
-16.023** 
(-2.37) 
-10.73 
(-1.59) 
LGDP70 -1.522*** 
(-4.24) 
-1.761*** 
(-5.31) 
-1.837*** 
(-5.17) 
-2.032*** 
(-5.84) 
LINV7099 1.985*** 
(6.34) 
1.491*** 
(4.77) 
1.726*** 
(4.09) 
1.297*** 
(2.99) 
LSCHL70 0.606** 
(2.41) 
1.491*** 
(2.84) 
  
LLIFE70   7.172*** 
(3.76) 
6.552*** 
(3.55) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -1.01*** 
(-3.75) 
-0.906*** 
(-3.69) 
-0.609* 
(-1.67) 
-0.518 
(-1.47) 
HIPCs  -1.691*** 
(-3.77) 
 -1.581*** 
(-2.78) 
No. of Observation 66 66 82 82 
R2 0.55 0.64 0.53 0.58 
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Table (19) 
Cross-section results for (1980-2000)  
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 6.475** 
(2.58) 
9.965*** 
(3.84) 
-1.761 
(-0.33) 
2.466 
(0.46) 
LGDP80 -1.067*** 
(-3.18) 
-1.318*** 
(-4.06) 
-0.677** 
(-2.56) 
-0.884*** 
(-3.37) 
LINV8099 1.964*** 
(5.26) 
1.574*** 
(4.24) 
1.802*** 
(4.57) 
1.428*** 
(3.59) 
LSCHL80 0.299 
(1.05) 
0.225 
(0.83) 
  
LLIFE80   1.468 
(0.95) 
1.122 
(0.76) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -1.294*** 
(-4.49) 
-1.219*** 
(-4.49) 
-1.073*** 
(-3.93) 
-0.995*** 
(-3.79) 
HIPCs  -1.61*** 
(-3.18) 
 -1.439*** 
(-2.96) 
No. of Observation 72 72 84 84 
R2 0.48 0.55 0.49 0.52 
 
 
 
Table (20) 
Cross-section results for developing countries (1990-2000) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 4.473 
(1.27) 
8.720** 
(2.36) 
-12.716 
(-1.53) 
-4.881 
(-0.55) 
LGDP90 -0.744 
(-1.5) 
-1.073** 
(-2.19) 
-0.917*** 
(-2.09) 
-1.082** 
(-2.49) 
LINV902000 1.381*** 
(3.08) 
1.138** 
(2.6) 
1.36*** 
(2.91) 
1.123** 
(2.4) 
LSCHL90 0.643 
(1.45) 
0.433 
(1.0) 
  
LLIFE90   4.82** 
(1.97) 
3.457 
(1.4) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -1.349*** 
(-3.27) 
-1.209*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.887** 
(-2.25) 
-0.813** 
(-2.11) 
HIPCs  -2.024*** 
(-2.74) 
 -1.683** 
(-2.22) 
No. of Observation 74 74 86 86 
R2 0.33 0.40 0.29 0.33 
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Table (21) 
Cross-section results for developing countries (1960-69) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 2.561 
(0.8) 
4.135 
(1.26) 
-7.277 
(-1.52) 
-5.895 
(-0.56) 
LGDP60 -0.368 
(-0.80) 
-0.526 
(-1.14) 
-0.382 
(-0.95) 
-0.417 
(-1.02) 
LINV6069 1.147*** 
(4.23) 
1.047*** 
(3.82) 
1.027*** 
(3.53) 
1.01*** 
(3.42) 
LSCHL60 0.363 
(1.23) 
0.373 
(1.29) 
  
LLIFE60   2.875* 
(1.89) 
2.618* 
(1.64) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.459* 
(-1.76) 
-0.425* 
(-1.65) 
-0.438* 
(-1.66) 
-0.432 
(-1.63) 
HIPCs  -0.895* 
(-1.69) 
 -0.306 
(-0.56) 
No. of Observation 66 66 84 84 
R2 0.33 0.36 0.31 0.31 
 
 
 
Table (22) 
Cross-section results for developing countries (1970-79)  
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 3.828 
(0.89) 
7.783* 
(1.82) 
-21.981*** 
(-3.4) 
-17.684** 
(-2.51) 
LGDP70 -1.182** 
(-1.98) 
-1.533** 
(-2.65) 
-1.331*** 
(-3.09) 
-1.432*** 
(-3.31) 
LINV7079 1.92*** 
(4.76) 
1.638** 
(2.29) 
1.58*** 
(4.28) 
1.469*** 
(3.92) 
LSCHL70 0.924** 
(2.21) 
0.908** 
(2.29) 
  
LLIFE70   7.336*** 
(3.77) 
6.573*** 
(3.28) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.037 
(-0.09) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.386 
(1.47) 
0.429 
(1.64) 
HIPCs  -2.098*** 
(-2.88) 
 -0.978 
(-1.47) 
No. of Observation 66 66 82 82 
R2 0.40 0.44 0.47 0.48 
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Table (23) 
Cross-section results for developing countries (1980-89) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 4.596 
(1.32) 
7.403* 
(1.91) 
-1.249 
(-0.17) 
3.013 
(0.39) 
LGDP80 -0.998** 
(-2.06) 
-1.187** 
(-2.4) 
-0.891** 
(-2.43) 
-1.08*** 
(-2.83) 
LINV8089 2.03*** 
(4.06) 
1.743*** 
(3.31) 
1.986*** 
(4.03) 
1.765*** 
(3.49) 
LSCHL80 0.147 
(0.36) 
0.073 
(0.18) 
  
LLIFE80   1.463 
(0.68) 
1.01 
(0.47) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.914** 
(-2.42) 
-0.892** 
(-2.39) 
-1.025*** 
(-3.15) 
-1.024*** 
(-3.18) 
HIPCs  -1.214 
(-1.59) 
 -1.134 
(-1.63) 
No. of Observation 72 72 84 84 
R2 0.26 0.28 0.35 0.38 
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D. Panel Regression for developing countries (1960-2000) 
 
 
Table (24) 
Descriptive Statistics for Developing countries’  Panel (1960-2000) 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LGDPG 360 1.650 2.836 -7.056 10.77 
LGDPI 360 7.67 0.859 3.614 9.94 
LLIFE 342 3.961 0.207 3.45 4.35 
LSCHL 284 2.743 1.062 -0.105 4.84 
LINV 358 2.665 0.780 0.177 4.43 
Ln(n+g+ )δ  352 2.364 0.902 -3.63 5.96 
 
Table (25) 
Cross-section pooled time series results for developing countries (1960-2000)10  
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONSTANT 3.121* 
(1.66) 
7.013*** 
(3.61) 
6.259*** 
(3.37) 
-7.506** 
(-2.05) 
LGDP -0.640** 
(-2.44) 
-0.999*** 
(-3.84) 
-1.014*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.952*** 
(-4.68) 
LINV 1.752*** 
(8.6) 
1.466*** 
(7.24) 
1.374*** 
(6.98) 
1.387*** 
(6.97) 
LSCHL 0.109 
(0.59) 
0.121 
(0.68) 
0.424** 
(2.27) 
 
LLIFE    3.378*** 
(3.34) 
Log (n+g+δ ) -0.645*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.585*** 
(-3.2) 
-0.616*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.342** 
(-2.28) 
HIPCs  -1.839*** 
(-5.17) 
-1.574*** 
(-4.59) 
-0.988*** 
(-2.93) 
1960s   1.223*** 
(3.0) 
1.652*** 
(4.06) 
1970s   0.852** 
(2.16) 
0.786** 
(2.07) 
1980s   -0.773** 
(-2.15) 
-0.626* 
(-1.76) 
No. of Observation 278 278 278 336 
R2 0.25 0.32 0.39 0.37 
10. dependent variable is growth rate of log GDP per capita 
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Table (26) 
Panel regression results for developing countries (1960-2000) 
 
                           Random Effects Model                               Fixed Effects Model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Const. 4.88** 
(2.24) 
8.484*** 
(3.88) 
7.279*** 
(3.46) 
-7.437** 
(-1.95) 
21.071*** 
(5.58) 
21.071*** 
(5.58) 
17.31*** 
(4.13) 
4.897 
(0.51) 
LGDPI -0.904*** 
(-3.02) 
-1.203*** 
(-4.16) 
-1.181*** 
(-4.26) 
-0.992*** 
(-4.73) 
-2.884*** 
(-6.02) 
-2.884*** 
(-6.02) 
-2.498*** 
(-5.0) 
-1.698*** 
(-4.84) 
LINV 1.838*** 
(8.05) 
1.528*** 
(6.9) 
1.442*** 
(6.65) 
1.412*** 
(6.88) 
1.379*** 
(4.05) 
1.379 
(4.05) 
1.505*** 
(4.43) 
1.714*** 
(5.2) 
LSCHL 0.079 
(0.41) 
0.09 
(0.49) 
0.454** 
(2.26) 
 0.117 
(0.50) 
0.117 
(0.50) 
0.293 
(0.97) 
 
LLIFE    3.411*** 
(3.26) 
   1.333 
(0.61) 
Log 
(n+g+δ ) 
-0.603*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.555*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.596*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.318** 
(-2.07) 
-0.458 
(-1.45) 
-0.458 
(-1.45) 
-0.408 
(-1.28) 
-0.059 
(-0.28) 
HIPCs  -2.053*** 
(-4.88) 
-1.683*** 
(-4.09) 
-1.013*** 
(-2.83) 
    
1960s   1.165*** 
(2.94) 
1.632*** 
(4.04) 
  0.171 
(0.30) 
0.731 
(1.16) 
1970s   0.799** 
(2.12) 
0.767** 
(2.05) 
  0.161 
(0.35) 
0.177 
(0.38) 
1980s   -0.797** 
(-2.39) 
-0.637* 
(-1.83) 
  -1.033*** 
(-2.95) 
-0.932*** 
(-2.53) 
No. Obser. 278 278 278 336 278 278 278 336 
R2 0.13 0.49 0.24 0.25 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.28 
Prob(Chi2)1 0.000 0.000 0.17 0.044     
 
1.The Prob (Chi2) in columns 1 and 2 indicate that one the Hausman test is in favor of the fixed effects 
model while in colums 3 and 4, the Hausman test indicate that the random effects model should be chosen. 
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E. Panel Regression for HIPCs (1960-2000) 
 
 
Table (27) 
Descriptive statistics for HIPCs (1960-2000) four decades panel 
Variable Observation Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
GDPG 116 0.2148 2.6351 -7.0562 6.6288 
Log (GDPI) 116 7.034 0.6896 3.144 8.2961 
Log (INV) 90 3.085 0.4621 1.98 3.87 
LLIFEI 112 3.8085 0.1527 3.45 4.2 
POPG 116 2.637 0.6836 -0.46 4.25 
 
 
 
Table (28) 
Cross-section pooled time series results (1960-2000) decade averages-HIPCs alone 
Variable 1 2 3 
Constant 2.188 
(1.42) 
12.551* 
(1.92) 
-1.614 
(-0.23) 
GDPI -1.67*** 
(-3.46) 
-1.375*** 
(-2.61) 
-1.789*** 
(-3.56) 
INV 2.109*** 
(4.03) 
2.272*** 
(4.25) 
2.369*** 
(4.73) 
LLIFEI  -2.581 
(-1.35) 
1.601 
(0.78) 
POPG 0.226 
(0.61) 
0.208 
(0.56) 
0.148 
(0.43) 
Dummy for 1960s   2.636*** 
(3.7) 
Dummy for 1970s   1.282** 
(1.98) 
Dummy for 1980s   0.078 
(0.13) 
No. Observations 90 90 90 
R2 0.21 0.22 0.37 
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Table (29) 
Regression results using a panel data (1960-2000) decade averages-HIPCs alone 
 
                                Random Effects Model                           Fixed Effects Model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
CONST 12.552* 
(1.92) 
-1.614 
(-0.23) 
63.85*** 
(6.23) 
56.542** 
(2.43) 
LGDPI -1.375*** 
(-2.61) 
-1.789*** 
(-3.56) 
-5.441*** 
(-5.27) 
-5.297*** 
(-4.84) 
INV 2.272*** 
(4.25) 
2.369*** 
(4.73) 
1.334* 
(1.89) 
1.239* 
(1.72) 
LLIFE -2.581 
(-1.35) 
1.601 
(0.78) 
-8.022*** 
(-3.39) 
-6.385 
(-1.19) 
POPG 0.208 
(0.56) 
0.148 
(0.44) 
0.68 
(1.29) 
0.673 
(1.21) 
Dummy for 1960s  2.636*** 
(3.7) 
 0.296 
(0.22) 
Dummy for 1970s  1.282** 
(1.98) 
 0.228 
(0.26) 
Dummy for 1980s  0.078 
(0.13) 
 -0.276 
(-0.45) 
No. observations 90 90 90 90 
R2 0.23 0.37 0.49 0.50 
Prob (Chi2)1 0.000 0.04   
1. Prob (Chi2) = 0.04 is a Hausman test that indicates that the random effects model in column 1 is a more 
appropriate model to use for this regression, while column 2 indicates the other way around. 
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Table (30) 
List of countries included in the regression 
Angola Cape Verde Guyana Mozambique Senegal 
Argentina Costa Rica 
Hong Kong, 
China Mauritania Singapore 
Australia Ecuador Honduras Mauritius Sierra Leone 
Austria Egypt, Arab Rep. Haiti Malawi El Salvador 
Burundi Denmark Indonesia Malaysia Sweden 
Belgium Cyprus India Namibia Seychelles 
Benin 
Dominican 
Republic Ireland Niger 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
Burkina Faso Algeria Iran, Islamic Rep. Nigeria Chad 
Bangladesh Spain Iceland Nicaragua Togo 
Bolivia Ethiopia Israel Netherlands Thailand 
Brazil Finland Italy Norway Trinidad and Tobago 
Barbados Fiji Jamaica Nepal Tunisia 
Botswana France Jordan New Zealand Turkey 
Central African 
Republic Germany Japan Pakistan Tanzania 
Canada Gabon Kenya Panama Uganda 
Switzerland United Kingdom Korea, Rep. Peru Uruguay 
Chile Ghana Sri Lanka Philippines United States 
China Guinea Lesotho Papua New Guinea Venezuela, RB 
Cote d'Ivoire Gambia, The Luxembourg Portugal South Africa 
Cameroon Guinea-Bissau Morocco Paraguay Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. Equatorial Guinea Madagascar Romania Zambia 
Colombia Greece Mexico Rwanda Zimbabwe 
Comoros Guatemala Mali     
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Unconditional convergence (graphic representation) 
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II. An Empirical Exploration into the 
Determinants of External Indebtedness 
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Abstract 
 
The causes of the external indebtedness of developing countries and their subsequent failure to 
meet contractual debt obligations have generated the heated debates both in the academic circles, 
policy makers, and the broader international community since the outset of the debt crisis in 
1982. While poverty and external factors seem to be the most profound factors behind the 
external indebtedness of poor nations, there is still an ongoing debate on the determinants of the 
demand for overseas borrowing by developing countries.  
 
This chapter contributes to this debate by empirically investigating the causes of external 
indebtedness by developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. First, I empirically examine the 
robustness of a recent study, which is based on the hypothesis that indebted countries have a 
greater tendency to exercise bad policies. Second, moving to a broader approach and using annual 
cross-section, fixed effects and random effects models and cross-section pooled time series 
strategies, this paper shows that poverty (the savings gap), income instability, and external factors 
that include debt service payments to be the main causes of overseas borrowing by developing 
countries in the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
As far as the empirical strategy is concerned, the application of a panel data approach seems to be 
highly preferred, as it allows us control for time-specific events that are linked to overseas 
borrowing, particularly given the rapid changes in the global macroeconomic environment in the 
past years. Moreover, this strategy helps to produce a more robust explanation by allowing to 
incorporate country-specific factors as developing countries themselves are heterogeneous in 
terms of their colonial heritages, geopolitical and strategic significance, and creditworthiness, all 
affecting  the level of indebtedness and the potential bargaining power to manage the subsequent 
debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“ International debt has become the defining feature of the contemporary world economy” , (Eatwell and 
Taylor, 2000, in: Dymski, 2002, p. 244)  
 
The problem of developing countries’  external debt is believed to be one of the major 
challenges of the new millennium The debate has been further intensified thanks to the 
involvement of not only the traditional international financial institutions, but also 
independent analysts, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Though it is 
generally believed that external debt helps countries that are suffering from capital 
deficiency to achieve accelerated economic growth, once this financial gap becomes 
unmanageable, the past accumulated external debt is likely to provoke further external 
borrowing, creating a vicious circle problem. This obviously creates a gloomy picture on 
future growth prospects and reduces the likelihood of developing countries to meet their 
debt-service obligations, which is exactly the current experience of the poorest nations of 
the world, earning the new name “ heavily indebted poor countries”  (HIPCs). 
 
It is particularly crucial given the factors behind this huge debt build up. Although 
poverty (the savings gap) seems to be the natural reason behind overseas borrowing, there 
are additional, mainly exogenous, factors that drove most developing nations into a 
chronic external debt crisis situation. The most frequently cited determinants of overseas 
borrowing in the 1970s and 1980s are the two-oil price shocks of the early and late 
1970s, and the subsequent recession in major industrialized countries, the change in the 
global economic policy and the deterioration in developing countries terms of trade are 
just to mention a few. On the supply side, the generous and irresponsible lending policies 
of private commercial banks in industrialized countries that are linked to the recycling of 
the “ Petrodollars”  are another widely acknowledged root causes behind developing 
countries debt accumulation. What is even worse in this context is that as private 
commercial banks were fast to discharge loans to developing countries in the 1970s, they 
were even faster to cut lending when the first sign of the debt crisis came into play 
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following Mexico’ s official announcement in August 1982 that it was no longer able and 
willing to meet its contractual debt obligation. 15  
 
It should, however, be added that irresponsible and corrupt governments (sometimes 
unelected ones) in developing countries themselves are the key players of the debt build 
up. Such leaders across the developing world, like Mobutu of Zaire, have been accused of 
shamelessly squandering their nations’  scarce resources for luxurious activities rather 
than investing them to improve the lives of these desperately poor nations. The joint 
effects of all these and other factors led most indebted countries to experience multiple 
debt crisis, which ultimately forced them to undertake frequent rescheduling and beg for 
debt reduction and relief. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to add to the current empirical literature on the 
determinants of overseas borrowing by developing countries in 1980s and 1990s. To 
answer this question, the remainder of the paper is divided into three parts. Part 2 
presents the general theoretical discussion on the evolution of the debt crisis, including 
the magnitude and structure of developing countries external debt with emphasis on 
HIPCs. In section 2.2., I investigate the robustness of Easterly’ s (2002) study on the 
determinants of HIPCs external borrowing using a cross-section, and cross-section 
pooled times series, fewer countries and slightly different time period. In section 2.3, 
using annual cross-section, panel data and cross-section pooled time series approachs; I 
present a further empirical investigation into the causes of indebtedness across HIPCs and 
non-HIPCs developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, part three 
summarizes the highlights of this study and its policy implications. 
 
                                                           
15
 The abnormal nature of the external debt problem of developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s was 
best expressed by the popular joke of the 1930s, which characterizes private credit as ” an umbrella that a 
person is allowed to borrow as long as the weather is fine, but which he has to return the moment it starts 
raining”  Anonymous (in: Wayne, 1993). 
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2. Why indebted countries got indebted in the first place? 
A theoretical explanation 
 
External borrowing is not a new phenomenon at all. Most of today’ s industrialized 
countries had been net borrowers in their path to economic development. But the reasons 
for being indebted might differ from country to country and time to time. This part 
mainly discusses the reasons behind developing countries indebtedness in the 1980s and 
1990s. The arguments for overseas borrowing and lending are numerous. Though as is 
well known, there is a lender to every borrower, I will rather focus my analysis on the 
indebted countries, hence the demand side of external indebtedness. The supply side will 
only be marginally discussed when relevant. The causes of external indebtedness might 
be classified into four categories: poverty-driven indebtedness, the foreign exchange gap, 
the return argument, and the contribution of external factors, are just to mention the major 
factors behind overseas borrowing. 
 
A. The savings gap as a driving force behind external indebtedness 
 
There is a widespread consensus among growth economists that poverty plays an 
enormous role in driving countries into serious external indebtedness. In this context, 
from the view point of debtors, the economic justification to borrow overseas is 
associated with the rising gap between national savings and domestic investment.16 That 
is, at the expense of running a current account imbalance, a country may manage to 
obtain resources to invest even if its domestic savings levels are low. Several studies 
associate the major cause of external indebtedness to the poverty-vicious circle type of 
argument. For example, Singer (1990, in: Healey (1995)), argues that the external 
imbalance is caused by the vicious circle of poverty: poor people are poor because they 
are undernourished or illiterate, and they are undernourished and illiterate because they 
are poor. In the same token, poor countries are poor because they have low savings and 
investment and they have low savings and investment because they are poor.  
 
                                                           
16
 For the formal treatment of the savings gap and the foreign exchange gap (the two-gap model), see Basu 
(2000). 
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Similarly, Root (1990) argues that the major development obstacle of developing 
countries is the vicious circles of the saving-investment gap: productivity is low because 
investment is low, investment is low because savings are low, saving are low because 
income is low, income is low because productivity is low; thus, in a very real sense, 
according to Root (1990), the poor nations are poor because they are poor. The savings 
gap, therefore, reflects the inability of poor countries to save sufficient amount of 
resources to finance the desired level of investment necessary for self-sustained growth. 
Overseas borrowing is bound to fill this gap by generating resources that domestic savers 
are unable or unwilling to sacrifice.17 With the elapse of time, growth in income should 
boost domestic savings, eventually generating a surplus over investment which can be 
used to repay the accumulated past borrowing. Furthermore, the absence of developed 
(malfunctioning) financial system to mediate savings and investment in developing 
countries makes the situation for savers difficult to place their funds directly into 
investment opportunities leading to insufficient domestic savings available to provide the 
finance for domestic investment (Gybson, 1996, among others). From this standpoint, it 
is possible to argue that the deficit in poor countries is simply a development deficit that 
is inevitable if countries are to achieve long-term positive economic growth. Such a 
deficit, however, is not without cost as it increases foreign debt, which must be serviced 
and repaid in the future. Pereira and Rosser (1996) also take this same line, where they 
strongly link the external indebtedness of developing countries to their level of poverty.18 
Table (1.1) below indicates that HIPCs are substantially lagging behind non-HIPCs 
counterparts in income per capita level, gross domestic savings and investment, literacy 
rates and life expectancy. In contrast, they send out more resources abroad in the form of 
debt service payments. 
                                                           
17
 Many believe that under the circumstances of low level of savings, overseas borrowing by the public 
sector may help the private investment via the public investment and avoids possible crowding out effect of 
the private investment through domestic borrowing. This may also feed the economy with additional 
foreign exchange to finance past accumulated debt and imports (Serieux, 2001). 
18
 Their analysis is based on the 1990 UN Chronicle that presents the following statistical evidence on 
poverty across the world (Pereira and Rosser, 1996, pp. 46): 1 billion people live in absolute poverty, 100 
million persons are completely homeless, 800 million go hungry everyday, 1.75 billion people are without 
access to safe drinking water, and 1.5 billion are without access to primary education, an alarming figure 
that demonstrates the severity of poverty across developing countries, many of which are members of 
HIPCs. 
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Table (1.1) 
Some economic and social indicators for HIPCs and Non-HIPCs (1980-98) 
  
Heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC) Low & middle income 
 Economic and social indicators 1980-89 1990-98 1980-89 1990-98 
GDP per capita (constant 1995 US$)a  310.69 338.10 1158.65 1341.01 
Gross Domestic Investment (% of GDP) 17.82 19.25 27.82 29.28 
Gross Domestic Savings (% of GDP) 11.01 12.16 27.99 28.70 
Total Debt Service (% of exports) 24.41 20.61 22.52 18.90 
Illiteracy rate, adult total b  53 44 38 31 
Life expectancy at birth, total (years) c 50 52 60 63 
 
a. the 1980-89 average is only 1984-89 
b. this is data for 1980 and 1990 
c. this is data for 1980 and 1990 
 
Source: own calculations based on data from the World Bank, World Development  
             Indicator, 2001 (CD-ROM) 
 
The poverty driven indebtedness is particularly alarming to heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs). As Serieux (2001, pp.307) rightly puts it, “ heavily indebted”  and 
“ poor”  clearly spells out the combined attributes that HIPCs apart from other developing 
countries and make them a focus of concern for northern governments, international 
public agencies, and international civil-society organizations” . All the gap models argue 
in this direction.19 Classens, et al (1997) also indicates that HIPCs situation differ from 
other middle-income debtors in several respects that include the poor income level and 
poor economic reform in this group (pp. 233). IMF in its recent study acknowledges that 
“ the increase in many low-income countries’  debts, beginning in the 1970s and peaking 
                                                           
19
 For a further discussion, see Agenor and Montiel (1996), Taylor (1994), and Bacha (1990), among 
others. In this context many argue that overseas borrowing may be beneficial to generate higher economic 
growth if an increase in investment contributes to higher growth, which generates additional foreign 
exchange to finance past accumulated debt. In this context Healey (1995) among others, argue that foreign 
capital would be translated into growth if the saving and foreign-exchange gaps can in due course be 
reversed, and the funds are invested in projects that generate higher rate of returns compared to the cost of 
borrowing, hence the market interest rate. Similarly, others, for example Easterly (1999) argue that if aid is 
viewed as a permanent income by a developing country government, the recipient government is highly 
likely to spend these resources on boosting consumption rather than investment, making aid meaningless in 
terms of boosting growth. The endogenous growth theory is also in this line. The central argument is that if 
aid is transferred as a lump sum, it would have no impact on investment.  
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in the 1980s, was accompanied by disappointing performance in their struggle against 
poverty”  (IMF, 2003, pp. 6).20  
 
B. The foreign-exchange constraint 
 
Another equally important justification behind the overseas borrowing of developing 
countries is that of the foreign exchange gap. Because even assuming that there were no 
capital deficiency and no savings gap that serve as a constraint to economic development, 
the growth rate of developing countries may still be hindered by a foreign exchange gap. 
This seems to suggest that domestic savings in developing countries are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions for raising investment to a desired level.21 This is again linked to the 
import structure of developing countries where imports of capital goods are vital for the 
further expansion of the tradable sector in poor countries. The significance is twofold 
given that most of the least income countries own domestic currencies that are not freely 
convertible. Moreover, export earnings are usually insufficient to generate enough 
foreign exchange to finance imports making overseas borrowing the indispensable means 
of gaining access to the technology that is vital for the expansion of the export sector that 
ultimately leads to rapid economic growth.  
 
C. The return argument for overseas borrowing 
 
Though it is more of a supply-side story, the return argument is another justification for 
overseas borrowing.22 The central argument here is that since poor countries are suffering 
from financial deficiency and in contrast, there is a surplus in developed countries, capital 
should move from the latter to the former. The neo-classical growth theory supports this 
idea. Because since the ratio of capital to labor in developing countries is lower, the 
                                                           
20
 The IMF (2003, pp. 6) added that “ for HIPCs alone, nominal debt stocks rose from moderate debt levels 
in the early 1980s to some 800 percent of exports and 160 percent of gross national income in the mid-
1990s, in many cases contributing a debt overhang that may have contributed to these countries poor 
growth performance” , again indicating the link between external indebtedness and poverty. 
21
 As Easterly (1999) summarizes that investment must be both sufficient in terms of quality as well as 
quantity if it is to be translated into growth. 
22
 The risk is often accompanied by higher premium for invested resources, which in the absence of any 
actual risk, generates higher rate of returns in countries that are more risky than less risky one.  
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marginal product of capital is bound to be higher. In contrast, in countries with high 
capital to labor ratio (because of high level of savings) and the investment opportunities 
exploited already, savings of these countries are invested in developing countries where 
they turn out to generate higher expected rates of returns (Barro (1991); Sala-i-Martin 
and Barro (1995); and Solow (1956); among others). This seems to suggest that the flow 
of resources from rich to poor countries is mutually beneficial. The LDCs can make use 
of the excess savings of the rich countries for financing their investment while the 
lending developed countries would potentially generate high rates of returns by investing 
in poor countries as opposed to in their own countries. Therefore, as Healey (1995), 
among others, argue theoretically economic efficiency (the marginal efficiency of capital) 
and commercial logic dictate that capital should flow from the relatively less- profitable 
” First World”  to the relatively more-profitable ”Third World” .  
 
D. External factors as driving force to external indebtedness 
 
The evolution of the debt crisis goes back to the two oil-price shocks of the 1973-74 and 
1979-80 and the subsequent recession of the world economy. Most of today’ s indebted 
poor countries got indebted mainly during and after these periods. This has been 
accompanied by the dramatic fall in the terms of trade of mainly primary commodities, 
which further widened the financial gap and made things even more complicated.  The 
Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC), which initially comprised of only five 
countries, namely, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, was established in 
1960. However, in 1973, the organization was enlarged when it was joined by another 
eight oil-producing countries (Algeria, Equador, Gabon, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, and 
United Arab Emirates). This group of countries having formed a cartel got a remarkable 
concentration of power by producing nearly two-thirds of world oil resources 
(Chacholiades, 1990).23 
                                                           
23
 Although initially OPEC had functioned properly, things had moved to a different direction in 1973 
because of the Arab-Israeli war when the Arab members of OPEC temporarily embargoed oil exports to the 
United States and other pro-Israeli countries. As soon as the Arab oil embargo was lifted in 1974, OPEC 
made use of the temporary supply shortage to increase the price of crude oil within three months (from 2.59 
USD to 11,65 USD a barrel (Pilbeam, 1992; Chacholiades, 1990, Wayne, 1993; among others). The Iranian 
revolution was another phenomenon for the rise of oil price in 1978, where Iran that had produced nearly 
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1. oil transfer; 2. monetary transfer; 3. monetary transfer; 4. monetary transfer; 5. monetary transfer; 6. 
Transfer of goods, 7. oil transfer, and 8. monetary transfer 
 
Fig. 3. The recycling of the petrodollar scheme 
Source: Chacholiades, M. (1990), ” International Economics”  McGraw Hill, Inc., pp. 395 (numbers 7 and 8 
added) 
 
An increase in the price of oil increased its revenue in excess of these countries’  demand. 
These” petrodollars”  were, therefore, deposited in Eurodollar markets by OPEC countries. 
The” fund-starved”  developing countries borrowed these funds from the Eurodollar 
market to pay their import bills from Europe, the United States and Japan (see figure 1 
above). Moreover, most developing countries themselves are net importers of oil adding a 
further pressure on their demand for foreign exchange either in the Eurodollar market or 
else where. This is one of the important things that the “ petrodollars”  scheme does not 
capture (numbers 7 and 8 in figure 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
20 percent of OPEC exports suddenly disappeared from the world oil market. This already bad situation got 
even worse when the war broke out between Iran and Iraq resulting in the rise of Saudi Arabian light crude 
oil price which reached the record level of 32 USD a barrel (Chacholiades, 1990, among others). The fall in 
the supply of oil and the dramatic rise in its price in the 1970s gave OPEC members the historical chance of 
maintaining the most lucrative monopoly in the world. Following that, there was a tremendous amount of 
the so called ” petrodollars”  that was transferred from oil importing to oil exporting- countries. 
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While figure (1) indicates the evolution of the debt build up in developing countries in 
the 1980s, the debate on how poor nations got indebted is far from over. One of the major 
debates on the exogenous causes of the debt crisis in the 1980s is linked to the change in 
the global macroeconomic policy from the part of developed countries that developing 
nations could not help at all. Such policy changes include but are not limited to the 
dismantiling of the Bretton Wood Monetary System, and the switch from an 
expansionary monetary policy to a restrictive monetary policy. What is even worse is that 
these policy changes took place during the second oil price shock of 1979-80, together 
with persistently high inflationary expectations and large deficits in the United Sates, 
boosted real interest rates up to almost 10 % (Wayne, 1993), among others. The spill over 
effects of these and other policy changes had been particularly detrimental to the growth 
prospects of poor nations. Higher real interest rates, for instance, meant high debt service 
payments and as the result, little resources are left over for domestic investment, which 
hampers subsequent economic growth, and leads again to higher demand for external 
loans. 
 
In this context, many argue that the way most of today’ s heavily indebted countries 
(HIPCs) came to indebtedness significantly differ from those of middle-income countries, 
often referred to as the “ MBA debt crisis” .24 As Serieux (2001, pp. 314) argues, “ the 
current crisis facing the poorest countries has little to do with the large transfers of 
private credit that precipitated the MBA debt crisis in the 1980s. Rather it is the result of 
the change in the global economy that placed new, long-term limits on these countries 
debt-carrying capacities-a reality the rest of the world was slow to recognize” . This is 
consistent with the source structure of HIPCs that is predominantly from multilateral 
rather than from private commercial banks as it was the case for the middle-income 
indebted countries, notably Latin America. 
 
Others, for instance, Dymski (2002), accuse of multinational banks in developed 
countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s for “ pushing”  credit on to less-developed 
countries because of their competition to get rid-of the accumulated petrodollars. Some 
                                                           
24
 MBA refers to Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. 
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call this as ”  the herd instinct about investors” , where lenders found themselves in an 
aggressive competition to lend to developing countries.25  
 
Schwartz (1988) argues in this line. “ The current debt problem differs from historical 
ones in at least two respects: First, in the present case, international debt settlement 
involves not only the private creditors and debtor countries but also international agencies 
and creditor-country governments. Second, in the present case, the creditors have been 
urged, if not coerced, lending and however reluctantly, have continued lending to 
troubled nations”  (pp. 9-10). As Schwartz further argues, the hidden though behind 
lending new money was to protect the old money lent.  
 
Similarly, Pereira and Rosser (1996) link the debt crisis of the 1980s to the irresponsible 
lending policies of the industrialized countries. As they put it, “ the proof of the wrong-
mindedness of lending in the 1970s, became dramatically apparent in 1981” . Like 
numerous authors argue, they further blame the rise in the interest rates, and the 
deterioration in the terms of trade of primary commodities.26 
 
But the conclusion is rather mixed. While Sachs and Berg (1988, p. 4) believe that in 
many of the indebted countries external debt in the 1970s was provoked by irrational 
political decision (borrowing overseas rather than raising the tax rates to avoid domestic 
political risk), they also acknowledge that this indebtedness was aggravated by other 
structural changes, such as expansionary US-monetary policy in the early 1970s, the 
breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system and the subsequent sharp rise in global 
liquidity, OPEC oil price shock and the subsequent growth of “ petrodollar recycling” , 
and the dimming of bankers’  memories of defaults on sovereign loans in the Great 
Depression.  
                                                           
25
 In a similar fashion, Vos (1994, in: Dymaki (2002)), argues that the main driving force of overlending 
was the oligopolistic nature of overseas lending markets, competitors goal of expanding their market share, 
and lenders tendency to underassess risk. He added that most current LDC borrowers have defaulted in the 
past, more than once.  
26
 Pereira and Rossel (1994) indicate that the very deep recession of 1981-82 made it impossible for 
developing countries to pay back their loans. They also argue, quoting UNCTAD, commodity prices (for 
essentially food stuff, fuels, mineral) dropped by 28% in 1981-82, and interest payments on loans increased 
by 50% in nominal terms and 75% in real terms”  (pp. 6). This is also consistent with Wayne (1993) and the 
Jubilee (2000) initiative. 
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Similarly, Easterly (2002) associate the current debt crisis to the wrong investment 
policies of the indebted nations, among other things. As he puts it, “ the HIPCs debt 
problem arose not because of new borrowing, but because of disinvestment in productive 
potential”  (p.1683). Moreover, the uniqueness of HIPCs indebtedness mirrors the absence 
of any substantial improvement in the economic growth of this group despite decades of 
structural adjustment and external aid. In contrast, the debt build up continued to mount 
increasing the likelihood of furure debt servicing difficulties. 
 
Whatever the arguments and counter-arguments regarding the causes of the external debt 
of developing countries, one thing is true: these countries are suffering from huge 
external debt and that exogenous shocks played vital roles in aggravating the already 
ridicules situation across the heavily indebted countries in particular.  
 
 
2.1. What went wrong with the magnitude and structure of developing 
countries’ external debt? Some stylized facts 
 
 
Tables A1 to A2 in the appendix show the magnitude of the external debt of developing 
countries and various groups. Tables B1 to B3 give the costs associated with external 
debt. Tables C1 to C4 provide information about the term and source structures of 
external debt. Tables D1 to D6, indicate some of the factors that are linked to the balance 
of payments problem of developing countries.  
 
The magnitude of the external debt of developing countries grew from about 808 bn USD 
in 1982 to more than 2,536 bn. USD in 1998, indicating that the external debt grew by a 
factor of three in sixteen years.27 For HIPCs (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries), the total 
external debt which stood at around 74 bn. USD in 1982 turned to 213 bn USD, in 1998 
increasing by a factor of around three. It is interesting to note, however, that in absolute 
term,  the total external debt of either SSA (Sub-Saharan Africa) or HIPCs, is by far 
                                                           
27
 All debt indicators are in nominal terms. 
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lower than that of LAC (Latin America and the Caribbean) and EAP (East Asia and the 
Pacific). For instance, in 1982, SSA’ s total external debt represented only 21% and 58% 
of the total external debt of LAC and EAP, respectively. In 1998, this ratio remained 
around 29% and 34% of the external debt of LAC and EAP, respectively. The ratio for 
HIPCs is very similar to that of SSA.28 HIPC’ s share of the developing countries’  total 
external debt was around 9% in 1982, which declined to 8% in 1998. It is also equally 
important to note that while the share of SSA, HIPCs, LAC and MENA’ s debt over the 
total developing countries’  debt had been declining over time, there was an increase in 
the share of ECA (Eastern Europe and central Asia) and EAP’ s debt in total developing 
countries’  external debt.29 (See; table A2 in the appendix for other groups).  
 
However, external debt comparison using absolute values as discussed above could be 
misleading as it fails to take into account the size of a country and its economic potential. 
Tables A3 and A4 present the share of external debt to GNP and exports of goods and 
services. It now becomes apparent why HIPCs are, in fact, called HIPCs. The most 
indebted region in terms of absolute value, LAC, had a share of its total debt to GNP of 
45% and 41% in 1982 and 1998, respectively. In contrast, HIPCs’  share of total debt to 
GNP was 72% in 1984 and 115% in 1998, respectively. What is even more interesting is 
that this alarming share has been increasing over time. This ratio for SSA had been 32% 
in 1982 and 72% in 1998, respectively.  
 
Tables B1 to B3 indicate the costs linked to external debt. While the total debt service to 
GNP indicates the solvency problem of an indebted country, the total debt service to 
exports of goods and services ratio indicates the liquidity burden of external debt. This 
may also capture the impact of external debt on foreign exchange cash flows (Schadller, 
1993). In other words, this indicates the amount of foreign exchange that an indebted 
country has got to surrender when debt service payments are due. Table B1 indicates that 
the debt service to exports of goods and services ratio for LAC was around 47% in 1982 
                                                           
28
 Since 33 of the 41 countries categorized by the World Bank and the IMF as HIPCs are in SSA, the 
similarity between SSA and HIPCs is not surprising. 
29
 This may suggest that there was a diversion of resources away from SSA and LA towards Eastern Europe 
and East Asia, the two regions with better track record of creditworthiness and overall trade significance for 
the developed world.  
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and 34% in 1998. This ratio for HIPCs was 21% and 16% in 1982 and 1998, respectively. 
This shows that HIPCs had to sacrifice around 20% of their export revenues to pay back 
part of their accumulated external debt.30 Table B2 shows the ratio of interest payments 
to GNP and exports, which is a major indicator of the pure (net) cost of external debt on 
foreign exchange cash flows. This also captures the swings in the interest rates across 
developed countries, which had been a peculiar characteristic of the 1980s. From table 
B2 it is also apparent that while the highest interest payment burden was in LAC, HIPCs 
seem to have been the second largest victim in transferring foreign exchange to creditors, 
which reached 12% in 1982, though declined to 6% in 1998.31   
 
Now turning to the maturity and source structures of the external debt of developing 
countries’  external debt, it appears that there is indeed a substantial difference across 
different groups. From the perspectives of the maturity structure of external debt, as 
shown in table C1, it is clear that though HIPCs had around 12% of its debt in the form of 
short term debt; this had been maintained until 1998. The situation is even worse for 
SSA, which had 15% of its debt in the form of short term debt in 1982, which grew to 
18% in 1998.32  The source structure in tables C2 to C4, indicate that SA (South Asia), 
SSA and HIPCs, had been the biggest recipients of multilateral and concessional loans. 
This indicates, among other things, the poor creditworthiness of these groups, hence their 
inability to secure loans from other sources at market conditions. HIPCs received high 
concessional loans both in absolute value and in terms of the ratio to total external debt, 
which reached around 20% in 1982 and 28% in 1998. This may also seem to suggest that 
this group of countries, on average, received more foreign aid relative to other groups. 
Tables D1 to D8, indicate different economic indicators that are linked to the current 
account stability and overall balances-of- payments sustainability.  
 
                                                           
30
 On the other hand, the relatively lower debt service ratio also suggests that this group of countries had 
access to more concessional loans relative to wealthier countries across the developing countries.   
31
 The decline of interest rate payments for HIPCs, particularly in 1990s might indicate debt relief on the 
one hand and the concentration of multilateral debt (as the result of the drying up of loans from private 
sources) during this decade. 
32
 The negative impact of short term debt on economic growth will be both theoretically and empirically 
discussed in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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2.2. Why HIPCs become HIPCs? Revisiting Easterly (2002) 
 
HIPCs are different from other groups in several ways: “ they are poorer, they have lower level of human 
capital, they carry much higher debt stock, they owe debt to the public, and they failed to generate debt-
servicing revenue despite long-years of adjustment”  (Serieux, 2001, p. 309-310).  
 
The objective of this section is to investigate the robustness of Easterly’ s (2002) 
empirical study on the determinants of HIPCs’  external indebtedness. Easterly’ s 
empirical strategy was to regress an average of each policy indicator or macroeconomic 
imbalance (over the debt relief period, 1980-97) on the log of initial income, and a 
dummy for HIPCs for the whole sample of less-developed countries (p. 1684). The 
objective was to identify the determinants of HIPCs indebtedness. For this analysis, he 
relies on the following hypotheses (p.1682): First, HIPCs become HIPCs through 
unfavorable exogenous shocks, such as terms of trade and war. Second, highly indebted 
countries tend to exercise bad policies. Third, heavily indebted countries have a greater 
desire to discount the future. Finally, “ the irresponsible lender story predicts that public 
debt will substitute private debt” .  
 
Easterly’ s findings suggest the following (see also table 2.37 in the appendix): First, on 
the macroeconomic policy front, he finds that HIPCs have worse macroeconomic policies 
compared to non-HIPCs. This is reflected in high current account and government budget 
deficits, low M2/GDP ratio, and high real overvaluation index. HIPCs, however, were not 
substantially different from non-HIPCs developing countries in inflation, real interest rate 
and black market premium (though the former two variables were marginally statistically 
significant) (p. 1685). Second, from the perspectives of external financing, it appears that 
while HIPCs received less foreign direct investment compared to non-HIPCs 
counterparts, in contrast, it got indebted by borrowing a lot from the international 
financial institutions (p. 1686).33 He concludes that “ multilateral lenders filling the 
financing gap will have significant role in financing high-discount rate economies”  (p. 
1686). Third, turning to the terms of trade shocks and war, he finds that none of these 
factors is the major players for HIPCs to become HIPCs. 
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 Easterly (2002) argues that low level of foreign direct investment is an indirect measure of bad policies in 
HIPCs countries. HIPCs have been bypassed by foreign direct investment thanks to their bad policies. 
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Though, Easterly’ s findings are interesting, there are some caveats that need to be sorted 
out to check the robustness of his results. First, there is a reverse causality issue. For 
instance, HIPCs have higher capital account deficit due to lack of growth and the savings 
and foreign exchange constraints rather than the other way around. The remedy to this is 
not straightforward, but this may imply that the results should be interpreted with caution. 
Second, there are missing variables that aggravated HIPCs external indebtedness. In this 
respect, though I have not overcome the measurement problem, capital flight has been 
incorporated to check to what extent it contributed to external indebtedness of HIPCs. 
One of the reasons for the low rate of investment in poor countries is linked to capital 
flight, which provokes further borrowing as past debt is not translated into growth. Third, 
since external indebtedness has also been caused by violent crisis and war, and we know 
that most of the poor countries across the world have been undergoing these incidences, 
Eatsrely’ s finding that war was not a big issue for HIPCs is counterintuitive and against 
other empirical evidences. Using the SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute) index, these two have been included to find a further explanation for 
indebtedness. Fourth, one of the major causes of the external indebtedness of HIPCs is 
both the fall in the demand for their primary goods and decline in foreign aid inflows. 
These have been substantially aggravated by the sluggish growth in OECD trade partners 
of HIPCs. It may also be an indirect measure of the fall in the terms of trade as the 
demand for HIPCs’  exports is exogenously determined in the industrialized world. I, 
therefore, incorporated the growth of OECD trade partners as an additional explanatory 
variable. Finally, from the perspectives of empirical methodology, as opposed to 
Easterly, who uses only cross-section analysis, I used both cross-section and panel (cross-
section pooled times-series analysis). The panel data approach turned out to be more 
plausible relative to the classical cross-section approach at least for two reasons: First, in 
terms of the overall significance of the regression results of the coefficients thanks, 
among other things, to the enlargement of the observations and the subsequent gain in the 
degrees of freedom. Second, the panel approach helps to control for time-specific factors 
that are very relevant given the turbulence macroeconomic-policy environment that 
aggravated the indebtedness of poor nations in the past two decades.34 
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 Easterly (2002), for instance classified the past two decades into three periods (p. 1684): the 1979-87 
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The variables chosen are based on economic theory, past theoretical and empirical 
studies, mainly Easterly’ s 2002 paper, and the specific nature of the past two decades. 
The definitions of the variables and their source are presented in table (2.1). The 
comparison between HIPCs and non-HIPCs in selected variables are in table (2.2). The 
list of countries included in this analysis is in table (2.4) and tables (2.5) and (2.6) present 
descriptive statistics for the panel and the cross-section regression, respectively 
 
2.2.1. Model, data description, empirical results and discussion 
 
The variables chosen are falling into three categories: 
 
1. The first include general macroeconomic factors that derive to potential 
external indebtedness. These include: capital flight, current account deficit to 
GDP ratio, quasi-money to GDP ratio (M2/GDP), an index of overvaluation, 
the real interest rate, and log of the black market premium.  
2. The second category includes external factors that lead an economy into 
foreign indebtedness, which include: log of the percentage change in the terms 
of trade, violent crisis and war incidence, which might contribute to 
involuntary (forced) indebtedness and the growth of industrialized countries. 
3. The last category represents the forms of financing the current account deficit, 
which include: foreign direct investment; IMF and World Bank financing and 
their joint financing (the summation of both institutions). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
when debt ratios rose, the 1988-94, when debt ratios remained constant, and the 1995-97 in which debt 
ratios fell” . This may imply that the time-specific factors should be incorporated to capture these effects, 
which calls for the switch to a panel data approach. 
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Table (2.1) 
Definitions of the variables in the HIPCs regression 
Variablea Definitionb Sourcec 
CFLGDP Capital flight to GDP ratio (calculated using 
“ source-uses”  approach) = (change in debt 
+foreign direct investment) – (current 
account deficit + change in reserves) 
Global Development Finance, 
2000 (CD-ROM) 
and  
World Development Indicators, 
2001 (CD-ROM) 
CAGDP Current account to GDP ratio World Development Indicators, 
2001 (CD-ROM) 
DEFGDP Government budget deficit (including 
transfers) to GDP ratio  
Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
INFL Log (1+inflation rate) Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
OVERVAL Index of real overvaluation (1992 Dollars) Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
RINT Real interest rate (the deposit rate less the 
rate inflation measured by GDP deflator)  
Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
LMBP Log of black market premium (parallel 
exchange rate/market exchange rate)*100 
Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
LM2GDP Log of M2 to GDP ratio Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
GRIND GDP growth of OECD trade partners Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
LTOTG Log of the percentage change in the terms of 
trade 
Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
FDIGDP Foreign direct investment to GDP ratio Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
IBRDGDP Disbursements from the IBRD to GDP ratio Global Development Finance, 
2000 (CD-ROM) 
IMFGDP Disbursements from the IMF to GDP ratio Global Development Finance, 
2000 (CD-ROM) 
War The percentage of time at war WWW.SIPRI.org 
Violent The percentage of time at violent crisis WWW.SIPRI.org 
 
all variables are average values; b. my own calculation; and c. Easterly and Mirvat (2002), Database for 
Global Development Network, World Bank 
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Table (2.2) 
Macroeconomic policy, financing, and external shocks: A comparison between HIPCs 
and Non-HIPCs  (1982-99)b 
  Heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) 
Non-heavily indebted less-developed 
countries 
 Variables 1982-87 1988-93 1994-99 1982-87 1988-93 1994-99 
LWBGDPI 6.81 6.68 7.40 7.80 8.18 8.40 
CFLGDP 0.02 2.79 10.46 3.47 3.51 3.61 
CAGDP -8.83 -8.61 -8.59 -3.43 -1.54 -2.46 
LBMP 3.80 3.06 1.24 3.10 2.87 1.60 
RINTR -0.66 11.56 8.93 4.79 7.38 10.98 
FDIGDP 0.48 0.47 2.39 1.08 1.94 3.79 
DEFGDP -3.29 -2.57 -2.85 -4.18 -1.44 -1.96 
INFL 3.14 3.85 5.18 3.20 4.08 4.96 
OVERVAL 218.50 148.07 122.15 107.14 99.74 105.79 
LTOTG 0.30 -1.97 0.33 -0.53 -0.37 -0.23 
LM2GDP 2.95 2.84 3.16 3.38 3.43 3.56 
IMFGDP 1.074 0.747 1.158 0.777 0.445 0.324 
WBGDP 0.520 0.266 0.018 0.762 0.672 0.477 
 
Source: own calculation based on data sources 
b. see, table (2.1) for the definitions of the variables 
 
The dependent variables are defined the same as that of Easterly. The results for the 
cross-section regressions are in tables (2.7) to (2.20), while the regression results for 
cross-section pooled time series are in tables (2.21) to (2.36) in the appendix. Most of the 
results in this paper are consistent with the findings of Easterly (2002), despite the fact 
that I have used a panel data and cross-section pooled time series approach, fewer 
number of observations (due to usual data constraint) ,we do not consider identical time 
period (Easterly considers the period (1979-97), while my case is (1982-99)). However, 
the panel data approach generates more plausible results than a simple cross-section 
approach. 
 
1. Macroeconomic stability 
 
“ Macroeconomic stability- reflected in low and stable inflation, sustainable budget deficit, and appropriate 
exchange rates, sends important signals to the private sector about the direction of the economic policies 
and the credibility of the authorities regarding their ability to manage the economy efficiently”   
(Hadjimichael and Ghura (1995, p. 3) 
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There is a general consensus, despite persisting measurement problems, that one of the 
primary root causes of the external indebtedness of indebted countries is undoubtedly 
capital flight. As it will broadly be discussed in chapter four of this dissertation, although 
LDCs (less developed countries) got heavily indebted, paradoxically, they were reported 
to have the highest capital flight in the world. Part of the reason is macroeconomic 
instability (financial repression, and other detrimental policies like high tax rates) in poor 
countries. In this calculation, the positive sign would mean capital flight while a negative 
sign would mean capital flight reversal. I therefore, expect a more capital flight from 
HIPCs relative non-HIPCs counterparts.35 This indicator has a negative sign, though not 
significant, for HIPCs (surprisingly, indicating that the private sector in heavily indebted 
countries is engaged in higher capital flight that in non-HIPCs countries (see tables (2.7) 
and (2.21)). Having said that, however, the result of this coefficient should be interpreted 
with caution as there is high measurement problem that may result in a downward biased 
estimator. If part of the insignificance were not caused due to measurement errors, the 
result would have simply been interpreted as anomalous, because it is purely 
counterintuitive and against the available evidence.  
 
The most important macroeconomic factor relevant to external indebtedness is the current 
account balance.36 Basically, the current account balance indicates the savings–
investment gap (see graph 1). This captures the behavior of both the private and the 
government sector. If there is a current account deficit, this is either because the private 
                                                           
35
 Zaire under Mobutu is an example in point. For almost 10 years Zaire had been engulfed by several debt 
crises. Following Erbe (1985), while for example in 1982, Zaire’ s total external debt stock stood at around 
4 billion USD, Mobutu’ s and his clan private assets held abroad in the same year was estimated to be 
between 4 and 6 billion USD (p. 268). It is also believed that 39% of private capital of SSA be held abroad, 
while at the same time the region got to a historically high record of external indebtedness (Collier;  
Hoeffler; and Pattillo (1999), in: Easterly 2002, pp. 1689)).Collier and Gunning (1994) also support this. A 
similar result has been found by Ajayi (1997), who indicates that the stock of accumulated capital flight 
over the period 1980-91 for HIPCs to have represented 40% of the group’ s outstanding debt (Ajayi, 1997; 
in: Easterly (2002), pp. 1689). Boyce and Ndikuman (2001) for 25 low-income Sub-Saharan countries find 
out that, while the accumulated capital flight in 1996 totaled more than 285 billion USD, the accumulated 
external debt stock  in the same year was 178 USD, making the region as they call it, a ‘net creditor’  to the 
rest of the world. Dornbusch (1985, in Smith et al (1985, p. 215)) concludes that ” the debt build up does 
not correspond one-for-one to a resource transfer from lending countries to the borrowers. Part of the 
increased gross debt merely reflects capital flight and no change in aggregate foreign assets” . 
36
 Most argue that after the 1982 debt crisis the view on current account changed. As Fischer (1988, pp. 
115, in: Edwards (2001, pp. 10) puts it, “ the primary indicator (of a looming crisis) is the current account 
deficit. Large actual or projected current account deficits or, for countries that have to make heavy debt 
repayments, insufficiently large surpluses ..., are a call for devaluation)” . 
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sector invests (consumes) more than it manages to save, or the government sector spends 
more than it is capable of collecting tax revenues.37 As will be discussed further on, this 
might also be due to other exogenous factors that are beyond the scope of the domestic 
economy. The external balance on goods and services (resource balance) also indicates 
that HIPCs have done very poorly with this indicator (see graph 2).38 The empirical 
results of both the cross-section and the cross-section pooled- times series indicate that 
the current account deficit played an enormous role in the process of HIPC’ s 
indebtedness.39 (See tables (2.8) and (2.22)). This is consistent with the finding of 
Easterly (2002), who rightly concludes that ”HIPCs got indebted by borrowing a lot”  (p. 
1685). 
 
                                                           
37
 As McFadden, et al, (1985, in Smith, et al (1985, p. 182) rightly puts it, “ pegging exchange rate at 
unsustainable levels or borrowing to finance current consumption can lead to a” day of reckoning” . These 
policies also signal to creditors a lack of the economic control necessary to generate the foreign exchange 
inflows for debt service” . 
38
 The external balance on goods and services captures the difference between exports of goods and 
services and imports of goods and services (WB, Global Development Finance, CD- ROM, 2000). 
39
 This is not a surprising finding for HIPCs. Most HIPCs are suffering from the saving-investment gap as 
the result of their weak income. Moreover, even under the assumption of domestic saving availability to 
finance investment, still external indebtedness is likely to occur due, among other things, to the foreign-
exchange gap. Most HIPCs do still have inconvertible domestic currencies and as the result, foreign 
reserves to finance imports are extraordinarily vital. 
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The government budget deficit is thought to be detrimental to the external account. 
Higher government expenditure, in the context of developing countries, put further 
pressure on the current account balance and increases external indebtedness. However, 
there is a reverse causality problem. On the one hand, it is possible that there is a high 
government budget deficit in order to finance past current account deficit. On the other 
hand, a high current account deficit may be due largely to high government expenditure. 
The results indicate that high budget deficit was not a major policy distortion across 
HIPCs (see, table 2.9). The impact of inflation on the indebtedness process is not that 
straightforward. Inflation might increase external borrowing by depressing external 
competitiveness and consequently widening the current account deficit. On the other 
hand, it might worsen the current account deficit simply by reducing investment, since 
high rate of inflation leads to low real interest rates that discourage both savings rate and 
foreign investment. This may have enormous implications to LDCs due mainly to the 
absence of developed and functioning capital markets.40 Inflation in the early 1980s had 
been quite high for Latin America and since 33 of the 41 countries classified as HIPCs 
are in Africa, it implies that inflation had been a phenomena more relevant to Latin 
America rather than HIPCs (see, tables (2.10 and 2.24)). 
 
On the exchange-rate policy front, LDCs (less developed countries) have always been 
criticized for their unwise exchange-rate policies. In theory, an overvaluation of the 
domestic currency may lead to higher external indebtedness by weakening the export 
sector’ s international competitiveness and subsequently reducing the foreign exchange 
that is vital for financing import bills. A decline in export revenue in the context of LDCs 
in general and HIPCs in particular is crucial as other forms of financing imports (foreign 
direct investment and portfolio investment) are highly limited. If the domestic currency is 
perceived as overvalued, it is often accompanied by devaluation expectation, which 
hinders investment as people would prefer to wait and see simply because they do not 
have any clue about the timing of devaluation and its magnitude. The results of both the 
                                                           
40
 The negative impact of inflation on growth in the context of poor countries reflects, among other things, 
the decision by households of holding their assets during high rate of inflation. In the absence of 
functioning capital market, which is the case in most poor countries, people hold their wealth either in the 
form of real estates, foreign currencies or keep it in foreign bank accounts in the form of capital flight. This 
obviously reduces both the rate of savings and the amount of foreign exchange available in the economy. 
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cross-section and pooled-time series indicate that HIPCs have in fact been driven to 
external indebtedness also thanks to their mistaken exchange-rate policies (See tables 
(2.11) and (2.25)).41 This may also be interpreted as the inclination of indebted countries 
to choose bad rather than good policies as has been argued by Easterly. 
 
Similarly, a black market premium is considered to be detrimental for maintaining a 
sustainable external balance position. A high black market premium is often an indicator 
of financial repression, which among other things, leads to low or negative real interest 
rates. This may ultimately discourage savings and lead to further external borrowing to 
finance investment projects and maintain the level of consumption. Here again, the 
empirical results suggest that the black market premium was not significantly different 
for HIPCs compared to their Non-HIPCs counterparts. (See tables (2.13) and (2.27)). 
Real interest rates do not seem to be the core factor behind HIPCs indebtedness. The 
impact of high real interest rate seems to be significant in the second and third period 
rather than the first period (1982-87). (See tables (2.12) and (2.26)).  
 
The ratio of M2 to GDP is another important macroeconomic variable that provides a 
broader picture of the degree of financial liberalization and the openness of the economy. 
The higher this ratio, the less the degree of financial repression and the higher would be 
the subsequent economic growth that ultimately leads to less external borrowing. Turning 
to the empirical results, both the cross-section and panel approaches indicate that there 
was a sluggish improvement in HIPCs financial liberalization and overall openness 
relative to the other group. The time dummies indicate that this situation for the whole 
group under consideration was particularly bad in the first period (1982-87). This is also 
consistent with the empirical finding of Easterly (2002) (see tables (2.14) and (2.28)).42 
 
                                                           
41
 Obviously, as always, overvaluation should not always be a bad thing since it helps to decrease the prices 
of imports (if the major part imports consists of technological goods and other inputs that are inevitable to 
the expansion of the export sector). Indeed, this had been one of the development strategies, known as 
” import –substitution development”  that was followed by developing countries notably Latin America, but 
turned out to be a failure as opposed to the ” export promotion strategy”  followed by East Asian countries. 
 
42
 The debt overhang effect hypothesis argues in this line, where indebted countries loose the incentive to 
formulate and exercise good policies since part of the success will be eaten up by creditors 
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2. External factors 
 
Now turning our attention to the contribution of external factors, it appears that HIPCs 
had been hit by external shocks more seriously than their respective non-HIPCs 
counterparts. I start with the growth of industrialized countries. There are several reasons 
as why the growth in industrialized countries should matter for HIPCs growth. First, a 
slow growth in industrialized countries reduces the amount of aid flows to poor countries. 
Second, such a sluggish growth may lead to the fall in the demand for poor countries’  
exports in industrialized countries, which by the way are the major trade partners of most 
HIPCs countries. The fall in foreign aid and export revenue should ultimately drive the 
economy to serious internal and external indebtedness. Finally, a recession in 
industrialized countries may substantially jeopardize the amount and timing of the debt 
relief that HIPCs are badly in need of.43 The new challenges to the international 
community have also led to the diversion of resources and overall attention away from 
HIPCs in general and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular towards other parts of the world.44 
 
The empirical results of both the cross-section and panel data indicate that HIPCs have 
indeed been significantly affected by the deterioration in the growth of the industrialized 
world. The time specific dummies suggest that the impact has been more acute in the 
second (1988-93) and third (1994-99) periods. (See tables (2.15) and (2.29)). 
 
Violent crisis and war (both calculated as percentage of period in violent crisis and war) 
capture the extent to which political instability may undermine growth and push to 
                                                           
43
 Eichengreen and Portes (1986, p.612) argue that ” in the 1930s, one of the principal channels through 
which these deflationary pressures were transmitted to developing countries was via primary commodity 
prices” . Moreover, Eaton, et al (1981, p. 301), conclude that ” despite lack of long-run data, much 
borrowing by poor country governments during the 1970s has been motivated by short-term adjustment 
associated with oil price increases and OECD recessions” . On the other hand, as McFadden et al (1985, in 
Smith, et al (1985) have argued, high growth rate in high-income countries may also reflect the level of 
investment in these countries, which may crowd out the amount of loans left for developing countries 
loans.  
44
 After the 1989, former communist countries like Russia, that used to be a donor, now turned out to be a 
rival competitor against developing countries for foreign aid and loans. The collapse of communism and 
the transition of former Eastern block countries to a market economy demanded that resources were 
diverted towards these countries. Moreover, the 1990s witness the intensified preoccupation of the 
international community with the restoration of peace across the developing world which put further 
pressure on global financial resources. 
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external indebtedness and dependence. The empirical results in the panel data indicate 
that HIPCs had been the victim of war and violent crises. The results I found here are 
consistent with other empirical studies on the economic causes of civil war and violent 
crisis. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000), for example, identify that over the last 40 years, 
nearly 20 African countries (40% of SSA) have experienced at least one civil war. They 
also added that 20% of SSA’ s population now lives in countries which are formally at 
war; and that the prevalence of civil war increased in the past two decades, which is also 
the period of deepest external indebtedness, and I believe that this definitely is not a mere 
coincidence. On the empirical front, Collier and Hoeffler (1998), indicate that there are 
strong economic reasons behind a civil war. 45 (See table (2.30) and (2.31)). 
 
One widely recognized factor behind the external indebtedness of LDCs is the severe 
deterioration in the terms of trade of mainly primary commodities. The justification is 
linked to the loss in export revenue and an increase in export bills that lead to serious 
financial discrepancy, which must be filled by overseas borrowing. As in Easterly’ s case, 
the empirical results in this study do not suggest that HIPCs had been especially 
negatively affected by swings in their export revenue. In other words, while it is 
recognized that HIPCs have experienced serious deterioration in their terms of trade, but 
this turned out to be true for other LDCs too.  (See tables (2.16) and (2.32)). 
 
3. External financing  
 
A short run current account deficit should not be a serious obstacle if it is financed 
through non-debt creating sources (foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, 
official transfers, gold sales, and so on).  But the experiences of most poor countries 
indicate that this has not been the case. Foreign direct investment accounted for only a 
smaller proportion of the foreign direct investment in the world. The empirical analysis in 
this paper indicates that HIPCs have failed to attract foreign direct investment in the past 
                                                           
45
 Collier and Hoeffler (1998), conclude that higher income reduces the duration of civil war and the 
probability of its occurrence, that the possession of primary commodities is bad unless there are plenty of 
them, that high populous countries are prone to civil war, and that ethnic fractionalization increases the 
probability of civil war. Obviously HIPCs fulfill the majority of these criteria. 
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two decades, controlling for income and time specific events. The coefficients on the 
time dummies also suggest that the inflow of foreign direct investment was worst in the 
last period (1994-99). The reasons are complicated than one may assume. Some, for 
example, Easterly (2002), relate this to poor economic policies in HIPCs, emphasizing 
that the fall in the supply of foreign direct investment in these economies is simply the 
reaction to their huge macroeconomic-policy distortions. But one has to add that despite 
the fact that some countries have managed to minimize economic-policy distortions, the 
flows of foreign direct investment have still been constrained by other non-economic 
bottlenecks, political instability, for instance. Therefore, to conclude that only policy 
matters for the inflows of foreign direct investment to HIPCs, I assume, is rather a gross 
generalization (see tables (2.17) and (2.33)). 
 
Financing from the international financial institutions has been vital for the vast majority 
of LDCs. As private creditors withheld loans in the late 1980s and 1990s, especially the 
IMF becomes, as it is often called, the ” last resort”  for poor countries to borrow overseas. 
This has been particularly true since the vast majority of HIPCs have undertaken the 
Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) orchestered by the IMF. The results indicate that 
HIPCs have not become HIPCs by borrowing from the World Bank (IBRD), but rather 
from the IMF (disbursements from the IMF).46 To see the contribution of the World 
Bank’ s and IMF’ s joint financing for HIPCs’  indebtedness, I took the summation of 
funds from both of these institutions. The results now indicate that the two international 
financial institutions worked together for HIPCs to be become HIPCs, though the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. (See, tables (2.18), (2.19), (2.20); and (2.34), 
(2.35), and (2.36)). Table (2.37) presents Easterly’ s (2002) results. 
 
                                                           
46
 This makes sense since I use disbursements from the IRBD that is non-concessional, hence borrowing at 
market interest rates; and HIPCs could hardly afford to take such expensive loans as opposed to Non-
HIPCs counterparts. In contrast, loans from IMF, though not significant in terms of their size, but continued 
to be inevitable to sign the SAPs with the IMF if countries were to get debt relief and further borrowing 
even from other multilateral and governmental sources. This gives the IMF its popular name the 
” Gatekeeper”  and ” Watchdog”  of the international debt management (Wayne, 1993). 
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What have we learnt so far from the analysis? 
 
From the analysis so far one may draw several conclusion on HIPCs external 
indebtedness: First, though it has been widely argued that one of HIPC’ s root cause of 
external indebtedness is the deterioration in the terms of trade, the results of Easterly and 
this paper indicate that this group was not affected differently by the shocks in the terms 
of trade compared to other developing countries. Second, HIPCs have indeed been 
suffering from high external account imbalance compared to the non-HIPCs counterpart. 
This may be a reflection of the savings-investment gap that is argued by the two-gap 
model. Moreover, HIPCs have exercised more distorted policies, including less openness, 
overvalued exchange rates, and higher black market premium, among other things, 
compared to non-HIPCs. Third, HIPCs have failed to attract foreign investment 
compared to its non-HIPCs counterpart. Though this may imply, as Easterly argues, that 
HIPCs are suffering from their own bad policies, one should be careful of rushing into 
conclusion. The reason is that there is a reverse causality (endogeneity) problem. Fourth, 
as the result of the first three reasons, HIPCs become dependent on multilateral sources 
of financing, particularly that of the IMF. The results both in Eastery’ s study and in this 
work indicate that in fact HIPCs got indebted mainly with the help of the IMF. 
 
Nevertheless, Easterly’ s strategy does not encompass the broader debate on the 
determinants of external debt. That is, while his approach gives a general framework 
about the behavior of HIPCs, one needs to further investigate the motives of developing 
countries to borrow overseas in a more comprehensive way. That is what I intend to do in 
the next section. 
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2.3. A further empirical exploration into the causes of 
LDCs external indebtedness in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
2.3.1. Determinants of demand for overseas borrowing: A theoretical model 
 
Here I first summarize the theoretical framework that justifies the need for external 
overseas borrowing by developing countries.47 The framework is adapted from 
McFadden, et al (1983, pp. 203-204). The model begins by summarizing the determinants 
of the current account (CA) surplus, where CA is the difference between items that 
generate foreign exchange and those that require foreign-exchange expenditure. 
 
                  OTPILFMXCA −−−=                                                                      (1) 
Where, 
X = export; M, imports; ILF, interest paid on loans from foreigners; and OTP, other net 
factors payments and transfers to foreigners. 
 
FDILFBFNIRCA −∆−∆+∆=                                                             (2) 
 
Eq. (2) is another way of writing the current account surplus of equation (1). This time, 
the current account is the difference between changes in the international reserves (∆NIR) 
and foreign bonds placed domestically (∆BF)), and an increase in loans from foreigners 
(∆LF) and foreign direct investment (FDI). Then, the change in loans from foreigners 
(∆LF) is basically the difference between new foreign loans (N) and payments of foreign 
loan principal (PLF). Then, demand for new foreign loans (N) would be: 
 
MXOTPFDIBFNIRILFPLFN +−+−∆+∆++=                         (3) 
 
Eq. (3) implies that the demand for new foreign loans is an increasing function of 
payments of foreign loan principal due (PLF); interest paid on loans from foreigners 
                                                           
47
 Dornbusch (1985, in Smith, et al (1985, p. 214) links the increase in gross external debt to (current 
account deficit - direct and long-term portfolio capital inflows) + (official reserve increases + other private 
capital outflows).  
 
 105 
(ILF); ∆NIR; ∆BF; OTP; and imports; and a decreasing function of exports (X) and 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  
 
Now, the sum of interest (ILF) and principal (PLF) payments paid is nothing other than 
total debt service paid (DSP). The DSP is also nothing else other than the difference 
between total debt service due (DSD), which incorporates also past arrears outstanding 
and current arrears (A). Substituting these relationships into equation (3), they found 
equation (4), which represents the demand for new foreign loans. 
 
MXOTPFDIBFNIRDSDAN +−+−∆+∆+=+                        (4) 
 
The assumption they follow here is that countries prefer to protect their reputation by 
rolling over their external debt rather than by arrears. This gives an equation for a one-
period –ahead ex ante demand for new loans, which satisfies:  
 
eeeeeeeD MXOTPFDIBFNIRDSDN +−+−∆+∆+=                (5) 
 
Where, ND stands for new loan demanded, and the superscripts e stands for expectations 
and other variables are as defined above.  
 
From eq. (5) it implies that the demand for overseas borrowing is an increasing function 
of total debt service (DSD), the change in international reserves, the change in foreign 
bonds placed domestically (which partly reflects capital flight), net transfers to 
foreigners, and imports of goods and services. In contrast, capital inflows in the form of 
foreign direct investment and export revenues reduce the demand for external borrowing.  
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2.3.2. A summary of previous empirical studies 
 
There are several empirical studies that investigated the determinants of external 
borrowing. Although they all have the same fundamental arguments, they deviate with 
respect to the choice of covariates that determine the demand for external loans and their 
methodological approaches. Eaton, et al (1981) was among the first to look at this issue. 
The theoretical model and its corresponding empirical counterpart are based on the 
following assumptions: First, the amount of a country’ s debt is determined by its 
willingness to borrow and a credit ceiling. Second, a rise in income variability (measured 
by the standard deviation exports) boosts the demand for borrowing. Third, while a rise in 
the growth rate of GDP leads to higher demand for borrowing, it decreases or increases 
the credit ceiling depending of the degree of risk aversion.48 Finally, provided that the 
utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion, then the income elasticities of 
both the ceiling and willingness to borrow are one. They also empirically show, using 
logit model and data for 81 countries for the periods 1970 and 1974, that the demand for 
borrowing is positively related with income variability, ratio of import to GDP, and initial 
income. 
 
Eichengreen and Portes (1986), using both annual cross-section from 1930-38 for 16 to 
23 countries and panel data indicate that while export instability and degree of openness 
are positively correlated with government external debt, they are not statistically 
significant. The only explanatory variable that was always significantly different from 
zero is the log of GDP per capita (LGDP). Shifting their approach to panel data, they 
indicate that all the variables but export variability turned out to be statistically 
significant. Though they recognized the problem of potential simultaneity, they have 
done little to resolve this problem.  
 
On the other hand, in a different approach, Hajivassiliou (1987), using data for 79 
developing countries in the period 1970-82, and treating the demand for and the supply of 
                                                           
48
 Following Eaton, et al (1981), “ a negative effect of growth on the ceiling is more likely the more risk 
averse is the country, the more rapidly its risk aversion falls with increase in income, and possibly, if the 
percent variability of income falls as income increases”  ( p. 301). 
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loans separately, finds out that the demand for borrowing is positively determined by 
total debt service to export ratio, growth of GDP per capita, import to GDP ratio, interest 
and principal to export ratios and negatively by real GDP per capita (in contrast to both 
Eichengreen’ s and Eaton’ s, who used GDP). Similar results were obtained by McFadden, 
et al (1983), which shall be discussed more in the context of a debt service crisis in just a 
moment.  
 
2.3.3. The empirical model, data description and results 
 
Recognizing that previous empirical studies have produced fruitful results, there seems to 
be a room for extending those studies by considering the following: 
 
• The 1980s and partly 1990s witness that capital flight has been a disastrous 
phenomena for developing countries. I, therefore, include this variable in this 
regression.  
• The role of the fall in the terms of trade that has been ignored by previous studies 
should be given an appropriate attention.  
• One needs to separately deal with whether the demand for external borrowing for 
HIPCs differ from those of other LDCs. This has been taken care of by two 
approaches. One approach is simply by putting a dummy for HIPCs in the 
regression for all samples and the second one is by running a separate regression 
for HIPCs alone. Since the number of HIPCs with full data is around 21, 
sometimes even less, I run a cross-section pooled time-series rather than a fixed 
effects model. Otherwise, there would just be not enough degrees of freedom.  
• Thirdly, for all observations, I run annual cross-section pooled time-series and 
random and fixed effects model to control for country and time-specific effects.49 
                                                           
49
 The panel data approach is particularly important when analyzing the causes of indebtedness. As 
Hajivassiliou (1987) correctly puts it, except the traditional advantage of the panel data approach that will 
be discussed broadly in the fourth chapter of this work, developing countries seem to differ from each other 
due to colonial histories, political and financial institutions, and degree of creditworthiness. Therefore, the 
problem of heterogeneity might be substantially reduced by allowing country-specific factors. Moreover, 
the time-specific dummy may help to control for swings in international economic policies and 
indebtedness and debt relief over time. 
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• Finally, to my knowledge, except Easterly’ s 2002, there is no fresh empirical 
work in this area to explore the demand for indebtedness in the 1980s and 1990s 
. 
      
( )
)()()(
)()()()()(
+−+
−++++
+++
++++++=
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LTOTTDSXCFLXMGDPSDXLEDTGDPLEDT α
 
The basic empirical model that captures the covariates and their expected signs is just 
above. The dependent variable is the logarithm of total external debt (and its ratio to 
GDP). The variables, their definitions and sources are presented in (2.3). Tables (2.3a) 
and (2.3b) in the appendix present the results for the annual regression. Tables (2.38) and 
(2.39) present the annual cross-section regressions of log of total external debt (LEDT) 
and its ratio to GDP (LEDTGDP) on selected variables. Tables (2.40a), (2.40b), and 
(2.40c) present descriptive statistics and correlation matrices, respectively. Tables (2.41a) 
and (2.41b) present fixed effects and random effects models results for LEDT and 
LEDTGDP, respectively. Table (2.42) contains cross-section pooled time series 
regression results for all observations. Table (2.43) presents differences in the mean 
values of the covariates for HIPCs and non-HIPCs, while table (2.44) presents the impact 
of each covariate on the difference in the level of log of total external debt to GDP ratio 
(LEDTGDP). Tables (2.45a) to (2.45c) present descriptive statistics and correlation 
matrices for HIPCs panel data. Finally, tables (2.46a) and (2.46b) present cross-section 
pooled time series results for HIPCs.  
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Table 2.3 
Definitions of variables used in the regression (1982-98)1 
Variable Definition Source 
LTEDT logarithms of total external debt (LEDT) 
(average 1982-98) 
Global Development Finance, 
CD-ROM, 2000 
LEDTGDP LEDT to GDP ratio Global Development Finance, 
CD-ROM, 2000 
SDX Standard deviation of exports (1995 
constant prices) 
World Development Indicators, 
2001 
TDSX Total debt service due to exports ratio Global Development Finance, 
CD-ROM, 2000 
CFLX Capital flight to export ratio. The 
“ sources and uses”  methodology: 
(Capital flight = (change in debt + 
foreign direct investment)-(current 
account deficit + change in reserves) 
Global Development Finance, 
CD-ROM, 2000 and  
World Development Indicators, 
2001 
LTOTG The logarithms of the percentage change 
in the terms of trade 
Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002)2 
MGDP Imports to GDP ratio World Development Indicators, 
2001 
LGDP Log of GDP (PPP-adjusted) World Bank, Easterly William 
and Mirvat Sewadeh (2002) 
GRGDP Growth rate of GDP (PPP-adjusted) World Bank, Easterly William 
and Mirvat Sewadeh (2002 
LPOP Log of  population World Development Indicators, 
2001 
 
1. all covariates are initial values to minimize possible simultaneity  
2.
 Database for Global Development Network, World Bank 
 
Turning to my own analysis, the regression results indicate the following: First, I start 
with the log of total external debt as a dependent variable (see table 2.38). Higher 
standard deviation of exports (SDX) used as a proxy for income stability, though not 
statistically significant, increases the demand for external borrowing. This seems to 
suggest that countries with higher income instability are dependent on external financing 
and are therefore not prone to defaulting because of fear of sanctions by creditors.  
 
However, the coefficient of this covariate has not been significant in any of the years 
considered, except 1996. Countries with higher ratios of imports to GDP (MGDP), which 
is also a measure of openness and the price of penalty, have a greater tendency to borrow 
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overseas more than those with lower MGDP ratio. In the annual cross-section regression, 
this variable turned out to be positive and significant between the years 1982 and 1986. 
The coefficient for capital flight (CFLX) while remains positive in all the periods (except 
1984 and 1997), it has been statistically significant only in 1983, 1987, 1989, 1990. The 
positive signs for capital flight suggest that countries with higher capital flight tend to 
borrow more than those with less capital flight. The log of the percentage change in the 
terms of trade used as a proxy for welfare gain or loss in international trade, indicates that 
in 1983, 1986, 1988 and 1997, it was negatively and statistically significantly related to 
the demand for external borrowing. This indicates that countries with the worsening 
terms of trade should find themselves on the front door of the borrowing market. Total 
debt service payments to exports ratio (TDSX) seems to indicate that countries with 
higher debt service payments tend to borrow more in order to finance their past 
accumulated debt. This is consistent with the vicious circle of financing or simply 
” circular financing”  phenomena poor countries have come across.50 The log of GDP 
(LGDP) and the growth rate of GDP (GRDPG) are key indicators of creditworthiness.51 
The log of GDP (LGDP) in particular seems to be the main factor behind external 
borrowing. The results suggest that relatively larger economies had a greater tendency to 
borrow overseas and pay back their debts afterwards. The relationship is almost one-for -
one across the 1980s and 1990s with the exception of 1988, 1996 and 1997. This may 
also mean that richer countries have better collateral to borrow overseas and have 
generally higher creditworthiness.  
 
The results are very similar to those of Eichengreen and Portes (1986) who also found the 
same empirical evidence for the debt crisis in the 1930s. Their findings also indicate that 
the level of GDP was the key determining factor that shaped the behavior of debtors in 
the 1930s. The regression for the growth of GDP (GRGDP) has given mixed results, 
though the coefficients are not significant in most of the periods under consideration. For 
                                                           
50
 Kanbur (2000, pp. 688; in: UNCTAD, 2001, pp. 123) argue that “ ...official donors, who are also 
creditors, are putting money in so that the debt can be serviced” . Similarly, Killick and Stevens (1997, pp. 
165; in: UNCTAD, 2001, pp. 123) conclude that “ creditor governments have been taking money with one 
hand what they have given with the other” . 
51
 As McFadden, et al (1985, in Smith, et al (1985, p. 188) put it, both the level of income and its growth 
rate may reflect the ability to pay and the presence of government infrastructure adequate to control trade 
and exchange activities. 
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example, in 1982, this variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient 
perhaps indicating that countries with poor growth performance tend to have a greater 
desire to borrow overseas. The positive coefficients for HIPCs’  dummy suggest that this 
group has been affected more seriously than the non-HIPCs countries that are under 
investigation in this study. The coefficients, however, are significant only for selected 
years (1986, 1989, 1992, 1994 and 1997).  
 
One of the shortcomings of taking the absolute value of total external debt as a dependent 
variable is that it is not possible to appropriately control for country and economy size 
differences across countries. I, therefore, deflated the total external debt by GDP and used 
it as an alternative dependent variable. The results for the annual cross-section regression 
are in table (2.39) in the appendix. It appears that while there was no dramatic change in 
the results, it is now worthwhile to notice that the income (LGDP) variable that has 
always been positive and significant in the previous analysis now becomes insignificant 
or negative. The negative sign on this variable indicates that smaller economies have a 
greater desire to borrow overseas.  
 
Switching to a panel data approach presented in table (2.41a), the regression results 
suggest that now the significance of the income stability indicator (SDX) becomes 
stronger both in the random effects and fixed effects models. The capital flight to exports 
(CFLX), total debt service (TDSX) and the change in the terms of trade (LTOTG) 
continue to have the right signs and remain significant, except the last two variables that 
are not significant in the fixed effects model. The import to GDP ratio (MGDP) suggests 
that higher share of imports to GDP matters for external indebtedness only if we leave 
out CFLX, TDSX and LTOT. The log of GDP both in the random effects and fixed 
effects models suggest that relatively larger economies have higher desire to borrow 
overseas and also tend to payback their past debt. As opposed to the annual cross–section 
model, in the panel analysis, countries with higher growth rate have a tendency to borrow 
less. The coefficients on HIPCs dummy suggest that things have gone worst for this 
group when all the variables are included (column 4 of table 2.41a) in the random effects 
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model. The cross-section pooled-time series analysis is very similar to that of the random 
effects model (see, table 2.42). 
 
Similarly, deflating the total debt stock by GDP in the framework of a panel data, the 
results for income per capita variable (LGDP) changed significantly. In both the random 
and fixed effects models, the LGDP variable has now negative and statistically 
significant coefficients (see, table 2.41b). This seems to suggest that, controlling for the 
independent variables, country-specific and time-specific factors, it is smaller economies 
rather than larger ones that have a greater desire to borrow overseas. This result is 
consistent with the gap models, and other theoretical justification about the determinants 
of demand for overseas borrowing by poor countries that has been discussed earlier.  
 
A separate cross-section pooled time-series regressions for HIPCs that are in tables 
(2.48a and 2.48b) in the appendix, indicate that SDX is negatively related to the demand 
for external debt. This suggests that countries with higher income instability tend to 
demand less borrowing overseas, a result that must be interpreted rather as anomalous.  
On the other hand, such a result may also be the outcome of a credit ceiling. This may be 
for example because countries with unsustainable export revenue do have less incentive 
to pay back their past debt  or simply do no posses enough collateral and this may worsen 
their access to the borrowing market. Capital flight seems to have contributed to HIPCs 
external indebtedness. This may indicate that resources obtained by borrowing from 
overseas are diverted to foreign bank accounts, leaving external debt vitually 
unproductive and further increasing the demand for new loans. The total debt service 
payment and the loss in the terms of trade have also stimulated further external 
borrowing. HIPCs that are relatively open (higher share of imports to GDP (MGDP) 
borrowed more than their less-open HIPCs counterparts. In addition, more open HIPCs 
have a tendency to payback their past debt since the penalty (trade embargo, for instance) 
of default is higher for these countries. The LGDP indicates that relatively larger HIPCs 
had higher demand for external debt and this has been almost one for one. This also 
indicates that relatively larger HIPCs had a tendency to payback their debt as they want 
to borrow in the future. The other variables have not been significant. 
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3. Conclusion and the policy implication of this study 
 
This paper made an attempt to empirically address one of the most important questions of 
the contemporary world: Why developing countries frequently find themselves on the 
front door of borrowing market?  
 
To answer those questions, several empirical strategies have been employed. The first 
attempt was to check the robustness of previous other empirical results in this area. The 
most relevant and recent in this case was that of Easterly (2002), who empirically 
addresses HIPCs external indebtedness. It appears that though in general his studies are 
robust, the implementation of a cross-section pooled time series approach rather than a 
simple cross-section one generates a more robust empirical results as it enables one to 
incorporate time-specific factors that allow to control for changes in the global 
macroeconomic-policy environment, which affect the development of external 
indebtedness over time. 
 
Moving to a broader approach of empirically investigating the causes of external 
indebtedness, again using both annual cross-section, random and fixed effects models and 
cross-section pooled time series, the results suggest that capital flight, debt service 
payments, the imports to GDP ratio, the level of income, and the growth rate of GDP are 
the key determinants of the demand for overseas borrowing. A separate cross-section 
pooled times series analysis for HIPCs indicates that this group’ s demand for overseas 
borrowing was driven mainly by sluggish economic growth, high past debt service 
payments, the deterioration in their terms of trade, and demand for foreign exchange to 
finance their import bills (as most of them are holding currencies that are not freely 
convertible), which is partly the reflection of the foreign-exchange gap.  
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The policy implications of this study are relatively straightforward: 
 
First, the fact that external factors are one of the causes of the external indebtedness of 
developing countries may imply that developed nations should bear part of the 
responsibility as they are part of the problem. Second, debt mismanagement and other 
forms of distortions in developing countries themselves might be responsible for the 
failure of massive inflows of scarce resources to get translated into sustainable economic 
growth. The paradox of this may be apparent given the amount of capital flight from 
developing countries which further widens the financial gap and calls for further demand 
for external loans. This may also be a reflection of poor investment strategies in poor 
countries.  
 
As it is now apparent, given the scale of the debt crisis, indebted poor nations are not able 
to pay back their contractual debt; therefore, it is the moral obligation of developed 
nations to forgive part of their debt claim against these nations. Therefore, while 
developed countries should help their developing counterparts through debt relief and 
other forms of cooperation, developing countries should get their economy in order and 
make sure that external resources are not consumed but rather invested in projects, which 
generate higher returns compared with the cost the external debt. Finally, the developed 
world should stop providing any loan to those of African leaders who come to power 
unconstitutionally.  
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1. Results of the cross-section and Panel regressions (1982-99): 
HIPCs’ Indebtedness 
 
 
Table (2.4) 
List of countries included in the regression1 
Heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs) 
Non-heavily indebted less-developed countries 
 (Non-HIPCs) 
Bolivia Argentina Mauritius 
Burkina Faso Bangladesh Mexico 
Cameroon Belize Morocco 
Chad Botswana Nigeria 
Congo, Rep. Brazil Pakistan 
Cote d'Ivoire Chile Panama 
Ethiopia Colombia Papua New Guinea 
Ghana Costa Rica Paraguay 
Honduras Dominican Republic Peru 
Kenya El Salvador Philippines 
Madagascar Gabon Swaziland 
Malawi Gambia, The Thailand 
Mauritania Guatemala Togo 
Mozambique Haiti Tunisia 
Nicaragua India Uganda 
Niger Indonesia Venezuela, RB 
Rwanda Iran, Islamic Rep. Zambia 
Senegal Jordan Zimbabwe 
Sierra Leone Korea, Rep.   
Trinidad and Tobago Lesotho   
Uruguay Malaysia   
 
1. the number of countries was dictated by data availability 
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Table (2.5) 
Descriptive statistics for HIPCs’  indebtedness (cross-section regression - 1982-99) 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LWGDPI 60 7.448 0.763 6.032 8.952 
CFLGDP 60 2.254 10.782 -22.441 41.366 
CAGDP 60 -4.147 4.526 -26.299 6.250 
LBMP 58 3.032 1.574 0.259 8.291 
RINTR 50 8.051 8.285 -11.969 42.934 
FDIGDP 60 1.542 1.537 -0.462 8.618 
DEFGDP 45 -2.961 3.462 -10.187 9.788 
INFL 60 4.239 0.189 3.635 4.576 
OVERVAL 57 113.5 75.15 37.855 589.423 
LTOTG 60 -0.443 2.043 -6.790 3.102 
LM2/GDP 60 3.311 0.458 2.261 4.624 
IMFGDP 60 0.682 0.840 0 2.173 
IBRDGDP 60 0.450 0.429 0 1.614 
 
 
 
Table (2.6) 
Descriptive statistics for HIPCs’  indebtedness (Panel regression -1982-99) 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LWGDPI 180 7.717 0.827 6.032 9.553 
CFLGDP 180 3.803 8.815 -22.44 56.818 
CAGDP 180 -4.688 6.614 -37.112 10.549 
LBMP 178 2.603 1.693 -0.877 9.446 
RINTR 153 8.793 14.291 -60.848 100.938 
FDIGDP 180 1.850 2.889 -4.68 27.226 
DEFGDP 148 -2.978 4.311 -22.357 13.722 
INFL 179 4.092 1.110 -0.538 5.754 
OVERVAL 170 132.876 108.85 0 1342.871 
LTOTG 180 -0.404 3.581 -14.728 14.395 
LM2GDP 180 3.294 0.493 1.966 4.791 
IMFGDP 180 0.682 0.840 0 5.445 
IBRDGDP 180 0.501 0.592 -0.01 2.976 
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1.1. Cross-section results for HIPCs’ Indebtedness (1982-99) 
 
Table (2.7) 
Dependent variable is Capital flight to GDP ratio (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Constant 7.889 0.42 
LGDPI -0.566 -0.24 
HIPC -4.051 -1.07 
R2   0.025  
N 60  
 
Table (2.8) 
Dependent variable is Current Account balance to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -0.370 -0.07 
LGDPI -0.246 -0.29 
HIPC     -5.552*** -4.19 
R2 0.31  
N 60  
 
Table (2.9) 
Dependent variable is Government budget deficit to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -8.678 1.26 
LGDPI 0.791 0.90 
HIPC -0.800 -0.55 
R2 0.06  
N 60  
 
• *. Significant at 10% level. 
• **. Significant at 5% level. 
• ***. Significant at 1% level. 
 
• T-values are in parentheses, unless they are presented in separate columns. This is applicable for 
all regressions in this paper, except for the correlation matrices, where standard errors are 
presented in parentheses). 
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Table (2.10) 
Dependent variable is log (1+inflation rate) (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant     4.523*** 13.75 
LGDPI -0.035 -0.84 
HIPC -0.058 -0.88 
R2   0.016  
N 60  
 
Table (2.11) 
Dependent variable is overvaluation (1992 constant Dollars) (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -145.69 1.21 
LGDPI 30.823** 2.01 
HIPC 81.891*** 3.34 
R2 0.17  
N 60  
 
Table (2.12) 
Dependent variable is real interest rate (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -29.764* 1.94 
LGDPI 4.835*** 2.45 
HIPC 5.458* 1.85 
R2 0.11  
N 60  
 
Table (2.13) 
Dependent variable is log of black market premium (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 3.692 1.36 
LGDPI -0.113 -0.33 
HIPC  0.529 0.96 
R2  0.039  
N 60  
 
 
Table (2.14) 
Dependent variable is Log of M2/GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant   3.155*** 4.86 
LGDPI 0.040 0.45 
HIPC   -0.415*** -2.91 
R2 0.23  
N 60  
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Table (2.15) 
Dependent variable is growth of real GDP per capita of OECD trade partners (1982-99 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 3.005*** 4.61 
LGDPI -0.155* 1.87 
HIPC -0.379** -2.85 
R2 0.12  
N 58  
 
Table (2.16) 
Dependent variable is log the percentage change in the terms of trade (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -2.329 -0.66 
LGDPI  0.269 0.59 
HIPC -0.347 -0.49 
R2   0.027  
N 60  
 
Table (2.17) 
Dependent variable is foreign direct investment to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 2.309 0.90 
LGDPI -0.053 -0.16 
HIPC    -1.055** -2.04 
R2   0.098  
N 60  
 
 
Table (2.18) 
Dependent variable is disbursements from the IBRD to GDP ratio (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 0.065 0.09 
LGDPI 0.064 0.73 
HIPC -0.270* -1.92 
R2 0.15  
N 60  
 
Table (2.19) 
Dependent variable is use of IMF credit to GDP ratio (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 0.489 0.59 
LGDPI -0.003 -0.03 
HIPC 0.392** 2.33 
R2 0.14  
N 60  
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Table (2.20) 
Dependent variable is IBRD + IMF (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 0.554 0.48. 
LGDPI 0.061 0.42 
HIPC 0.123 0.53 
R2 0.005  
N 60  
 
 
1.2. Panel results for HIPCs’ indebtedness (1982-98)  
 
 
Table (2.21) 
Dependent variable is Dependent variable is Capital flight to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 12.340 1.38 
LGDPI -1.318 -1.17 
PD2  1.502 0.91 
PD3     4.208** 2.49 
HIPC -0.751 -0.39 
R2   0.038  
N 179  
 
Table (2.22) 
Dependent variable is Current Account balance to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -1.308 -0.28 
LGDPI -0.217*** -5.11 
PD2 0.924 0.83 
PD3 0.865 0.75 
HIPC -6.568*** -5.11 
R2 0.212  
N 180  
 
Table (2.23) 
Dependent variable is Government budget deficit to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -12.217*** -2.45 
LGDPI 1.079* 1.71 
PD2 1.029 1.18 
PD3 1.044 1.11 
HIPC 0.716 0.68 
R2 0.056  
N 148  
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Table (2.24) 
Dependent variable is ln(1+inflation) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 5.197*** 5.91 
LGDPI -0.251** -2.26 
PD2 0.928** 5.75 
PD3 1.831*** 11.05 
HIPC -0.265 -1.43 
R2 0.415  
N 179  
 
Table (2.25) 
Dependent variable is overvaluation (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -112.546 -1.05 
LGDPI       31.379** 2.33 
PD2     -38.722** -1.95 
PD3    -52.518** -2.55 
HIPC      94.307*** 4.18 
R2   0.118  
N 170  
Table (2.26) 
Dependent variable is real interest rate (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -25.318 -1.63 
LGDPI     3.695* 1.88 
PD2       5.1269* 1.82 
PD3       6.815** 2.27 
HIPC    4.518 1.39 
R2     0.087  
N   153  
 
Table (2.27) 
Dependent variable is log of black market premium (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 8.039*** 5.44 
LGDPI -0.595*** -3.19 
PD2 -0.212 -0.78 
PD3 -1.656*** -5.93 
HIPC -0.602** -1.92 
R2 0.288  
N 178  
 
Table (2.28) 
Dependent variable is Log (M2/GDP) ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant     2.737*** 6.08 
LGDPI 0.084 1.48 
PD2 0.015 0.18 
PD3 0.085 1.01 
HIPC    -0.361*** -3.79 
R2 0.219  
N 180  
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Table (2.29) 
Dependent variable is growth of GDP per capita in OECD trade partners (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 3.799*** 11.32 
LGDPI -0.169*** -4.02 
PD2 -0.488*** -8.11 
PD3 -0.132** -2.15 
HIPC -0.265*** -3.77 
R2 0.39  
N 171  
 
Table (2.30) 
Dependent variable is percent of period a country is at war (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 1.471*** 4.03 
LGDPI -0.161*** -3.50 
PD2 0.008 0.12 
PD3 0.100 1.45 
HIPC -0.212*** -2.74 
R2 0.072  
 
Table (2.31) 
Dependent variable is percent of period at war (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 1.749*** 5.22   
LGDPI -0.199*** -4.72  
PD2 0.065 1.07   
PD3 0.051 0.82  
HIPC -0.263*** -3.71  
R2 0.118  
N 180  
 
Table (2.32) 
Dependent variable is log of the percentage change in the terms of trade (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant -2.021 -0.45 
LGDPI 0.222 0.39 
PD2 -0.866 -1.07 
PD3 0.157 0.19 
HIPC 0.163 0.17 
R2 0.012  
N 180  
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Table (2.33) 
Dependent variable is foreign direct investment to GDP ratio (1982-99) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 0.713 0.26 
LGDPI 0.073 0.21 
PD2 0.527 1.05 
PD3 2.355*** 4.58 
HIPC -1.117** -1.93 
R2 0.165  
N 180  
 
Table (2.34) 
Dependent variable is disbursements from IBRD to GDP ratio (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 0.238 0.43 
LGDPI 0.073 1.04 
PD2 -0.191* -1.83 
PD3 -0.395*** -3.75 
HIPC -0.302** -2.56 
R2 0.16  
N 180  
 
Table (2.35) 
Dependent variable is disbursements IMF to GDP ratio (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 1.08 1.32 
LGDPI -0.046 -0.45 
PD2 -0.314** -2.08 
PD3 -2.420 -1.57 
HIPC 0.423** 2.43 
R2 0.16  
N 180  
 
Table (2.36) 
Dependent variable is (IBRD + IMF) to GDP ratio (1982-98) 
Variable Coefficient t- Statistic 
Constant 1.320 1.23 
LGDPI 0.026 0.19 
PD2 -0.505** -2.57 
PD3 -0.638*** -3.16 
HIPC 0.120 0.53 
R2 0.06  
N 180  
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Table (2.37) 
 
Easterly (2002) results 
 
Regression results for policies in LDCs 1980-97, controlling for income (sample of all LDCs) 
  
  current account balance/GDP budget deficit, excl. grants/GDP 
Dependent variable,         
average 1980-97 coefficient t-Statistic coefficient t-Statistic 
Log of income, 1979 0.08 0.11 1.47 2.08 
Dummy for HIPCs -5.58 -4.36 -4.26 -3.67 
R2 0.25  0.32  
No. of Observation 77  81  
     
  budget deficit incl. grants/GDP                 M2/GDP 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 -0.34 -0.46 1.5 0.48 
Dummy for HIPCs -4.97 -3.94 -15.65 -2.96 
R2 0.19  0.15  
No. of Observation 84  83  
     
  log (1+inflation rate) index of overvaluation 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 0.13 2.6 9.07 1.13 
Dummy for HIPCs 0.15 1.79 64.19 4.92 
R2 0.08  0.3  
No. of Observation 82  68  
     
     
  Real interest rate Log(1+black market premium) 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 -0.01 -0.47 0.04 0.6 
Dummy for HIPCs -0.05 -1.79 0.09 0.78 
R2 0.05  0.01  
No. of Observation 74  77  
     
  CPIA (1-5 scale)                 FDI/GDP 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 0.07 0.72 0.11 0.66 
Dummy for HIPCs -0.33 -2.15 -0.84 -2.92 
R2 0.11  0.17  
No. of Observation 77  77  
 130 
 
  World Bank Financing/GDP IMF Financing/GDP 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 -0.4 -3.76 0.05 0.41 
Dummy for HIPCs 0.96 5.35 0.73 3.4 
R2 0.53  0.15  
No. of Observation 83  83  
     
  World Bank share of disbursement/GDP IMF share of disbursement/GDP 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 -8.1 -5.72 0.69 0.79 
Dummy for HIPCs 7.17 3.14 4.37 3.12 
R2 0.54  0.13  
No. of Observation 76  76  
     
  Log growth in the terms of trade percent of period at war 
Dependent variable,       
average 1980-97         
Log of income, 1979 0.00 -0.79 -0.04 -0.75 
Dummy for HIPCs 0.00 -0.05 -0.09 -1.1 
R2 0.02  0.02  
No. of Observation 77  76  
 
Source: Easterly William (2002), “ How Did Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Become Heavily Indebted? 
Reviewing Two Decades of Debt Relief” , World Development, Vol. 30, No. 10, (pp. 1685-1686). 
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2. Empirical results on determinants of external indebtedness (1982-99) 
 
Table (2.38) 
Annual Cross-section (All developing Countries)1 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
CONS -1.06 
(-0.43) 
0.494 
(0.19) 
-0.822 
(-0.33) 
-0.676 
(-0.28) 
-2.361 
(-1.09) 
0.581 
(0.22) 
4.172 
(1.56) 
-1.375 
(-0.48) 
-0.191 
(-0.05) 
SDX 0.000 
(0.19) 
0.000 
(1.44) 
0.000 
(0.34) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(0.32) 
0.001 
(1.04) 
0.000 
(1.50) 
-0.000 
(-0.17) 
0.000 
(0.73) 
MGDP 0.009** 
(2.13) 
0.012** 
(2.15) 
0.010* 
(1.97) 
0.011** 
(2.15) 
0.012** 
(2.28) 
0.007 
(1.29) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(1.15) 
0.006 
(0.99) 
CFLX 0.001 
(0.70) 
0.003*** 
(2.77) 
-0.002 
(-1.17) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
0.001 
(1.52) 
0.002*** 
(2.89) 
0.002 
(1.51) 
0.002* 
(1.67) 
0.002* 
(1.63) 
LTOT 0.005 
(-0.95) 
-0.019*** 
(-3.01) 
0.006 
(0.81) 
0.000 
(0.08) 
-0.009** 
(-2.69) 
0.016*** 
(3.21) 
-0.014** 
(2.22) 
0.027*** 
(3.13) 
0.007 
(0.89) 
TDSX 0.018*** 
(3.61) 
0.023*** 
(3.99) 
0.032*** 
(4.92) 
0.030*** 
(4.14) 
0.024*** 
(4.58) 
0.022*** 
(3.63) 
0.019*** 
(3.02) 
0.012* 
(1.62) 
0.021** 
(2.37) 
LGDP 1.110*** 
(6.72) 
0.942*** 
(5.39) 
1.012*** 
(5.76) 
1.035*** 
(6.12) 
1.256*** 
(8.65) 
1.054*** 
(6.11) 
0.826*** 
(4.87) 
1.193*** 
(6.23) 
1.064*** 
(4.64) 
GRGD 0.032** 
(2.26) 
-0.020* 
(-1.65) 
0.006 
(0.48) 
-0.024* 
(-1.91) 
-0.013 
(-1.08) 
-0.03*** 
(-3.35) 
-0.018 
(-1.23) 
-0.009 
(-055) 
-0.007 
(-0.42) 
LPOP -0.248* 
(-1.92) 
-0.111 
(-0.82) 
-0.132 
(-0.96) 
-0.165 
(-1.21) 
-0.39*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.247* 
(-1.85) 
-0.125 
(-0.88) 
-0.333** 
(-2.04) 
-0.227 
(-1.24) 
HIPC 0.314 
(1.30) 
0.307 
(1.35) 
0.271 
(1.12) 
0.261 
(1.09) 
0.619*** 
(2.78) 
0.408 
(1.59) 
0.089 
(0.32) 
0.655** 
(2.29) 
0.400 
(1.14) 
N 56 57 57 59 59 59 60 60 60 
R2 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.86 0.81 
1. Dependent variable is log of total external debt (annual) 
 
 Table (2.38) continues 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
CONS 0.350 
(0.11) 
0.629 
(0.24) 
0.303 
(0.17) 
-2.084 
(-0.71) 
-3.059 
(-1.20) 
2.578 
(1.08) 
2.004 
(0.88) 
1.174 
(0.41) 
SDX 0.000 
(0.32) 
0.002 
(0.55) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.000 
(-0.25) 
0.0001* 
(1.81) 
0.000 
(1.53) 
0.000 
(0.61) 
MGDP 0.004 
(0.63) 
0.004 
(0.76) 
0.005 
(0.84) 
0.008 
(1.48) 
0.007 
(1.46) 
0.003 
(0.68) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
0.002 
(0.45) 
CFLX 0.000 
(0.11) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(1.23) 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.000 
(-0.33) 
-0.003* 
(-1.79) 
0.000 
(0.23) 
LTOT -0.003 
(-0.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
-0.008 
(-0.63) 
-0.004 
(-0.52) 
0.010 
(1.23) 
0.021*** 
(3.87) 
-0.016** 
(-2.17) 
-0.005 
(0.22) 
TDSX 0.011** 
(1.98) 
0.018* 
(1.89) 
0.013 
(1.48) 
0.021*** 
(3.13) 
0.016** 
(1.99) 
0.033*** 
(3.77) 
0.029*** 
(3.45) 
0.021** 
(2.37) 
LGDP 0.955*** 
(4.57) 
0.949*** 
(5.21) 
0.955*** 
(4.87) 
1.142*** 
(5.64) 
1.204*** 
(6.84) 
0.859*** 
(5.23) 
0.874*** 
(5.11) 
0.921*** 
(4.65) 
GRGD 0.007 
(0.38) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
-0.005 
(-0.26) 
-0.009 
(-0.94) 
0.014 
(1.33) 
-0.0100 
(-0.52) 
-0.008 
(-0.59) 
-0.029 
(-1.42) 
LPOP -0.08 
(-0.48) 
-0.100 
(-0.63) 
-0.082 
(-0.50) 
-2.226 
(-1.39) 
-0.266* 
(-1.77) 
-0.097 
(-0.75) 
-0.080 
(-0.59) 
-0.083 
(-0.55) 
HIPC 0.492 
(1.51) 
0.567* 
(1.72) 
0.578 
(1.61) 
0.553* 
(1.79) 
0.728** 
(2.51) 
0.472* 
(1.85) 
0.466* 
(1.83) 
0.441 
(1.53) 
N 60 58 57 57 57 56 55 52 
R2 0.85 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.90 
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Table (2.39) 
Annual Cross-section (All developing Countries)2  
 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
CONS 4.351* 
(1.78) 
5.620** 
(2.39) 
2.878 
(1.33) 
4.143** 
(2.21) 
3.581* 
(1.73) 
4.827** 
(2.11) 
7.419*** 
(3.16) 
2.463 
(0.96) 
2.899 
(0.99) 
SDX 0.000 
(0.31) 
0.000 
(1.03) 
0.000 
(-0.16) 
0.000 
(-0.35) 
0.000 
(-0.17) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.000 
(-1.22) 
0.000 
(-0.88) 
MGDP 0.007* 
(1.68) 
0.006 
(1.42) 
0.011** 
(2.49) 
0.011*** 
(3.01) 
0.010** 
(2.08) 
0.005 
(1.05) 
0.003 
(0.65) 
0.008 
(1.58) 
0.010* 
(1.91) 
CFLX 0.002 
(1.36) 
0.000 
(0.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
-0.000 
(-0.35) 
0.000 
(-0.24) 
0.002*** 
(2.98) 
0.001 
(0.96) 
0.002** 
(2.39) 
0.003*** 
(3.14) 
LTOT -0.006 
(-0.97) 
-0.009 
(-1.59) 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
0.007 
(1.46) 
-0.003 
(-0.92) 
0.015*** 
(3.38) 
-0.016*** 
(-2.99) 
0.021*** 
(2.65) 
0.009 
(1.19) 
TDSX 0.016** 
(3.16) 
0.026*** 
(4.76) 
0.031*** 
(5.47) 
0.032*** 
(5.69) 
0.022*** 
(4.39) 
0.015*** 
(2.95) 
0.011** 
(2.02) 
0.012 
(1.61) 
0.021** 
(2.62) 
LGDP 0.018 
(0.11) 
-0.132 
(-0.87) 
0.066 
(0.044) 
0.021 
(0.02) 
0.081 
(0.58) 
0.035 
(0.23) 
-0.176 
(-1.18) 
0.184 
(1.05) 
0.086 
(0.43) 
GRGD 0.016 
(1.12) 
-0.009 
(-.79) 
-0.005 
(-0.43) 
-0.015 
(-1.53) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.021** 
(-2.36) 
-0.03** 
(-2.32) 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
LPOP -0.112 
(-0.87) 
0.025 
(0.20) 
-0.098 
(-0.83) 
-0.075 
(-0.72) 
-0.151 
(-1.27) 
-0.122 
(-1.06) 
0.049 
(0.39) 
-0.207 
(-1.40) 
-0.113 
(-0.71) 
HIPC 0.299 
(1.24) 
0.268 
(1.25) 
0.291 
(1.40) 
0.168 
(0.91) 
0.251 
(1.16) 
0.198 
(0.88) 
0.024 
(0.10) 
0.518** 
(2.00) 
0.277 
(0.99) 
N 55 56 57 59 59 59 60 60 60 
R2 0.36 0.43 0.49 0.54 0.39 0.46 0.44 0.36 0.44 
2. Dependent variable is log of total external debt as a ratio to GDP (LEDTGDP) 
 
Table (2.39) continues 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
CONS 5.275** 
(2.06) 
6.034*** 
(2.69) 
5.221** 
(2.01) 
3.556 
(1.32) 
2.419 
(1.01) 
8.731*** 
(3.91) 
7.531*** 
(3.35) 
6.00** 
(2.07) 
SDX 0.000 
(-0.45) 
0.000 
(-0.02) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
0.000 
(-1.05) 
0.000 
(-1.31) 
0.000 
(0.98) 
0.000 
(0.86) 
0.000 
(0.39) 
MGDP 0.008* 
(1.66) 
0.009* 
(1.86) 
0.011** 
(2.01) 
0.011** 
(2.05) 
0.013*** 
(2.77) 
0.009** 
(2.37) 
0.010*** 
(2.66) 
0.011 
(2.14) 
CFLX 0.001 
(0.57) 
0.002* 
(1.71) 
0.002 
(0.94) 
0.001* 
(1.64) 
0.000 
(-0.68) 
-0.001** 
(-2.37) 
-0.002 
(-1.50) 
0.000 
(-0.11) 
LTOT -0.001 
(-0.24) 
0.002 
(0.33) 
-0.004 
(-0.37) 
0.001 
(0.22) 
0.006 
(0.78) 
0.010* 
(1.98) 
-0.011 
(-1.63) 
0.002 
(0.30) 
TDSX 0.019*** 
(4.29) 
0.025*** 
(3.06) 
0.015* 
(1.87) 
0.014** 
(2.22) 
0.016** 
(2.18) 
0.033*** 
(4.01) 
0.024*** 
(3.02) 
0.016* 
(1.89) 
LGDP -0.172 
(-0.98) 
-0.234 
(-1.48) 
-0.235 
(-1.30) 
-0.084 
(-0.44) 
-0.034 
(-0.21) 
-0.439*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.344** 
(-2.14) 
-0.291 
(-1.47) 
GRGD -0.014 
(-0.86) 
0.000 
(-0.01) 
-0.007 
(-0.44) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
0.009 
(0.91) 
-0.009 
(-0.48) 
-0.010 
(-0.45) 
-0.027 
(-1.31) 
LPOP 0.142 
(0.98) 
0.164 
(1.18) 
0.227 
(1.49) 
0.109 
(0.72) 
0.091 
(0.64) 
0.305** 
(2.49) 
0.243* 
(1.92) 
0.234* 
(1.73) 
HIPC 0.241 
(0.87) 
0.351 
(1.23) 
0.463 
(1.40) 
0.725** 
(2.53) 
0.811*** 
(2.98) 
0.339 
(1.41) 
0.496** 
(2.02) 
0.527* 
(1.83) 
N 60 58 57 57 57 56 55 52 
R2 0.52 52 0.50 0.62 0.47 0.67 0.54 0.50 
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2.1. Panel results on determinants of external indebtedness (1982-99) 
 
Table (2.40a) 
 
Descriptive Statistics (All developing countries) 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LEDT 180 22.29 1.60 18.47 25.93 
LEDTGDP 180 4.12 0.64 2.59 6.45 
SDXI 179 885.41 2113.67 0.06 14380 
CFLXI 179 26.08 84.97 -242.69 812.09 
TDSXI 180 23.54 15.45 0.22 81.75 
LTOTGI 178 -0.68 12.80 -83.19 48.75 
MDGDPI 180 36.22 21.71 2.98 126.18 
LGDPI 180 23.22 1.70 19.64 28.08 
GRGDPI 179 6.51 7.63 -49.64 27.42 
LPOP 180 16.05 1.55 19.77 28.24 
 
 
Table (2.40b) 
 
Correlation Matrix (standard errors in parenthesis) (All developing countries) 
Variables LEDT SDX CFLX TDSX LTOTG MDGDP LGDP GRGDP 
LEDT 1.00        
SDX 0.546*
 
(0.000) 
1.00       
CFLX 0.105 
(0.16) 
-0.049 
(0.52) 
1.00      
TDSX 0.413* 
(0.000) 
0.032 
(0.642) 
-0.042 
(0.56) 
1.00     
LTOTG -0.082 
(0.27) 
-0.018 
(0.81) 
-0.013 
(0.72) 
-0.026 
(0.72) 
1.00    
MDGDP -0.452* 
(0.000) 
-0.072 
(0.32) 
0.063 
(0.39) 
-0.357* 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.75) 
1.00   
LGDP 0.917* 
(0.000) 
0.557* 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.85) 
0.283* 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.80) 
-0.535* 
(0.000) 
1.00  
GRGDP 0.053 
(0.48) 
0.081 
(0.27) 
-0.017 
(0.82) 
0.014 
(0.85) 
0.073 
(0.33) 
0.028 
(0.70) 
0.069 
(0.35) 
1.00 
 
• Significant at 5 % level 
• Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table (2.40c) 
 
Correlation Matrix (standard errors in parenthesis) (All developing countries) 
Variables LEDT-
GDP 
SDX CFLX TDSX LTOTG MGDP LGDP GRGDP 
LEDTG 1.00        
SDX -0.210* 
(0.004) 
1.00       
CFLX 0.364* 
(0.000) 
-0.049 
(0.515) 
1.00      
TDSX 0.307* 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.673) 
0.042 
(0.569) 
1.00     
LTOTG -0.168* 
(0.024) 
-0.018 
(0.810) 
-0.013 
(0.863) 
-0.026 
(0.721) 
1.00    
MGDP 0.192* 
(0.009) 
-0.073 
(0.326) 
0.063 
(0.399) 
-0.357* 
(0.000) 
-0.023 
(0.755) 
1.00   
LGDP -0.287* 
(0.000) 
0.557* 
(0.000) 
0.014 
(0.849) 
0.289* 
(0.000) 
-0.018 
(0.803) 
-0.532* 
(0.000) 
1.00  
GRGDP -0.083 
(0.268) 
0.081 
(0.279) 
-0.017 
(0.816) 
0.013 
(0.854) 
0.073 
(0.330) 
0.028 
(0.703) 
0.069 
(0.355) 
1.00 
 
 
• = significant at 5 % 
• Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table (2.41a) 
Panel regression results (1982-98)3 
                                Random Effects Model                               Fixed Effects Model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Const 2.844** 
(2.01) 
2.968** 
(2.31) 
2.64** 
(2.13) 
2.361* 
(1.90) 
21.46 
(2.79) 
16.61** 
(2.38) 
17.89** 
(2.53) 
18.36** 
(2.53) 
SDX 0.0001*** 
(3.42) 
0.0001*** 
(3.59) 
0.0001*** 
(3.34) 
0.00006*** 
(3.19) 
0.00007*** 
(3.35) 
0.0001*** 
(3.47) 
0.0001*** 
(3.40) 
0.0001*** 
(3.29) 
CFLX  0.0008** 
(2.96) 
0.001** 
(2.94) 
0.0008*** 
(2.90) 
 0.0007** 
(2.38) 
0.0007** 
(2.37) 
0.0007** 
(2.34) 
TDSX   0.003* 
(1.74) 
0.0029* 
(1.85) 
  0.0017 
(1.13) 
0.0018 
(1.23) 
LTOTG    -0.0024* 
(-1.65) 
   -0.002 
(-1.55) 
MGDP 0.0042** 
(2.11) 
0.0017 
(0.92) 
0.0022 
(1.15) 
0.0023 
(1.17) 
0.004* 
(1.86) 
0.0014 
(0.78) 
0.0017 
(0.84) 
0.0017 
(0.88) 
LGDP 0.725*** 
(7.45) 
0.757*** 
(8.28) 
0.790*** 
(8.73) 
0.815*** 
(8.90) 
0.350*** 
(2.72) 
0.478*** 
(4.00) 
0.464*** 
(3.87) 
0.474*** 
(3.75) 
GRGDP -0.006* 
(-1.92) 
-0.008*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.007** 
(-2.47) 
-0.0069** 
(-2.01) 
-0.0026 
(-0.82) 
0.006* 
(-1.92) 
-0.005* 
(-1.70) 
-0.004 
(-1.29) 
LPOP 0.129 
(1.28) 
0.079 
(0.82) 
0.044 
(0.48) 
0.024 
(0.25) 
-0.458 
(-1.06) 
-0.343 
(0.78) 
-0.405 
(-1.02) 
-0.449 
(-1.12) 
PD1 -0.072 
(-1.06) 
-0.007 
(-0.109) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.007 
(0.11) 
-0.509 
(-3.27) 
-0.339** 
(-2.36) 
-0.371** 
(-2.54) 
-0.379** 
(-2.51) 
PD2 0.065 
(1.29) 
0.091* 
(1.98) 
0.078 
(1.58) 
0.070 
(1.39) 
-0.134* 
(-1.64) 
-0.060 
(-0.80) 
-0.084 
(-1.09) 
-0.099 
(-1.22) 
HIPC 0.253 
(1.25) 
0.248 
(1.27) 
0.264 
(1.45) 
0.295* 
(1.63) 
    
N 178 177 177 177 178 177 177 176 
R2 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.01 0.52 0.37 0.28 
Prob(chi
2)a 
0.001 0.009 failed failed     
3. Dependent variable is log of total external debt (LEDT)     
a. the Hausman test in the first two columns is in favor of the fixed effects model. 
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Table (2.41b) 
Panel regression results for all developing countries (1982-98)4          
                    Random Effects Model                          Fixed Effects Model                                                                  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Const 6.222*** 
(4.15) 
6.753*** 
(4.79) 
7.121*** 
(5.39) 
6.848*** 
(5.26) 
-5.366 
(-0.43) 
-13.721 
(-1.23) 
-9.112 
(-0.83) 
-10.145 
(-0.90) 
SDX 0.00005* 
(1.79) 
0.00005** 
(2.09) 
0.00005* 
(1.93) 
0.00004* 
(1.68) 
0.0001** 
(2.85) 
0.0001*** 
(2.95) 
0.0001*** 
(2.87) 
0.0001*** 
(2.78) 
CFLX  0.0014*** 
(3.47) 
0.0015*** 
(3.59) 
0.0014*** 
(3.58) 
 0.001** 
(2.26) 
0.001** 
(2.29) 
0.001** 
(2.29) 
TDSX   0.0095*** 
(4.16) 
0.0098*** 
(4.32) 
  0.0062** 
(2.68) 
0.006*** 
(2.69) 
LTOTG    -0.004** 
(-2.19) 
   -0.0064 
(-1.35) 
MGDP 0.0056** 
(2.02) 
0.0025 
(0.98) 
0.0037 
(1.51) 
0.0039* 
(1.61) 
0.0071** 
(2.14) 
0.0032 
(1.04) 
0.0039 
(1.30) 
0.0038 
(1.25) 
LGDP -0.218** 
(-1.99) 
-0.213*** 
(-2.05) 
-0.236** 
(-2.44) 
-0.214** 
(-2.25) 
-0.661** 
(-3.18) 
-0.454** 
(-2.39) 
-0.502*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.447** 
(-2.28) 
GRGDP -0.011** 
(-2.07) 
-0.011*** 
(-2.69) 
-0.009** 
(-2.20) 
-0.007* 
(-1.73) 
-0.0043 
(-0.84) 
-0.009** 
(-2.00) 
-0.007 
(-1.58) 
-0.0064 
(-1.34) 
LPOP 0.173* 
(1.68) 
0.137 
(1.36) 
0.136 
(1.48) 
1.118 
(1.33) 
1.154** 
(2.22) 
1.762** 
(2.81) 
1.540** 
(2.49) 
1.521** 
(2.45) 
PD1 -0.279** 
(-3.11) 
-0.187** 
(-2.18) 
-0.234*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.23*** 
(2.77) 
-0.237 
(-0.95) 
0.044 
(0.19) 
-0.072 
(-0.32) 
-0.046 
(-0.19) 
PD2 0.074 
(0.98) 
0.115* 
(1.68) 
0.040 
(0.57) 
0.020 
(0.28) 
0.118 
(0.90) 
0.241** 
(2.02) 
0.151 
(1.25) 
0.151 
(1.19) 
HIPC 0.415** 
(2.19) 
0.362** 
(1.97) 
0.256 
(1.51) 
0.281 
(1.71) 
    
N 178 177 177 176 178 177 177 176 
R2 0.24 0.30 0.40 0.43 0.0004 0.006 0.001 0.003 
Prob(chi
2)b  
0.39 0.16 0.56 0.37     
4. Dependent variable is Log total external debt to GDP ratio (LEDTGDP)    
b. The Hausman test is in favor of the random effects model 
 
 137 
Table (2.42) 
 
Regression results of cross-section pooled time series for all (1982-98)5 
Variables 1 2 3 4 
Const -2.88** 
(-2.05) 
-2.564* 
(-1.84) 
-0.724 
(-0.54) 
-0.609 
(-0.46) 
SDXI 9.06e-06 
(0.32) 
0.00001 
(0.44) 
0.00003 
(1.14) 
0.00003 
(1.12) 
CFLXI  0.0014** 
(2.46) 
0.0013*** 
(2.59) 
0.0014** 
(2.58) 
TDSXI   0.0165*** 
(5.25) 
0.0162*** 
(5.19) 
LTOTGI    -0.007** 
(-2.29) 
MDGDPI 0.009*** 
(3.16) 
0.0014*** 
(2.75) 
0.0086*** 
(3.20) 
0.0083*** 
(3.08) 
LGDPI 1.176*** 
(12.57) 
1.174*** 
(12.69) 
1.050*** 
(11.79) 
1.051*** 
(11.92) 
GRGDPI -0.006 
(-0.88) 
-0.0053 
(-0.81) 
-0.0037 
(-0.62) 
-0.0019 
(-0.31) 
LPOP -0.203*** 
(-2.56) 
-0.221*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.170** 
(-2.29) 
-1.759** 
(-2.40) 
PD1 0.205* 
(1.64) 
0.293** 
(2.28) 
0.157 
(1.28) 
0.150 
(1.28) 
PD2 0.144 
(1.21) 
0.181 
(1.52) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.026 
(0.28) 
HIPC 0.761*** 
(5.29) 
0.698*** 
(4.84) 
0.445*** 
(3.12) 
0.450*** 
(3.18) 
N 178 177 177 176 
R2 0.86 0.86 0.88 0.88 
5. Dependent variable is log of total external debt (LEDT) 
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Table (2.43) 
 
  
Differences in covariates between HIPCs and Non-HIPCs (1982-98) 
Average 
values 
Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs) 
Non-Heavily Indebted 
countries (NON-HIPCs) Differences between the means 
  1982-87 1988-93 1994-98 1982-87 1988-93 1994-98 1982-87 1988-93 1994-98 
LEDTG 4.12 4.62 4.82 3.97 3.95 3.84 0.15 0.67 0.98 
LPOP 15.74 15.91 16.05 16.02 16.15 16.26 -0.28 -0.25 -0.21 
CFLX -10.63 52.99 119.26 -1.36 9.86 24.19 -9.26 43.13 95.07 
SDX 53.25 27.88 46.88 1580.95 772.20 1641.75 -1527.7 -744.33 -1594.8 
MGDP 32.67 30.12 38.92 37.20 35.84 39.38 -4.54 -5.72 -0.46 
LGDP 22.34 22.75 22.92 23.64 24.15 24.49 -1.30 -1.40 -1.58 
GRGDP 4.18 11.33 2.63 2.60 10.90 6.66 1.58 0.43 -4.03 
TDSX 23.95 32.03 27.06 23.15 23.79 17.02 0.79 8.24 10.04 
LTOTG 2.70 -4.50 1.60 -3.72 0.61 0.39 6.42 -5.11 1.21 
 
 
 
Table (2.44) 
 
The impact of each variable on the difference in the log of total external debt to GDP ratio between HIPCs 
and Non-HIPCs (1982-98) 
 
  Random effects model Fixed effects model 
  1982-87 1988-93 1994-98 1982-87 1988-93 1994-98 
LPOP 0.70 0.60 0.50 12.60 0.11 9.59 
CFLX 1.30 6.00 13.30 1.00 4.31 9.50 
SDX 6.10 3.00 6.40 15.20 7.41 15.94 
MGDP 1.80 2.20 0.20 1.00 1.00 0.07 
LGDP 27.70 29.90 33.70 58.00 62.31 70.48 
GRGDP 1.10 0.30 2.80 1.00 0.17 1.61 
TDSX 0.80 8.10 9.80 0.47 4.97 6.02 
LTOTG 1.50 1.20 0.30 1.00 1.00 0.24 
 
The effects of each variable on the difference in total external debt to GDP ratio between HIPCs and Non-
HIPCs was calculated as follows (I follow Klasen (2002): First, I take the difference in each covariates 
between the two groups as shown in table (2.43) . Second I take the regression coefficients of each 
covariate from column 4 and 8 of table 2.3d for the random and fixed effects models, respectively. Finally I 
multiplied the coefficients by the differences. 
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2.2. Panel results for determinants of indebtedness (HIPCs’) (1982-99) 
 
Table (2.45a) 
Descriptive Statistics (for HIPCs) 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LEDT 63 21.70 0.93 19.29 23.57 
LEDTG 63 4.52 0.69 2.99 6.45 
LPOP 63 15.89 0.76 14.37 17.88 
MGDP 63 33.90 16.99 2.98 90.91 
GRGDP 62 8.50 9.73 -16.5 49.2 
LGDP 63 22.66 0.79 20.71 24.1 
SDX 63 64.75 139.81 0.15 1020.71 
CFLX 62 54.74 127.24 -85.80 812.09 
LTOG 62 -0.06 19.28 -83.19 48.37 
 
 
 
Table (2.45b) 
Correlation Matrix (standard errors in parentheses)-HIPCs 
 LEDT SDX MGDP CFLX TDSX LTOTG LGDP GRGDP 
LEDT 1.00        
SDX -0.124 
(0.33) 
1.00       
MGDP 0.069 
(0.58) 
-0.079 
(0.54) 
1.00      
CFLX 0.289* 
(0.02) 
0.054 
(0.67) 
0.210 
(0.10) 
1.00     
TDSX 0.394* 
(0.001) 
0.033 
(0.79) 
-0.061 
(0.63) 
-0.009 
(0.94) 
1.00    
LTOTG -0.215 
(0.09) 
0.152 
(0.23) 
-0.084 
(0.517) 
-0.046 
(0.72) 
0.046 
(0.72) 
1.00   
LGDP 0.641* 
(0.000) 
0.036 
(0.77) 
-0.466* 
(0.000) 
0.164 
(0.20) 
0.179 
(0.16) 
-0.0009 
(0.99) 
1.00  
GRGDP 0.021 
(0.87) 
0.130 
(0.31) 
0.449* 
(0.000) 
-0.083 
(0.52) 
0.027 
(0.83) 
-0.072 
(0.58) 
-0.260* 
(0.04) 
1.00 
 
• *. Significant at 5 % level 
• Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table (2.45c) 
 
Correlation Matrix (Standard errors in parenthesis) HIPCs 
 LEDTG SDX MGDP CFLX TDSX LTOTG LGDP GRGDP 
LEDTG 1.00        
SDX -0.209 
(0.09) 
1.00       
MGDP 0.528* 
(0.000) 
-0.079 
(0.54) 
1.00      
CFLX 0.444* 
(0.000) 
0.054 
(0.67) 
0.210 
(0.10) 
1.00     
TDSX 0.219 
(0.08) 
0.033 
(0.79) 
-0.062 
(0.63) 
-0.009 
(0.94) 
1.00    
LTOTG -0.314* 
(0.01) 
0.153 
(0.24) 
-0.084 
(0.52) 
-0.046 
(0.73) 
0.046 
(0.72) 
1.00   
LGDP -0.027 
(0.83) 
0.063 
(0.78) 
-0.467* 
(0.000) 
0.164 
(0.20) 
0.179 
(0.16) 
-0.0009 
(0.99) 
1.00  
GRGDP 0.103 
(0.43) 
0.130 
(0.31) 
-0.449* 
(0.000) 
0.083 
(0.52) 
0.028 
(0.83) 
-0.072 
(0.58) 
-0.260* 
(0.04) 
1.00 
 
• *. Significant at 5% level 
• Numbers in parentheses are standard errors  
 
Table (2.46a) 
 
Regression results for HIPC Panel (Cross-section pooled-time series) (1982-98)6 
Variable  1 2 3 4 
CONST -3.024 
(-1.01) 
-2.407 
(-0.80) 
-1.441 
(-0.52) 
-1.062 
(-0.39) 
SDX -0.001* 
(-1.78) 
-0.0011* 
(-1.97) 
-0.001 
(-2.15) 
-0.0009* 
(-1.83) 
CFLX  0.0011 
(1.51) 
0.011* 
(1.68) 
0.0011* 
(1.66) 
TDSX   0.014*** 
(3.26) 
0.0155*** 
(3.50) 
LTOTG    -0.008** 
(-2.13) 
MDGDP 0.0215*** 
(3.26) 
0.0174** 
(2.42) 
0.0175** 
(2.65) 
0.0166** 
(2.60) 
LGDP 1.219*** 
(6.55) 
1.268*** 
(6.58) 
1.176*** 
(6.55) 
1.149*** 
(6.59) 
GRGDP 0.0099 
(0.94) 
0.013 
(1.22) 
0.0127 
(1.25) 
0.0117 
(1.19) 
LPOP -2.368 
(-1.23) 
-0.344 
(-1.64) 
-0.299 
(-1.54) 
-0.281 
(1.49) 
PD1 0.115 
(0.52) 
0.258 
(1.07) 
0.237 
(1.08) 
0.227 
(1.04) 
PD2 0.175 
(0.86) 
0.206 
(1.00) 
0.119 
(0.62) 
0.049 
(0.26) 
N 62 61 61 61 
R2 0.62 0.63 0.70 0.72 
 
6. Dependent variable is Log of total external debt (LEDT) 1982-98 
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Table (2.46b) 
 
Regression results for HIPC Panel (Cross-section pooled-time series) (1982-98)7 
Variable  1 2 3 4 
CONST 2.025 
(0.82) 
2.891 
(1.21) 
3.381 
(1.45) 
3.879* 
(1.73) 
SDX -0.0007 
(-1.42) 
-0.0008* 
(-1.81) 
-0.0008* 
(-1.84) 
-0.0006 
(-1.46) 
CFLX  0.0013** 
(2.17) 
0.0013** 
(2.25) 
0.0012** 
(2.31) 
TDSX   0.0075* 
(1.96) 
0.082** 
(2.27) 
LTOTG    -0.0086*** 
(-2.83) 
MDGDP 0.0285*** 
(5.21) 
0.0244*** 
(4.28) 
0.0244*** 
(4.40) 
0.023*** 
(4.51) 
LGDP 0.046 
(0.29) 
0.060 
(0.39) 
0.0134 
(0.09) 
-0.016 
(-0.11) 
GRGDP -0.022** 
(-2.49) 
-0.020** 
(-2.28) 
-0.0204** 
(-2.39) 
-0.0214*** 
(-2.67) 
LPOP 0.054 
(0.34) 
-0.0198 
(-0.11) 
0.0033 
(0.20) 
0.022 
(0.14) 
PD1 -0.582*** 
(-3.19) 
-0.402 
(-2.12) 
-0.413** 
(-2.24) 
-0.423** 
(-2.44) 
PD2 0.123 
(0.73) 
0.167 
(1.03) 
0.1234 
(0.77) 
0.048 
(0.32) 
N 62 61 61 61 
R2 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.65 
7. Dependent variable is Log of total external debt to GDP ratio (LEDTG)  
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A. The Magnitude of External Debt  
 
Table A1 
Total external debt (Millions of USD)12  
Years All ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 808,321 87,254 110,587 129,376 354,834 49,431 76,838 74,450 
1983 878,046 90,362 114,749 145,064 385,220 55,726 86,925 81,777 
1984 919,499 105,863 116,507 153,088 395,485 57,505 91,050 87,113 
1985 1,033,583 139,396 135,672 175,105 408,536 67,781 107,092 104,732 
1986 1,132,428 157,362 153,532 193,144 428,523 79,040 120,827 117,447 
1987 1,284,462 185,821 175,702 213,688 469,128 92,374 147,750 139,600 
1988 1,286,654 185,986 179,195 214,979 456,324 99,912 150,257 142,675 
1989 1,355,837 198,706 188,932 241,223 453,286 116,619 157,072 168,754 
1990 1,460,343 220,428 183,205 274,071 475,867 129,899 176,873 189,854 
1991 1,547,010 239,050 187,258 308,182 493,051 136,096 183,374 195,531 
1992 1,621,514 253,198 188,321 344,546 509,798 142,961 182,689 200,908 
1993 1,777,528 308,939 193,661 383,106 548,994 148,012 194,817 205,512 
1994 1,969,044 326,029 208,223 463,076 588,279 162,129 221,308 216,923 
1995 2,139,456 352,457 211,182 530,546 652,539 157,371 235,360 223,914 
1996 2,229,400 369,566 204,844 591,348 676,286 155,522 231,833 217,957 
1997 2,326,457 390,507 194,438 648,931 714,256 155,259 223,067 205,076 
1998 2,536,046 480,539 208,059 667,522 786,019 163,775 230,132 213,960 
12. Total external debt is the sum of public, publicly guaranteed, and private non-guaranteed long-term debt,   
  use of IMF credit, and short-term debt. 
Source: Global Development Finance 
 
Table A2 
 
Share of each group’ s debt in total developing countries’  debt (%) 
 ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 10.79 13.68 16.01 43.90 6.12 9.51 9.21 
1983 10.29 13.07 16.52 43.87 6.35 9.90 9.31 
1984 11.51 12.67 16.65 43.01 6.25 9.90 9.47 
1985 13.49 13.13 16.94 39.53 6.56 10.36 10.13 
1986 13.90 13.56 17.06 37.84 6.98 10.67 10.37 
1987 14.47 13.68 16.64 36.52 7.19 11.50 10.87 
1988 14.46 13.93 16.71 35.47 7.77 11.68 11.09 
1989 14.66 13.93 17.79 33.43 8.60 11.58 12.45 
1990 15.09 12.55 18.77 32.59 8.90 12.11 13.00 
1991 15.45 12.10 19.92 31.87 8.80 11.85 12.64 
1992 15.61 11.61 21.25 31.44 8.82 11.27 12.39 
1993 17.38 10.89 21.55 30.89 8.33 10.96 11.56 
1994 16.56 10.57 23.52 29.88 8.23 11.24 11.02 
1995 16.47 9.87 24.80 30.50 7.36 11.00 10.47 
1996 16.58 9.19 26.52 30.33 6.98 10.40 9.78 
1997 16.79 8.36 27.89 30.70 6.67 9.59 8.81 
1998 18.95 8.20 26.32 30.99 6.46 9.07 8.44 
 
Source: own calculations based on Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) 
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Table A3 
Total debt (EDT)/GNP (%)13  
  All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 26.10 26.81 .. .. 45.16 27.66 19.09 32.19 
1983 28.98 28.34 .. .. 57.19 27.06 20.34 38.57 
1984 30.38 27.64 .. 71.54 60.89 27.20 21.12 44.20 
1985 32.77 29.13 .. 81.15 60.65 30.56 22.92 56.37 
1986 34.40 32.26 .. 63.51 60.16 33.69 25.24 58.48 
1987 38.24 35.08 .. 85.80 64.84 43.54 26.56 60.98 
1988 35.03 29.43 .. 88.78 55.22 46.70 26.80 59.55 
1989 33.88 28.72 16.06 106.10 48.71 48.18 31.02 61.41 
1990 34.19 29.81 18.56 118.78 44.35 42.84 32.02 63.01 
1991 35.50 30.24 20.78 123.45 43.49 44.46 37.61 63.68 
1992 35.89 30.65 24.78 137.32 39.55 41.89 39.94 62.91 
1993 38.00 31.58 31.28 141.91 39.68 43.15 38.99 70.99 
1994 39.42 32.07 37.86 166.59 37.83 47.57 37.38 82.57 
1995 37.58 30.18 36.27 147.79 38.24 44.57 32.60 77.57 
1996 35.72 29.95 33.57 129.77 37.55 38.34 29.74 73.82 
1997 36.03 32.92 34.70 113.45 37.28 33.74 28.30 67.74 
1998 42.14 40.16 48.59 114.64 40.83 36.05 29.22 72.32 
13. Total debt to gross national product ratio (%) 
Source: Global Development Finance 2000, CD-ROM 
 
Table A4 
Total debt (EDT)/XGS (%)3  
  All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 127 117 - 252 278 60 209 121 
1983 146 129 - 289 313 74 214 142 
1984 148 121 - 286 289 84 210 145 
1985 175 142 - 350 311 111 262 171 
1986 209 148 - 393 369 168 289 215 
1987 203 128 - 447 360 172 296 227 
1988 181 106 - 437 308 173 296 222 
1989 174 108 - 487 274 160 311 219 
1990 162 108 - 501 256 114 327 210 
1991 165 107 - 544 261 117 315 225 
1992 159 105 129 556 251 113 317 223 
1993 165 105 148 579 249 123 285 246 
1994 158 103 135 552 230 135 262 273 
1995 140 93 115 459 213 121 216 243 
1996 132 95 108 391 201 103 195 218 
1997 128 94 107 350 192 97 183 205 
1998 148 105 134 378 210 129 189 239 
14. Total debt to exports of goods and services ratio (%) 
 
Source: Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) 
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B. The Costs of External debt 
 
Table B1 
Debt service (TDS)/Exports of goods and services (XGS) (%)15 
  All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 19.17 18.01 .. 21.06 46.68 9.32 14.70 12.11 
1983 19.27 18.27 .. 20.16 41.03 12.35 17.24 13.32 
1984 19.93 18.28 .. 20.41 38.70 13.27 17.67 15.83 
1985 23.03 23.84 .. 22.49 36.97 14.62 22.17 17.58 
1986 26.53 23.92 .. 26.22 41.88 20.85 28.84 17.25 
1987 24.23 24.74 .. 25.39 36.02 17.44 27.81 13.52 
1988 23.26 18.90 .. 24.72 36.90 19.43 26.28 14.86 
1989 20.63 16.72 .. 21.92 30.19 19.03 26.49 13.12 
1990 18.27 15.73 .. 21.14 24.50 15.10 29.00 12.92 
1991 17.36 13.35 .. 21.63 24.20 15.31 25.61 12.46 
1992 16.40 13.51 11.34 17.10 26.11 15.54 25.01 12.28 
1993 16.24 14.06 10.01 17.70 27.71 14.60 22.84 9.20 
1994 15.89 12.09 11.88 18.95 25.29 14.53 25.23 14.57 
1995 15.76 11.43 12.20 20.73 26.46 13.72 24.96 15.29 
1996 16.46 12.11 11.46 15.87 31.49 12.64 20.80 14.22 
1997 17.15 11.21 11.54 15.41 35.93 12.55 20.99 14.72 
1998 18.43 13.32 14.72 16.41 33.56 14.04 18.92 14.68 
15.
 Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in foreign currency, 
goods, or services on long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt and repayments (repurchases and 
charges) to the IMF 
Table B2 
Interest (INT)/Exports of goods and services (XGS) (%)16 
  All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 11 11 - 12 30 4 8 7 
1983 11 10 - 11 28 4 9 7 
1984 11 10 - 11 26 5 10 8 
1985 12 10 - 11 27 6 11 8 
1986 12 10 - 11 26 8 12 7 
1987 11 8 - 10 22 6 12 6 
1988 11 7 - 10 22 8 11 7 
1989 9 7 - 9 16 8 14 6 
1990 8 6 - 9 12 5 16 6 
1991 8 6 - 9 13 5 14 6 
1992 7 5 5 7 11 6 12 6 
1993 6 5 4 8 11 6 11 4 
1994 6 4 4 8 11 6 10 6 
1995 7 5 5 7 12 6 9 6 
1996 6 5 5 6 12 5 8 5 
1997 6 5 5 6 11 5 8 5 
1998 7 5 5 6 12 6 8 5 
16. payments made to domestic sectors and to nonresidents for the use of borrowed money. 
Source (for tables B1 and B2): Global Development Finance 2000, CD-ROM 
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Table B3 
Interest (INT)/GNP (%) 
  All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 2.26 2.42 - - 4.82 1.89 0.71 1.77 
1983 2.17 2.17 - - 5.18 1.63 0.83 1.82 
1984 2.33 2.27 - 2.70 5.46 1.65 0.96 2.37 
1985 2.30 2.14 - 2.46 5.20 1.54 0.96 2.49 
1986 2.05 2.08 - 1.84 4.27 1.53 1.05 1.97 
1987 1.98 2.15 - 1.94 3.97 1.63 1.09 1.53 
1988 2.05 1.92 - 2.04 4.03 2.05 1.04 1.87 
1989 1.81 1.83 0.97 1.96 2.79 2.33 1.40 1.78 
1990 1.65 1.66 1.04 2.07 2.13 2.01 1.53 1.89 
1991 1.66 1.65 1.05 2.14 2.13 1.91 1.64 1.82 
1992 1.52 1.47 0.89 1.80 1.79 2.17 1.53 1.58 
1993 1.47 1.45 0.91 1.85 1.76 1.98 1.44 1.22 
1994 1.57 1.39 1.17 2.30 1.84 1.96 1.41 1.78 
1995 1.77 1.53 1.50 2.16 2.20 2.13 1.36 1.77 
1996 1.71 1.47 1.46 1.96 2.21 1.84 1.16 1.86 
1997 1.75 1.63 1.56 1.86 2.21 1.59 1.20 1.55 
1998 2.00 2.03 1.93 1.96 2.41 1.55 1.20 1.65 
Source: Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) 
 
C. The Structure of External Debt 
 
Table C1 
The share of short-term debt in total external debt (%)17 
 All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 23.39 27.19 16.36 12.39 25.77 29.89 7.43 14.88 
1983 18.61 25.56 15.94 11.47 16.23 27.19 8.44 15.52 
1984 16.78 25.19 13.68 13.07 12.94 25.33 8.69 17.11 
1985 15.83 22.35 15.63 14.22 11.17 24.46 8.96 16.60 
1986 13.62 17.37 17.06 10.31 8.52 23.92 9.07 11.10 
1987 13.24 15.73 17.00 10.85 9.58 21.67 9.04 9.14 
1988 14.30 17.03 19.24 11.59 10.77 21.36 9.48 9.77 
1989 15.70 16.42 21.52 12.02 13.14 23.13 9.27 10.47 
1990 16.75 17.94 18.54 12.64 16.27 23.96 9.52 11.81 
1991 17.16 19.23 16.44 12.81 17.61 24.69 8.74 11.97 
1992 18.34 20.89 16.69 13.98 18.49 27.64 7.89 13.95 
1993 18.37 22.05 13.69 14.39 20.18 27.60 4.09 15.10 
1994 18.31 24.66 11.38 13.36 20.05 23.10 4.32 16.31 
1995 19.84 28.97 12.94 13.83 20.03 21.11 5.77 17.32 
1996 20.67 31.51 14.39 14.26 18.52 21.01 6.64 18.42 
1997 20.17 28.31 14.89 13.20 19.18 21.21 5.30 18.37 
1998 16.24 17.84 16.36 13.14 15.71 19.70 4.37 18.47 
17. Short-term debt includes all debt having an original maturity of one year or less and interest in arrears on 
long-term debt. 
 
Source: Global Development Finance, 2000(CD-ROM) 
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Table C2 
Concessional debt (Millions of USD)18 
Years All ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 137,304 8,586 23,624 19,403 31,379 31,758 22,554 27,440 
1983 149,514 8,768 26,775 21,044 34,423 33,889 24,615 30,667 
1984 148,644 8,384 27,478 21,259 31,108 34,079 26,336 32,902 
1985 174,342 12,632 31,492 26,095 33,229 39,225 31,670 39,640 
1986 196,588 10,881 35,683 31,919 35,461 45,077 37,567 46,853 
1987 235,494 12,370 41,491 41,695 41,434 52,597 45,907 56,354 
1988 247,020 12,173 43,299 44,657 44,070 54,678 48,142 59,451 
1989 284,320 11,104 45,074 65,828 45,549 66,299 50,467 79,724 
1990 313,755 12,652 44,206 76,918 48,373 73,147 58,460 91,548 
1991 333,579 13,296 47,962 82,802 51,554 74,960 63,006 95,471 
1992 354,173 22,619 48,308 85,757 53,338 78,186 65,964 99,531 
1993 374,676 23,748 50,163 93,462 55,573 82,147 69,583 104,156 
1994 402,529 23,451 53,915 100,511 58,052 90,748 75,852 111,453 
1995 414,838 25,529 57,133 102,695 59,670 89,034 80,777 115,315 
1996 405,916 25,034 61,092 99,056 57,264 80,730 82,740 115,212 
1997 374,195 21,859 58,063 78,037 56,419 76,893 82,925 98,523 
1998 377,925 24,087 59,964 91,141 30,804 82,824 89,105 106,730 
18. Concessional debt is defined as loans with an original grant element of 25 percent or more 
Source: Global Development Finance 2000 (CD-ROM) 
 
 
Table C3 
Ratio of concessional debt to total external debt (%) 
 ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 6.25 17.21 14.13 22.85 23.13 16.43 19.98 
1983 5.86 17.91 14.08 23.02 22.67 16.46 20.51 
1984 5.64 18.49 14.30 20.93 22.93 17.72 22.13 
1985 7.25 18.06 14.97 19.06 22.50 18.17 22.74 
1986 5.54 18.15 16.24 18.04 22.93 19.11 23.83 
1987 5.25 17.62 17.71 17.59 22.33 19.49 23.93 
1988 4.93 17.53 18.08 17.84 22.13 19.49 24.07 
1989 3.91 15.85 23.15 16.02 23.32 17.75 28.04 
1990 4.03 14.09 24.52 15.42 23.31 18.63 29.18 
1991 3.99 14.38 24.82 15.45 22.47 18.89 28.62 
1992 6.39 13.64 24.21 15.06 22.08 18.62 28.10 
1993 6.34 13.39 24.94 14.83 21.92 18.57 27.80 
1994 5.83 13.39 24.97 14.42 22.54 18.84 27.69 
1995 6.15 13.77 24.76 14.38 21.46 19.47 27.80 
1996 6.17 15.05 24.40 14.11 19.89 20.38 28.38 
1997 5.84 15.52 20.85 15.08 20.55 22.16 26.33 
1998 6.37 15.87 24.12 8.15 21.92 23.58 28.24 
Source: Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) 
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Table C4 
Share of multilateral debt in total debt (%)19 
 All ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 8.46 7.22 6.18 9.30 5.54 26.38 13.69 16.17 
1983 8.96 7.94 6.79 10.17 5.69 26.75 13.98 16.94 
1984 9.10 6.60 6.82 10.15 5.97 28.52 14.47 17.31 
1985 10.38 7.28 7.19 11.48 7.59 28.82 15.58 17.44 
1986 12.06 8.49 7.87 12.98 9.54 28.81 18.57 20.04 
1987 13.34 9.30 8.46 14.68 11.04 29.13 19.72 21.20 
1988 13.36 8.39 8.28 14.42 11.14 29.58 20.04 21.84 
1989 13.31 7.36 8.17 13.50 11.57 28.19 20.73 19.93 
1990 14.26 7.59 8.59 14.15 12.72 29.47 21.60 20.64 
1991 14.57 7.78 9.14 13.75 12.79 31.41 22.67 21.71 
1992 14.30 7.61 9.35 12.54 12.24 32.29 23.66 22.02 
1993 14.01 6.75 9.81 12.34 12.00 33.80 23.66 22.82 
1994 13.97 7.25 10.13 11.40 11.80 35.13 23.13 24.02 
1995 13.59 7.47 10.84 10.64 11.24 36.28 23.23 24.94 
1996 12.85 7.29 11.39 9.10 10.53 36.39 23.59 26.07 
1997 12.45 7.43 11.36 8.99 9.89 36.01 24.01 27.73 
1998 12.87 6.61 11.44 10.67 10.51 36.57 24.78 28.53 
19. Public and publicly guaranteed multilateral loans include loans and credits from the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and other multilateral and intergovernmental agencies. Excluded are loans 
from funds administered by an international organization on behalf of a single donor government 
 
Source: Global Development Finance 2000 (CD-ROM) 
 
D. Other indicators of external balance sustainability 
 
Table D1 
Reserves to Total External debt (%) 
 All EAP ECA HIPCs LAC MENA SA SSA 
1982 20.98 26.90 - 4.51 11.45 60.97 23.58 12.13 
1983 17.80 24.91 - 4.32 10.32 45.08 22.58 9.99 
1984 17.14 25.24 - 3.77 12.14 37.41 20.50 8.58 
1985 15.84 20.80 - 3.61 12.25 35.83 18.47 7.85 
1986 13.87 20.35 - 3.75 10.25 27.40 17.21 7.69 
1987 14.61 23.52 - 3.13 10.84 28.43 16.48 7.83 
1988 13.87 28.06 - 3.10 9.17 24.42 12.77 6.75 
1989 13.83 28.14 - 2.78 9.57 21.07 9.59 7.55 
1990 15.27 31.47 - 2.70 12.26 21.37 6.85 8.72 
1991 17.62 35.05 - 3.16 15.04 23.44 8.83 9.78 
1992 17.81 28.94 - 3.05 18.90 23.41 10.16 7.72 
1993 20.48 31.65 13.07 3.07 21.46 24.74 14.52 7.80 
1994 21.77 35.15 14.71 3.93 19.34 25.25 21.02 7.91 
1995 25.16 37.81 25.52 5.05 21.31 26.97 19.51 8.91 
1996 27.82 41.84 25.26 6.30 24.34 29.54 19.89 10.04 
1997 27.91 37.80 25.49 6.73 24.47 33.58 22.40 13.23 
1998 27.59 44.64 21.45 6.09 21.03 31.60 22.82 13.17 
Source: Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) 
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Table D2 
External Balance on Goods and services (Resource balance) (% GDP)20 
 ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 - 0.53 -1.00 0.31 -5.09 -4.25 -7.95 
1983 - -3.04 -1.49 3.45 -4.51 -1.24 -5.33 
1984 - -7.92 -0.14 4.83 -4.23 -0.55 -3.71 
1985 - -5.58 -1.39 4.66 -5.07 3.11 -3.93 
1986 - -7.36 0.47 2.39 -4.52 2.38 -4.54 
1987 - -4.45 2.49 2.68 -3.91 1.87 -6.05 
1988 - -4.51 1.81 3.11 -4.41 0.65 -6.52 
1989 0.80 -5.41 0.26 3.04 -3.76 1.03 -5.58 
1990 -0.90 -1.78 0.26 2.12 -3.96 1.50 -5.90 
1991 -0.45 -4.17 -0.09 0.39 -2.17 0.28 -5.21 
1992 0.93 -2.81 0.11 -0.20 -2.87 -1.27 -6.35 
1993 -0.76 -3.84 -1.04 -0.93 -2.90 -1.64 -7.60 
1994 0.31 1.18 -0.20 -1.35 -3.46 -1.41 -6.66 
1995 -0.84 0.77 -0.76 -0.90 -4.00 -1.59 -6.06 
1996 -1.77 3.65 -1.22 -0.86 -4.78 0.59 -6.36 
1997 -2.63 2.85 1.39 -2.16 -4.39 -1.26 -6.24 
1998 -1.59 -2.91 8.69 -3.05 -3.24 -2.70 -7.10 
20. The difference between exports of goods and services and imports of goods and services 
 
Table D3 
Share of each group (region) in total portfolio equity inflow (%)21 
 EAP ECA HPC LAC MNA SA SSA 
1980 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1981 28.19 0.00 0.00 71.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1982 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1983 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1984 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1985 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1986 5.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 32.38 0.00 
1987 46.36 0.00 0.00 11.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1988 44.31 0.00 0.00 16.01 0.00 5.10 0.00 
1989 77.79 2.11 0.00 12.87 0.00 4.98 0.00 
1990 61.18 6.28 0.00 29.68 0.00 2.81 0.05 
1991 15.88 0.00 0.13 83.79 0.00 0.30 0.03 
1992 37.72 0.46 0.00 59.11 0.00 2.70 0.01 
1993 40.67 1.93 0.17 53.39 0.00 3.97 0.04 
1994 35.87 6.26 2.49 37.43 0.30 17.70 2.45 
1995 50.68 7.57 1.22 21.20 0.56 6.49 13.50 
1996 36.79 16.97 1.21 28.25 3.32 10.57 4.09 
1997 30.45 15.93 -0.07 32.94 7.48 8.20 4.99 
1998 57.85 18.65 0.31 11.23 5.64 2.25 4.37 
21. Portfolio equity flows are the sum of country funds, depository receipts (American or global),  
    and direct  purchases of shares by foreign investors. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Global Development Finance 2000 
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Table D4 
Gross Domestic Savings (% GDP) 
 World ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 23.19 NA 27.30 29.70 21.87 17.02 17.07 9.57 
1983 22.70 NA 24.41 30.33 21.35 16.27 16.19 10.06 
1984 23.40 NA 21.79 31.07 22.18 16.35 16.72 10.63 
1985 23.22 NA 18.87 30.59 23.64 17.76 18.36 11.31 
1986 22.86 NA 16.02 31.81 21.00 17.58 17.72 10.50 
1987 23.31 NA 18.62 33.63 23.70 17.76 17.06 9.08 
1988 24.08 NA 18.49 34.20 25.26 18.47 17.98 9.69 
1989 24.64 31.43 21.27 34.01 25.01 19.10 17.88 8.93 
1990 23.99 26.01 22.70 34.89 21.46 19.72 16.21 9.16 
1991 23.54 27.50 20.95 35.46 19.86 19.61 15.41 9.90 
1992 23.25 28.34 23.18 35.17 19.42 20.15 13.55 8.73 
1993 22.77 24.68 21.08 36.83 19.76 18.23 14.52 8.71 
1994 23.09 24.40 24.13 37.37 20.21 19.28 16.28 11.64 
1995 23.21 23.97 25.25 37.10 20.38 20.88 16.69 12.18 
1996 23.11 22.83 24.20 36.14 19.95 16.73 18.08 12.13 
1997 23.43 21.45 24.28 36.53 19.85 18.11 15.96 12.40 
1998 23.07 19.87 19.19 37.59 18.77 18.14 16.10 12.46 
Source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank 
 
 
Table D5 
Gross domestic investment as a share of GDP (%) 
 World ECA MENA EAP LAC SA SSA HIPCs 
1982 23.13 NA 26.83 28.13 21.40 19.88 22.83 16.34 
1983 22.28 NA 27.73 28.82 17.81 19.09 21.11 14.95 
1984 22.20 NA 26.46 28.23 16.93 19.13 19.13 13.90 
1985 22.10 NA 23.88 27.56 17.22 19.92 18.20 13.41 
1986 22.10 NA 22.94 27.76 18.79 20.28 17.65 14.24 
1987 22.45 NA 22.11 28.36 20.60 20.76 17.03 14.19 
1988 22.98 NA 21.21 28.94 21.38 20.53 18.52 14.39 
1989 23.32 26.59 20.93 27.90 21.73 21.31 18.34 13.80 
1990 23.17 24.83 20.92 30.16 19.30 21.78 17.92 14.48 
1991 22.48 21.89 21.62 31.43 18.01 21.05 17.63 14.03 
1992 22.20 22.59 22.23 32.41 18.64 21.56 16.52 14.29 
1993 21.92 21.73 22.69 35.23 19.25 21.03 16.72 15.32 
1994 21.99 22.28 22.02 34.72 20.36 21.32 17.16 17.78 
1995 21.99 22.16 22.42 34.64 19.45 23.22 16.96 17.65 
1996 22.18 22.59 21.06 34.68 18.96 22.09 16.90 18.26 
1997 22.13 22.28 21.75 33.18 19.85 21.74 17.17 18.19 
1998 21.87 21.44 20.90 30.10 20.32 20.69 18.51 18.72 
Source: World Development Indicators 2001, World Bank 
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Table D6 
 
Net resource flows and transfers of HIPCs and other developing countries (1984-98)22 
  
Heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs) All developing countries 
Resource flows and transfers 1984-90 1991-98 1984-90 1991-98 
Net flows on debt, total (% of GNP)a  4.928 2.852 1.377 2.182 
Net transfers on debt, total (% of GNP)b  2.783 0.850 -0.646 0.504 
Aggregate net resource flows (% of GNP)c  8.405 10.536 2.117 4.433 
Aggregate net transfers (% of GNP)d  6.291 8.299 0.155 2.651 
Official net resource flows (% of GNP)e  7.485 8.273 1.167 0.948 
Official net transfers (% of GNP)f  6.612 7.099 0.747 0.454 
Portfolio equity flows (% of GNP)  0.000 0.175 0.025 0.550 
Private net resource flows (% of GNP)g  0.920 2.263 0.950 3.485 
Private net transfers (% of GNP)h  -0.321 1.199 -0.592 2.197 
22 data for GNP for HIPCs is available only since 1984 
 
a
. Net flows on debt is disbursements on long-term debt and IMF purchases minus principal repayments on  
    long-term debt and IMF repurchases up to 1984. Beginning in 1985 this line includes the change in stock    
    of short-term debt (including interest arrears for long-term debt).  
b. Net transfers on debt are net flows minus interest payments (or disbursements minus total debt service    
  payments). 
c. Aggregate net resource flows are the sum of net resource flows on long-term debt (excluding IMF) plus    
  net direct foreign investment, portfolio equity flows and official grants (excluding technical cooperation).   
   Net flows (or net lending or net disbursements) are disbursements minus principal repayments 
d. Aggregate net transfers are equal to aggregate net resource flows minus interest payments on long-term  
    loans and foreign direct investment profits. 
e. Private net resource flows are the sum of net flows on debt to private creditors (PPG and PNG) plus net  
   direct foreign investment and portfolio equity flows 
f. Official net transfers are equal to official net resource flows minus official interest payments on long-term    
  loans. 
g. Private net resource flows are the sum of net flows on debt to private creditors (PPG and PNG) plus net  
  direct foreign investment and portfolio equity flows 
h. Private net transfers are equal to private net resource flows minus private interest payments on long-term    
   loans (PPG and PNG) and foreign direct investment profits. 
 
Source: Own calculations based on data from Global Development Finance 2000,        (CD-ROM) 
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Abstract 
 
The failure of indebted developing countries to meet their contractual debt obligations has been 
one of the major concerns of the international community since the outset of the debt crisis in 
1982. While poverty and external factors seem to be the most profound factors behind the 
external indebtedness of poor nations, there is still an ongoing debate as to why indebted 
countries have failed to manage servicing their external debt. 
 
This paper, using cross-section pooled logit, probit and fixed effects logit models empirically 
explores the determinants of rescheduling contractual debt service payments by developing 
countries in the past two decades. The results seem to suggest that past external debt, the level of 
income per capita, the growth rate of GDP, openness, the levels of international reserves and 
capital inflows to be the core determining factors behind the behavior of borrowers towards 
meeting their contractual debt obligations. 
 
From the empirical strategy perspectives, as in the case of debt determinants, the application of a 
panel data approach seems to be highly preferred, as it allows to control for time-specific events 
that are linked to overseas borrowing, particularly given the rapid changes in the global 
macroeconomic environment in the past years. Moreover, this strategy helps to produce a more 
robust explanation by allowing to incorporate country-specific factors as developing countries 
themselves are heterogeneous in terms of their colonial heritages, geopolitical and strategic 
significance, and creditworthiness, all affecting the level of indebtedness and the potential 
bargaining power to manage the subsequent debt crisis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
“ The debt crisis can be studied as a problem in epidemiology. A powerful virus, high world interest rate, hit 
the population of capital importing developing countries in the 1980s. Some countries succumbed to the 
virus, having to reschedule their debt on an emergency basis, while others did not. And of those countries 
that arrived for emergency treatment, some recovered sufficiently to enter the period of quiet 
convalescence, while others are still suffering from febrile seizures in the IMF’ s intensive care unit” , Sachs 
and Berg (1988, pp. 1) 
 
The external debt crisis of developing countries’  is believed to be one of the major 
challenges of the new millennium. As Eatwell and Taylor (2000, in: Dymski, 2002) 
express it, “ international debt crisis has become a defining feature of the contemporary 
world economy” .52 In this regard, McFadden, et al (1985, in Smith, et al (1985)), among 
others, argue that the primary question in international debt crisis is why indebted 
countries failed to meet their debt-service obligations. The late 1980s and the 1990s 
witness that developing countries in general and HIPCs in particular have suffered from 
chronic debt-servicing difficulties.53. Though it is generally believed that external debt 
helps countries that are suffering from capital deficiency to achieve accelerated economic 
growth, once this financial gap becomes unmanageable, the past accumulated external 
debt is likely to provoke further external borrowing, creating a vicious circle problem. 
This obviously creates a gloomy picture on future growth prospects and reduces the 
likelihood of developing countries to meet their debt-service obligations, which is exactly 
the current experience of the poorest nations of the world, earning the new name “ heavily 
indebted poor countries”  (HIPCs). 
 
The debt-servicing difficulties of indebted poor countries are remarkable. For instance, 
based on the Global Development Finance, 2000, interest arrears as a ratio to total long-
term debt outstanding for SSA and HIPCs in 1989 represent 5.3% and 7%, respectively. 
                                                           
52
 As they put it, “ the past 8 years, a period of virtually unregulated cross-border financial flows, have 
witnessed 8 major episodes of international debt and financial crises: the 1994-95 Mexican “ Tequila”  crisis, 
the 1997-98 Asian financial crises, the 1998-99 run on Brazilian real, the 1998-99 Russian ruble (long-term 
credit crisis, the 2000 Turkish crisis, the 2001-02 meltdown of the Argentine economy, the 2002 attack on 
the Brazilian real, and the 2002 Uruguayan collapse” . 
53
 The debt-servicing difficulty in fact became apparent already in August 1982, after Mexico’ s official 
announcement that it could no longer manage to continue servicing its external debt. This was the 
beginning of the end to the creditworthiness of most poor countries. Fafchamps (1996) defines debt crises 
in terms of ability to pay, where he argues that a country defaults on its debt because it has run out of 
foreign exchange (pp. 315). 
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In 1998, this ratio increased to 11% and 9% respectively.  In 1989, principal arrears as a 
share of total long-term outstanding for SSA and HIPCs were around 10% and 13% 
respectively. In 1998, this ratio rose to 11% for SSA and nearly 24% for HIPCs. This is 
in contrast to 3% for EAP and 1.2% for LAC.  (See, table 3.1). 
 
Table (3.1) 
Arrears and rescheduling (% of total external debt (EDT) and GNP) 
    Heavily indebted poor countries All developing countries 
Debt crisis indicators 1984-90 1991-98 1984-90 1991-98 
Total amount of debt rescheduled (% of 
EDT)  3.05 2.12 4.75 2.68 
Principal rescheduled (% of EDT)  1.60 0.98 1.46 0.90 
Principal forgiven (% of EDT)  0.65 1.01 0.22 0.20 
Interest rescheduled (% of EDT)  NA 0.57 NA 0.54 
Interest forgiven (% of EDT)  0.07 0.26 0.03 0.04 
Debt stock rescheduled (% of EDT)  0.38 0.21 2.78 1.08 
Debt stock reduction (% of EDT)  0.08 0.65 0.61 0.50 
Interest arrears on LDOD (% of EDT)  4.77 8.34 1.91 2.21 
Principal arrears on LDOD (% of EDT)  8.25 19.22 2.87 4.37 
            
Total amount of debt rescheduled (% of 
GNP)  2.65 2.80 1.66 1.00 
Principal rescheduled (% of GNP)  1.38 1.31 0.50 0.33 
Principal forgiven (% of GNP)  0.65 1.36 0.08 0.07 
Interest rescheduled (% of GNP) NA 0.76 NA 0.20 
Interest forgiven (% of GNP)  0.07 0.34 0.01 0.01 
Debt stock rescheduled (% of GNP)  0.33 0.27 0.99 0.41 
Debt stock reduction (% of GNP)  0.08 0.82 0.21 0.18 
Interest arrears on LDOD (% of GNP)  4.36 11.30 0.65 0.82 
Principal arrears on LDOD (% of GNP)  7.65 25.96 0.99 1.64 
Total external debt (EDT) to GNP ratio 87.95 134.36 34.13 37.53 
 
Source: Own calculations based on: Global Development Finance, 2000 CD-ROM and  
              World Development Indicators, 2001 CD-ROM 
 
From table (3.1), it is also apparent that HIPCs average principal arrears on loans reached 
more than 8% of its total external debt in 1984-90, which rose to nearly 20% in the 1991-
98 period. Other developing countries have by far lower problems compared to those of 
the HIPCs. Similarly, this ratio on average reached about 26% of HIPCs’  GNP, a clear 
indication that this group has not managed to pay back its international debt obligations. 
This ratio for other developing countries, again, on average, was around 1% in (1984-90) 
and around 1.5% in the (1991-98) periods, respectively. Similarly, interest arrears on 
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loans are quite higher for HIPCs relative to other low and middle income countries. The 
ratio of interest arrears to GDP reached around 5% in the 1984-89, which even nearly 
doubled in the 1991-98 period. The difference is quite apparent that I need not to 
elaborate that further. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to empirically address the reasons behind the failure of 
indebted countries in the 1980s and 1990s to fully service their contractual external debt 
obligations.54 To answer the above question, the remainder of the paper is divided into 
seven parts: Part 2 presents a brief summary of the factors that drive countries to debt 
crises situations. Part 3 summarizes the past empirical studies in this area. Part 4 
discusses the empirical specification of the model used to figure out the factors that cause 
debt crisis. Part 5 briefly introduces the data and variables that are included in the 
regression. Part 6 presents results and the discussion. Finally part 7 concludes and 
presents the possible policy implications of the study.  
 
Now, reiterating the question, the main issue I intend to address here is what are the main 
factors that drive countries into a debt crisis situation? In other words, why have indebted 
poor countries failed to service their external debt and instead opted for rescheduling? 
Bearing this question in mind, and before I myself address these issues, I will briefly 
summarize most relevant previous researchers results. 
 
2. Factors affecting debt-repayment capacity: A theoretical review 
 
Following McFadden, et al (1985, in Smith, et al (1985)), among others, generally a 
country is said to be in a debt repayment crisis situation if it has arrears on principal or 
interest, higher-tranche IMF arrangements, or rescheduling requests (p.188). From the 
figures in table (3.1) it is apparent that HIPC’ s have failed to convert the resources they 
obtained through overseas borrowing into growth and ultimately service their external 
debt. However, although many of the indebted poor countries were in extremely difficult 
                                                           
54
 Most of the theoretical explanations on the debt crisis in the preceding chapter are relevant to this 
chapter. I will mainly focus on the empirical counterpart of the explanation for the debt payment difficulties 
of indebted nations in the past two decades.  
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situations, they in principle remained committed to repay their external debt obligations. 
This is in contrast to the debt crisis in the 1930s, where virtually every Latin American 
country unilaterally suspended servicing its external bond obligations (Sachs, 1986).55It 
appears that rescheduling rather than default is mutually beneficial both for debtors and 
creditors. Marchesi (2000) argues in this line. The rescheduling is “ a mechanism which 
not only allows debtors not to default on their loans and remain in the international 
financial system but also prevents creditors from facing the whole consequences of a 
financial crisis”  (p. 3). However, it appears that the hidden reason behind rescheduling 
rather than default is something more than that. As Sachs (1986) argues, the rescheduling 
in the 1980s was indeed in the interest of creditors, where he stresses that creditors during 
these periods used the leverage of multilateral financial institutions to make sure that 
debtors wouldn’ t interrupt servicing their debt. In effect, the creditor governments have 
endorsed debt rescheduling rather than debt relief (p.398).  
 
While this is generally true, the main thing left unexplained is why developing countries 
fail to pay back their external debt in the first place. Most of the reasons have already 
been dealt with in the preceding chapter of this dissertation. The factors that are chosen 
vary from author to author. McFadden, et al (1985, in Smith, et al (1985, p. 186) 
summarize the broader group of factors, which I base my empirical analysis: 
 
A. Factors in the world economy 
 
These are factors identified as beyond the help of developing countries that may to a 
great extent increase the likelihood of indebted countries to reschedule their contractual 
debt obligations. Following McFadden (1983) such factors may include but not limited to 
a price increase in “ noncompressible”  imports, the deterioration in the terms of trade of 
developing countries’  major export items, recession in industrialized countries, and 
volatility in trade.  
                                                           
55
 Sachs (1986, p.410) points out that the major difference between the 1930s and 1980s seems to be the 
absence of “ hegemonic”  power in the 1930s, while this gap was filled by United States in the 1980s. In this 
context default in the 1980s would mean sanctions, seizure of assets and other forms of punishments (a cut 
in foreign aid and trade sanctions, for instance). 
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B. Domestic factors 
 
These are factors that are in the full control of indebted countries themselves. These may 
include shock to the productive capacity of developing nations as the result of economic 
or non-economic factors, poor economic management by the government of an indebted 
country (which may include all forms of economic distortions), poor investment 
strategies, where the returns of the investment are by far lower than the cost of foreign 
capital, unsustainable growth strategies, and speculation and capital flight.56  These 
factors may directly or indirectly disrupt production, decrease export revenues, and 
ultimately wipe out the repayment potential of indebted countries. 
 
C. Factors affecting the supply of credit 
 
These are factors that directly or indirectly affect the supply of credit to indebted 
countries. Such factors include: A rise in interest payments due to higher real interest 
rates in industrialized countries, an increase in amortization due to a decline in maturities 
and an increase in the ratio of the short term debt, an increase in competition from other 
developed and oil exporting countries, limited capacity of governments to guarantee debt, 
and erratic behavior of creditors induced by institutional rules on exposure, and distortion 
in incentives of loan managers and panics are all believed to be detrimental to the 
repayment capacity of indebted nations. 
 
There obviously are reverse causality issues across some of the factors that are just 
mentioned. For instance, among the external factors, the recession in industrialized 
countries may be the cause for the deterioration in the terms of trade of developing 
countries key export items. Similarly, this may also be the case that the fall in the terms 
of trade will force developing countries to reschedule rather than fully service their 
contractual debt obligation and demand for further borrowing, which may reduce the 
financial transfers to the industrialized countries. Under the assumption of substantially 
larger debtors, this may also cause economic slow down in industrialized countries 
                                                           
56
 For a broader discussion on capital flight, see chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
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themselves. Moreover, it is always easy to precisely differentiate some of the domestic 
and external factors, as external factors may also impact on domestic ones. However, this 
gives a good general theoretical background to the empirical part of the analysis 
concerning the repayment difficulties of indebted countries in the past two decades. 
 
3. A summary of previous empirical studies 
 
Sachs and Berg (1988) are among those who investigate the likelihood of default and the 
factors that cause a debt crisis. Their attempt was to find a structural explanation to the 
debt crisis in the 1980s. They argue that the change in the terms of trade, the structure of 
foreign trade (share of manufacturing vs. primary goods in total exports and the degree of 
commodity diversification), the level of per capita income, and geographical location of a 
country (to capture “ contagion effect”  in pure commercial bank lending), and openness, 
are the main factors that determine the likelihood of default. The dependent variable is 
rescheduling of external debt owed to commercial banks during the period 1982-87. They 
have 15 countries, which rescheduled their debt and 20 countries that did not in their 
regression.  
 
Using a probit model, their findings indicate the following: 57 More open economies tend 
to have low ratio of total debt service to exports ratio due to rapidly growing export 
revenues, therefore are less likely to reschedule. Higher income inequality leads increases 
the probability of debt service difficulties. High income countries are less likely to 
reschedule since the costs of doing so (less access to new loans at friendly terms) are 
high. Moreover, high income countries have more effective political and institutional 
structures, which make them to manage their economies more efficiently (pp. 24). The 
surprising result is that the terms of trade turned out insignificant. This is constrast to the 
theoretical argument that a loss in the terms of trade may lead to debt repayment 
difficulties.  
 
                                                           
57
 for a broader discussion on the structural causes of the debt crisis, see, Sachs and Berg (1988). 
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Woller and Philips (1996) empirically investigate the debt-servicing difficulties of 29 
developing countries, most of them from Latin America during the period between 1985 
and 1993. The dependent variable is total debt reduction. Using a logit model, they show 
that debt reduction is inversely related to the rate of inflation, ratio of exports of goods 
and services to GDP, the change in the terms of trade, interest arrears, and positively to 
GDP per capita, ratio of exports to GDP, and ratio of current account balance to GDP. 
Some of their covariates appear to be suffering from a multicolinearity problem. For 
instance, taking the ratio of exports GDP and current account to GDP may lead to a 
serious problem as these variables are highly related. 
 
McFadden, et. al. (1985, in Smith et al (1985)) examine the determinants of debt-service 
difficulties across 93 developing countries in the period 1971-82. Using a probit model, 
they find out that the probability of rescheduling is a decreasing function of total reserves 
to GDP ratio, GNP per capita, and its real growth. In contrast, the likelihood of 
rescheduling is an increasing function of imports to GDP ratio, debt service due to 
exports ratio, and the change in the real exchange rate.58  
 
Marchesi’ s (2000) empirical strategy was aimed at testing the existence of an effect of 
adopting IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling. The 
central hypothesis is that those countries that adopt an IMF programme will be more 
likely to obtain a debt rescheduling than those that do not.59 The period under 
investigation is 1985-94 and this is because, as she puts it “ international debt strategy has 
shifted towards a policy more oriented to concede restructuring (respect to one more 
oriented to providing new loans) only in the eighties”  (p. 15). The dependent variable is 
chosen is total debt rescheduled. Using a bivariate probit model, Marchesi (2000) finds 
that rescheduling is negatively and strongly related to the rate of growth of the 
government consumption, the level of investment, the level of exports, and the 
                                                           
58
 The change in the real exchange was used as a proxy for capital flight, where they give the value of 0 for 
country observations with flexible exchange rate regime, while they take the growth of the real exchange 
rate for those with pegged exchange rate regime. See, also Hadjivassiliou (1987) for debt repayment 
problem discussion. 
59
 Marchesi (2000) takes into account different kinds of IMF programme on the ground that these 
programmes were chosen because they have different objectives and cover different time horizons. 
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disequilibrium in the balance of payments. In contrast, there is a strong and positive 
relation between rescheduling and the two dummy variables that are included: The 
adoption of IMF programme and participation in the Baker and Brady Plan. Finally, the 
total external debt turns out to be negatively and significantly related to rescheduling, 
implying that “ the more a country is indebted, the smaller the probability that it will 
obtain an arrangement with the Fund”  (p. 23). 
 
Ngassman (1992) using a logit model and 45 African countries during the 1976-87 period 
examines the determinants of rescheduling (or simply the factors that affect debt 
repayment capacity). His results seem to suggest that debt service ratio, reserve to 
imports ratio, the debt service payments to capital inflow ratio, the growth rate of GDP, 
the rate of domestic inflation, and the ratio of net government deficit to GDP ratio are 
important determinants of debt repayment capacity.  
 
 
4. Econometric specification and data description 
 
In order to measure the likelihood of debt service difficulties, I estimate the parameters 
using a logit model. For a comparison reason, a probit model is used alternatively.60 Later 
I switch to a fixed effects logit model to control for country specific factors and time 
specific that account for debt service difficulties. The notations and procedure of 
estimation of the logit model that I use here is adapted from Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
(1998).61 This method is basically a multivariate regression technique which is used to 
make predictions if we have a binary (dichotomous) dependent variable. 
 
In the logit model, my focus is to figure out the probability of debt service difficulties 
(total debt rescheduled used as a proxy for debt servicing difficulties) and the factors that 
are responsible for this difficulty to occur. Like in Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), using a 
logit approach, the probability of rescheduling total external debt (
 
Pi)  can be estimated 
as  
                                                           
60
 The two models should produce similar results, except that the scale of the coefficients will differ. 
61
 However, a broader discussion of this and other limited dependent variable can be found in Pindyck and 
Rubinfield (1998) and Maddala (1983). Ngassman (1992) also follows exactly the same procedure. 
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Here the individual Pi cannot be observed but from the World Bank Global Development 
Finance (2000 CD-ROM), it is possible to have information about countries that have 
rescheduled their external debt and those that do not. Unfortunately, such data is 
available only between the periods 1989-98. X is a vector of variables that impact on the 
debt capacity of debtor countries and e  is the base of natural logarithm of both sides of 
the equation. The dependent variable, Yi, is composed of two values: 1 for a country that 
has for some reason rescheduled its total debt payment and 0 for the one that was lucky to 
escape rescheduling during a give year. α  and β  are unknown parameters that should be 
estimated by the model.  Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998), Maddala (1983) and 
Ngassam (1992), among others, if the logit model with individual observations has been 
chosen, the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) would be the most appropriate 
estimation technique to be used.62  
 
Using Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) notation, the sample here consists of n1 countries 
that have rescheduled their external debt and n2 countries that managed to pay back their 
external debt. Therefore, we have (n1 + n2 = N) countries in total. I ordered the data in 
such a way that n1 observations are associated with rescheduling and n2 countries with 
non-rescheduling. The maximum likelihood function that is subject to maximization will 
then have the following form: 
 
L = Prob(Y1,…., YN) = Prob(Y1)….Prob(YN)                                                     (2) 
 
Recognizing that the probability of a country falling in the non-rescheduling group is 
simply 1 minus the probability of its being in the rescheduling group, and using n to stand 
for the product of a number of independent variables, the likelihood function reduces to 
                                                           
62
 All parameter estimators are consistent, and asymptotically efficient. In addition, all parameter estimators 
are known to be (asymptotically) normal, so that the analogy of the regression t test can be applied 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998)). 
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The last expression indicates that Yi = 1 for the n1 observations, and 0 for the n2 
observations. 
 
It is now time to maximize the logarithms of L by substituting for the logistic probability 
function from equation (1). It is necessary to note first that 
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 Following Ngassam (1992, p. 11), this implies that 
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In order to obtain the slope estimators of 
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 there is a need for a partial 
differentiation of log L with respect to the two unknown parameters ( βα and, ), and 
setting the outcome equal to zero, and solve: 
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 To test the significance of all or a subset of the coefficients in the MLE logit model, we 
use the standard chi-square distribution and likelihood ratio tests. 
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5. Data description and samples 
 
The data consists of 48 countries that have rescheduled during the 1989-98 period and 14 
countries that have not rescheduled their external debt service obligation (see table 
3.3).The number of countries chosen for this analysis purely depended on the availability 
of data. The dependent variable is total amount rescheduled in the 1989-98 period. The 
explanatory variables, their definitions and sources are in table (3.2). Unlike most 
previous researchers, I use lagged values of all the covariates to avoid the notoriously 
known simultaneity problem. Interest payments and total debt service payments are 
deflated by exports. While capital inflows are deflated by total debt services payments 
due, reserves are deflated by imports and imports are deflated by GDP to take account of 
heterogeneity in the size of developing countries. Tables (3.4) and (3.5) contain 
descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the covariates included in this study, 
respectively.  
 
6. Results of the regression and discussion 
 
In order to measure the likelihood of debt service difficulties, I estimate the parameters 
using a logit model. For comparison reasons, a probit model is used alternatively.63Later I 
switch to a fixed effects logit model to control for country and time specific factors that 
may account for debt service repayment capacity. The reason is that countries’  debt 
repayment potential may also be influenced by factors other than those that current 
empirical literature focuses. The second reason is that in a simple cross-section approach 
it is not possible to control for time-specific factors that may hamper the repayment 
capacity of indebted countries. To my knowledge these have not been taken care of by a 
current empirical literature. 
 
The empirical results for the causes of the debt crisis in the 1980s and 1990s have been 
presented in tables (3.6) to (3.9). In table (3.6), I presented the results for the cross-
section pooled time series logit and probit models, where columns 1-4 stand for the logit 
                                                           
63
 The two models should produce similar results, except that the scale of the coefficient will differ. 
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while 5-8 stand for the probit model.64 The results of table (3.6) suggest the following: 
Higher total debt service to exports ratio (TDSX) increases the probability of debt-service 
difficulties and leads to rescheduling. This is just because higher debt service exhausts 
the amount of resources and little is left over for investment and growth. Higher amount 
of reserves to imports ratio (RESIMP) decreases the probability of debt rescheduling 
since now an indebted country has enough foreign exchange to meet its external debt 
obligation. Higher real income per capita (LGDP) and growth in real income (GDPG) 
and import to GDP ratio (IMPGDP) decrease the probability of rescheduling. The reason 
is that higher income per capita and GDP growth that are indicators of creditworthiness, 
should enable an indebted country to generate resources to meet its foreign obligation.65 
On the other hand, the significance of IMPGDP variable is to a great extent linked to the 
degree of openness of an indebted country to international trade. An indebted country that 
is open to international trade is unlikely to default or demand for rescheduling as the 
penalty (trade sanction, embargo and trade credit) might be too damaging.  In column 2, I 
added the growth of OECD trade partners (OECDG) to capture the impact of this on the 
debt-servicing behavior of indebted countries. The results suggest, though not statistically 
significant, that higher growth of OECD trade partners decreases the probability of 
rescheduling (debt-servicing difficulties).  
 
Putting aside the statistically insignificance of the coefficient on OECDG for a moment, 
the result may be interpreted from two viewpoints: First, higher growth of OECD trade 
partners would mean higher export revenue for indebted countries which should enable 
them to pay their external debt back when due. Second, the growth of this group could 
also create a better economic environment for debt relief.66 In column 3, I added the 
percentage change in the terms of trade (LTOTG) that captures the welfare loss or gain in 
international trade, which affects export revenue. The positive sign on LTOTG (though 
not statistically significant) may suggest that an improvement in the terms of trade 
                                                           
64
 All covariates are lagged by one year to minimize possible simultaneity problem. 
65
 As McFadden, et al (1985, p. 188, in Smith, et al (1985)) rightly puts it,” the significance of income may 
reflect both the ability to pay and the presence of a government infrastructure adequate to control trade and 
exchange activities” . 
66
 However, as Hajivassiliou (1987) argues, higher growth in OECD countries may reflect the level of 
investment in these countries which may crowd out lending to developing countries. 
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increases the probability of debt–service difficulties, hence the demand for rescheduling, 
a result that should be interpreted rather as anomalous. Finally, the ratio of capital inflows 
to total debt service due (CAPTDS) may indicate that higher inflows of capital relative to 
the amount of scheduled debt service payment decreases the probability of rescheduling.  
 
Table (3.7) is similar to that of table (3.6) except that I now use interest payments to 
exports ratio (INTX) instead of total debt service ratio (TDSX). The reason is that it is 
actually interest payments ratio that captures the pure (net) impact of swings in the 
interest rate and represents the actual cost of external debt. While most of the covariates 
remain the same as that of table (3.6), the results for INTX suggest that higher interest 
payments strongly increase the likelihood of rescheduling.  
 
While the discussion so far suggests that the covariates in tables (3.6) and (3.7) (interest 
payments, total debt service ratio, income per capita and growth in income, capital 
inflows to scheduled debt service payments and reserves to imports ratio) are key 
determinants of external debt service difficulties, there are some caveats that need to be 
addressed. The crux of the matter here is that countries may encounter debt–service 
difficulties because of several other problems. As many argue, there are substantial 
economic, social and institutional differences across developing countries, which may 
affect their debt service capacities. Moreover, developing countries are different in their 
colonial heritage, geopolitical and strategic significance, political stability and other 
factors that may determine their creditworthiness and the potential bargaining power to 
manage debt–service difficulties.  
 
The empirical strategy to address the issues mentioned above is to use the fixed-effects 
model and in this case the fixed-effects logit model that allows to control for country-
specific factors. The results of the regression for the fixed–effects logit model are 
presented in tables (3.8) and (3.9). The results seem to suggest that TDXS, INTX, income 
per capita (LGDP) and IMPGDP are indeed major determinants of debt-service 
difficulties, hence the level of rescheduling across developing countries in the 1980s and 
1990s. It is also important to note that INTX and income per capita (LGDP) continued to 
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be the strongest explanation for debt-service difficulty across countries. The marginal 
effects (table 3.10) also confirm that debt service (mainly interest payments), reserves to 
GDP ratio, income per capita and imports to GDP ratio be the core determining factors 
behind the failure of indebted countries to service their contractual debt obligations.  
 
7. Conclusion and the policy implication of this study 
 
This paper was aimed at empirically addressing the factoring accounting for the debt 
repayment difficulties of indebted developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. In this 
respect, the main objective was to empirically explore the factors that increase the 
likelihood of debt rescheduling. 
 
To answer this question, several empirical strategies have been employed. Using the 
cross-section pooled time series probit, and logit, models and fixed effects logit model, 
the empirical findigs suggest that the core factors behind the poor nations’  debt–servicing 
difficulties are the scheduled external debt service payments (or interest payments), the 
amount of international reserves they have at disposal, the level of income per capita, the 
growth rate in income, the ratio imports to GDP, and the amount of capital inflows 
relative to the total debt service payments due ratio. It is important to note that the level 
of income per capita (which captures the level of poverty, among other things) and 
interest payments (which represent the actual cost of external debt and capture swings in 
international interest rates) are the most profound determinants of debt-servicing 
difficulties across developing nations in the 1980s and 1990s 
  
The policy implications of this study are relatively straightforward: 
 
The results here and other studies seem to suggest that poverty and past accumulated debt 
are the cardinal factors responsible for the failure of poor nations in meeting their 
contractual debt obligations. This may seem to support the call for debt relief for poor 
nations, as  further supply of loans to these nations would simply lead them to a 
notoriously known problem of “ circular financing” , hence, taking more expensive fresh 
loans to pay cheaper old ones back, leaving the circle unbroken, and poor nations poor 
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forever. In this context, the new HIPCs’  initiative by the IMF and World Bank should be 
recognized as a plausible start towards a real solution to the debt crisis of poor nations. 
Nevertheless, without a sincere policy change both in developing and developed 
countries, debt relief on its own will not guarantee a sustainable economic recovery 
across indebted poor nations. 
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3. Regression results for the likelihood of debt rescheduling (1989-98) 
 
 
Table (3.2) 
Definitions of the variables and their sources 
Variables Definitions Sources 
TDSX Total debt service (scheduled) to exports 
ratio (lagged by one year) 
Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
2000, World Bank 
RESIMP Reserves to imports ratio (lagged by year) Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
2000, World Bank 
LGDP Log of real GDP (PPP-adjusted) lagged 
by one year   
Database for Global Development Network, 
World Bank, Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
GDPG Annual growth rate GDP (PPP, and 
deflated by 1990 US CPI) lagged by one 
year) 
Database for Global Development Network, 
World Bank, Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
IMPGDP Ratio of imports to GDP (lagged by one 
year) 
Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
2000, World Bank 
OECDG Growth of OECD trade partners (lagged 
by one year) 
Database for Global Development Network, 
World Bank, Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
LTOTG The percentage change in the terms of 
trade (lagged by one year) 
Database for Global Development Network, 
World Bank, Easterly William and Mirvat 
Sewadeh (2002) 
CAPTDS The share of aggregate net resource flows 
to total debt service  (a proxy for capital 
inflows) lagged by one year 
Global Development Finance, CD-ROM, 
2000, World Bank 
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Table (3.3) 
Rescheduling of total external debt during the period (1989-98)a 
Rescheduling countries during  Non-rescheduling countries 
Argentina (7) Korea, Rep.(1) Bangladesh 
Belize (1) Madagascar (5) Botswana 
Bolivia (8) Malawi (1) Gambia, The 
Brazil (9) Mali (7) India 
Burkina Faso (6) Mauritania (7) Lesotho 
Cameroon (8) Mexico (4) Malaysia 
Chad (7) Morocco (5) Pakistan 
Chile (7) Mozambique (9) Papua New Guinea 
Colombia (1) Nicaragua (10) Sri Lanka 
Congo, Rep.(10) Niger (9) Swaziland 
Costa Rica (5) Nigeria (4) Thailand 
Cote d'Ivoire (9) Panama (6) Tunisia 
Dominican Republic (10) Paraguay (1) Zimbabwe 
El Salvador (4) Peru (9)  
Ethiopia (6) Philippines (5)  
Gabon (10) Rwanda (2)  
Ghana (2) Senegal (9)  
Guatemala (3) Sierra Leone (8)  
Haiti (2) Togo (9)  
Honduras (9) Trinidad and Tobago (4)  
Indonesia (1) Uganda (7)  
Jamaica (7) Uruguay (2)  
Jordan (9) Venezuela, RB (1)  
Kenya (1)   
 
a. Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of times debt has been rescheduled during 1989-98 
Source: Global Development Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) 
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Table (3.4) 
Descriptive statistics of the determinants on debt servicing difficulties (1989-98) 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TDSX 600 21.22 13.42 0 152 
RESIMP 594 3.25 3.15 0 25 
LGDP 599 7.43 0.82 5.61 9.22 
GDPG 600 3.67 5.61 -50.2 34.4 
IMPGDP 600 36.67 20.83 4.6 129.8 
OECDG 570 1.85 1.22 -1.67 4.78 
LTOTG 599 0.01 2.72 -15.84 18.02 
CAPTDS 600 341.91 2012.16 -210.54 45923 
 
 
Table (3.5) 
Correlation matrix 
Variable RESCDT TDSX RESIMP LGDP GDPG IMPGDP OECDG LTOT CAPTDS 
RESCDT 1.00         
TDSX 0.1813* 
(0.000) 
1.00        
RESIMP -0.155* 
(0.000) 
-0.08* 
(0.04) 
1.00       
LGDP -0.159* 
(0.000) 
-0.053 
(0.19) 
0.215* 
(0.000) 
1.00      
GDPG -0.01* 
(0.009) 
-0.017 
(0.68) 
0.136* 
(0.000) 
0.131* 
(0.001) 
1.00     
IMPGDP -0.126* 
(0.002) 
-0.331* 
(0.000) 
-0.114* 
(0.08) 
0.071 
(0.14) 
0.059 
(0.14) 
1.00    
OECDG -0.032 
(0.43) 
0.044 
(0.28) 
-0.032 
(0.43) 
0.016 
(0.69) 
0.075 
(0.07) 
0.022 
(0.59) 
1.00   
LTOT -0.002 
(0.95) 
-0.034 
(0.40) 
0.017 
(0.67) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
-0.024 
(0.55) 
-0.031 
(0.44) 
0.004 
(0.30) 
1.00  
CAPTDS 0.076 
(0.06) 
-0.109* 
(0.00) 
-0.037 
(0.36) 
-0.152* 
(0.000) 
-0.198* 
(0.000) 
-0.016 
(0.68) 
0.028 
(0.49) 
0.068 
(0.09) 
1.00 
 
• *significant at 5% level 
• Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table (3.6) 
Regression results for cross-section pooled analysis (1989-98)8 
 
                               Logit Model Estimates                            Probit Model Estimates  
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 2.336*** 
(2.8) 
2.34*** 
(2.8) 
2.339*** 
(2.8) 
1.266 
(1.29) 
1.44*** 
(2.8) 
1.459*** 
(2.8) 
1.453*** 
(2.8) 
0.782 
(1.3) 
TDSX 0.022*** 
(2.9) 
0.021*** 
(2.8) 
0.218*** 
(2.8) 
0.027*** 
(3.3) 
0.014*** 
(3.0) 
0.013*** 
(2.8) 
0.013*** 
(2.9) 
0.017*** 
(3.3) 
RESIMP -0.107 
(-2.8) 
-0.069 
(-1.6) 
-0.07* 
(-1.6) 
-0.079* 
(-1.8) 
-0.066*** 
(-2.9) 
-0.043* 
(-1.6) 
-0.044* 
(-1.6) 
-0.049* 
(-1.9) 
LGDPC -0.301*** 
(-2.8) 
-0.337*** 
(-3.1) 
-0.336*** 
(-3.1) 
-0.221* 
(-1.8) 
-0.181*** 
(-2.8) 
-0.209*** 
(-3.1) 
-0.209*** 
(-3.1) 
-0.137 
(-1.8) 
GDPG -0.029* 
(-1.8) 
-0.027* 
(-1.7) 
-0.027* 
(-1.6) 
-0.025 
(-1.4) 
-0.018* 
(-1.8) 
-0.018* 
(-1.7) 
-0.017* 
(-1.6) 
-0.015 
(-1.4) 
IMPGDP -0.01** 
(-2.1) 
-0.0001 
(-0.2) 
-0.0001 
(-0.00) 
0.0001 
(0.1) 
-0.006** 
(-2.2) 
-0.0002 
(-0.0) 
-0.0001 
(-0.0) 
0.0002 
(0.0) 
OECDG  -0.07 
(-1.1) 
-0.08 
(-1.1) 
-0.088 
(-1.22) 
 -0.048 
(-1.1) 
-0.049 
(-1.1) 
-0.054 
(-1.2) 
TOTG   0.003 
(0.52) 
0.02 
(0.6) 
  0.002 
(0.53) 
0.012 
(0.6) 
CAPTDS    0.0004** 
(1.9) 
   0.0003* 
(1.9) 
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.05 
N 593 563 563 563 593 563 563 563 
10. Dependent variable 1 for countries that rescheduled and 0 otherwise in all the regressions 
 
Regressions 1-4 are logit model estimations, and 5-8 are probit model estimations 
The asterisks *, **, and ***, represent significance at 10% level, 5% level, and 1% level, and are applied to 
all the regressions in this paper. 
 
Note: except the annual GDP growth that was taken from Easterly, et al (2002), all the other covariates 
have been my own calculations. All the variables are lagged by one year 
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Table (3.7) 
Regression results for the likelihood of debt-service difficulties (1989-98)9 
 
                                       Logit Model Estimates                         Probit Model Estimates 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 2.269*** 
(2.7) 
2.288*** 
(2.8) 
2.291*** 
(2.8) 
1.115 
(1.1) 
1.406*** 
(2.8) 
1.421*** 
(2.8) 
1.415*** 
(2.8) 
0.697 
(1.2) 
INTX 0.11*** 
(5.6) 
0.111*** 
(5.5) 
0.111*** 
(5.6) 
0.123*** 
(5.9) 
0.068*** 
(5.7) 
0.069*** 
(5.7) 
0.069*** 
(5.7) 
0.077*** 
(6.1) 
RESIMP -0.117*** 
(-2.9) 
-0.085* 
(-1.9) 
-0.086* 
(-1.9) 
-0.099** 
(-2.2) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.9) 
-0.053** 
(-1.97) 
-0.054** 
(-2.0) 
-0.062** 
(-2.3) 
LGDPC -0.387*** 
(-3.4) 
-0.426 
(-3.7) 
-0.427*** 
(-3.7) 
-0.301** 
(-2.4) 
-0.240*** 
(-3.5) 
-0.265*** 
(-3.8) 
-0.265*** 
(-3.8) 
-0.188** 
(-2.4) 
GDPG -0.024 
(-1.5) 
-0.021 
(-1.3) 
-0.021 
(-1.3) 
-0.018 
(-1.0) 
-0.015 
(-1.5) 
-0.013 
(-1.3) 
-0.013 
(-1.3) 
-0.011 
(-1.0) 
IMPGDP 0.004 
(-0.7) 
0.007 
(1.2) 
0.007 
(1.2) 
0.008 
(1.1) 
-0.002 
(-0.8) 
0.004 
(1.1) 
0.004 
(1.2) 
0.005 
(1.3) 
OECDG  -0.091 
(-1.2) 
-0.094 
(-1.3) 
-0.010 
(-1.4) 
 -0.055 
(-1.2) 
-0.057 
(-1.3) 
-0.062 
(-1.4) 
TOTG   0.018 
(0.6) 
0.027 
(0.8) 
  0.003 
(0.6) 
0.016 
(0.8) 
CAPTDS    0.0005** 
(2.1) 
   0.0003** 
(2.2) 
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.09 
N 593 563 563 563 593 563 563 563 
Regressions 1-4 are logit model estimations, and 5-8 are probit model estimations. 
 
9. Dependent variable is 1 for countries that have rescheduled and 0 otherwise. 
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Table (3.8) 
Regression results for fixed-effects Logit model (1989-98)10 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
TDSX 0.039*** 
(2.5) 
0.028* 
(1.79) 
0.401*** 
(2.5) 
0.028* 
(1.81) 
0.042*** 
(2.6) 
0.031* 
(1.92) 
0.051*** 
(3.10) 
0.039** 
(2.35) 
RESIMP 0.152 
(1.5) 
0.302*** 
(2.62) 
0.150 
(1.4) 
0.306*** 
(2.66) 
0.135 
(1.30) 
0.291*** 
(2.51 
0.130 
(1.20) 
0.279** 
(2.38) 
LGDP -3.533** 
(-2.3) 
-3.151** 
(-2.01) 
-3.509** 
(-2.3) 
-3.091** 
(-1.98) 
-3.379** 
(-2.20) 
-2.992* 
(-1.93) 
-2.319 
(-1.50) 
-1.798 
(-1.10) 
GDPG 0.017 
(0.7) 
0.023 
(1.01) 
0.017 
(0.7) 
0.022 
(1.00) 
0.019 
(0.8) 
0.025 
(1.12) 
0.047* 
(1.90) 
0.049** 
(2.01) 
IMPGDP -0.043* 
(-1.7) 
0.013 
(0.47) 
-0.042* 
(-1.9) 
0.028 
(0.77) 
-0.039 
(-1.50) 
0.029 
(0.94) 
-0.059** 
(-2.20) 
0.005 
(0.15) 
OECDG   -0.024 
(-0.2) 
-0.014 
(-0.85) 
-0.036 
(0.40) 
-0.014 
(-0.85) 
-0.055 
(-0.60) 
-0.009 
(-0.56) 
TOTG     0.036 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(1.03) 
0.036 
(0.8) 
0.009 
(0.95) 
CAPTDS       0.0006*** 
(2.60) 
0.0005** 
(1.97) 
1990  -1.313 
(-0.26) 
 -0.139 
(-0.27) 
 -0.117 
(-0.83) 
 -0.128 
(-0.24) 
1991  -0.307 
(-0.58) 
 -0.307 
(-0.58) 
 -0.330 
(-0.62) 
 -0.314 
(-0.58) 
1992  -0.354 
(-0.65) 
 -0.366 
(-0.67) 
 -0.344 
(-0.63) 
 -0.342 
(-0.61) 
1993  -0.501 
(-0.88) 
 -0.513 
(-0.90) 
 -0.497 
(-0.87) 
 -0.468 
(-0.80) 
1994  -1.645*** 
(-2.83) 
 -1.661*** 
(-2.86) 
 -1.638*** 
(-2.80) 
 -1.569*** 
(-2.63) 
1995  -1.130* 
(-1.88) 
 -1.139* 
(-1.89) 
 -1.171* 
(-1.94) 
 -1.375** 
(-2.22) 
1996  -1.272** 
(-2.08) 
 -1.191* 
(-1.93) 
 -1.237** 
(-1.98) 
 -1.174* 
(-1.87) 
1997  -1.783*** 
(-2.84) 
 -1.745*** 
(-2.78) 
 -1.759*** 
(-2.79) 
 -1.719*** 
(-2.67) 
1998  -1.69*** 
(-2.65) 
 -1.685*** 
(-2.64) 
 -1.717*** 
(-2.68) 
 -1.622** 
(-2.46) 
No. Obs. 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 
 
10. Dependent variable is 1 for countries that have rescheduled and 0 otherwise 
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Table (3.9) 
Regression results for fixed-effects Logit model (1989-98)11 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
INTX 0.192*** 
(4.20) 
0.153*** 
(3.28) 
0.193*** 
(4.41) 
0.154*** 
(3.29) 
0.200*** 
(4.50) 
0.157*** 
(3.37) 
0.221*** 
(4.8) 
0.179*** 
(3.68) 
RESIMP 0.171 
(1.6) 
0.277** 
(2.34) 
0.166 
(1.5) 
0.283** 
(2.39) 
0.141 
(1.3) 
0.264** 
(2.19) 
0.137 
(1.2) 
0.251** 
(2.05) 
LGDP -2.884* 
(-1.9) 
-2.602* 
(-1.63) 
-2.872* 
(-1.8) 
-2.555 
(-1.61) 
-2.722* 
(-1.70) 
-2.449 
(-1.55) 
-1.518 
(-0.9) 
-1.246 
(-0.75) 
GDPG 0.015 
(0.6) 
0.019 
(0.86) 
0.016 
(0.7) 
0.019 
(0.85) 
0.019 
(0.8) 
0.022 
(1.0) 
0.048* 
(1.9) 
0.046* 
(1.88) 
IMPGDP -0.022 
(-0.8) 
0.016 
(0.55) 
-0.022 
(-0.8) 
0.026 
(0.84) 
-0.017 
(-0.6) 
0.032 
(1.01) 
-0.038 
(-1.3) 
0.007 
(0.21) 
OECDG   -0.035 
(-0.41) 
-0.014 
(-0.87) 
-0.051 
(-0.5) 
-0.015 
(-0.87) 
-0.071 
(-0.7) 
-0.009 
(-0.56) 
TOTG     0.010 
(1.1) 
0.01 
(1.1) 
0.047 
(0.9) 
0.009 
(0.97) 
CAPTDS       0.0006*** 
(2.4) 
0.0004* 
(1.93) 
1990  -0.087 
(-0.17) 
 -0.098 
(-0.19) 
 -0.082 
(-0.16) 
 -0.094 
(-0.18) 
1991  -0.143 
(-0.27) 
 -0.139 
(-0.26) 
 -0.164 
(-0.3) 
 -0.122 
(-0.22) 
1992  -0.189 
(-0.34) 
 -0.199 
(-0.36) 
 -0.181 
(-0.32) 
 -0.173 
(-0.3) 
1993  -0.255 
(-0.44) 
 -0.263 
(-0.45) 
 -0.237 
(-0.4) 
 -0.191 
(-0.32) 
1994  -1.345** 
(-2.23) 
 -1.362** 
(-2.26) 
 -1.328** 
(-2.19) 
 -1.225** 
(-1.97) 
1995  -0.757 
(-1.21) 
 -0.767 
(-1.22) 
 -0.800 
(-1.27) 
 -0.998 
(-1.55) 
1996  -0.872 
(-1.36) 
 -0.783 
(-1.21) 
 -0.831 
(-1.28) 
 -0.741 
(-1.13) 
1997  -1.331** 
(-2.01) 
 -1.289** 
(-1.95) 
 -1.289* 
(-1.94) 
 -1.193* 
(-1.75) 
1998  -1.244* 
(-1.85) 
 -1.238* 
(-1.84) 
 -1.272* 
(-1.88) 
 -1.150* 
(-1.65) 
No. Obs. 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 425 
 
11. Dependent variable is 1 for countries that have rescheduled and 0 otherwise. 
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Table (3.10) 
Marginal effects after logit (Cross-section pooled time series) (1989-98) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
INTX    0,029*** 
(5,89) 
0,03*** 
(5,93) 
0,031*** 
(5,89) 
TDSX 0,007*** 
(3,38) 
0,007*** 
(3,41) 
0,007*** 
(3,29) 
   
RESIMP -0,028*** 
(-2,92) 
-0,028*** 
(-2,93) 
-0,022** 
(-1,95) 
-0,031*** 
(-3,05) 
-0,031*** 
(-3,07) 
-0,027** 
(-2,33) 
LGDP -0,047 
(-1,57) 
-0,046 
(-1,54) 
-0,006 
(-1,49) 
-0,066** 
(-2,16) 
-0,065** 
(-2,12) 
-0,065** 
(-2,04) 
GDPG -0,006 
(-1,52) 
-0,007 
(-1,54) 
-0,006 
(-1,49) 
-0,005 
(-1,17) 
-0,005 
(-1,20) 
-0,005 
(-1,13) 
IMPGDP -0,006** 
(-1,98) 
-0,002** 
(-1,96) 
0,002 
(1,00) 
-0,001 
(-0,68) 
-0,001 
(-0,66) 
0,004* 
(1,88) 
CAPTDS 0,0001* 
(1,89) 
0,0001* 
(1,93) 
0,0001* 
(1,73) 
0,0001** 
(2,8) 
0,0001** 
(2,14) 
0,0001* 
(1,97) 
LTOTG  0,004 
(0,52) 
0,004 
(0,6) 
 0,005 
(0,67) 
0,006 
(0,78) 
OECDG   -0,002 
(-1,33) 
  -0,02 
(-1,40) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Debt Overhang, Capital Flight and Economic 
Growth: A Panel Data Approach 
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Abstract 
 
This paper looks at whether external debt and capital flight could be potential explanations for 
growth rate differences across the developing world. Although there is a wide-ranging of 
theoretical literature on this issue, there are only few empirical studies that show that there is an 
inverse relationship between growth and external imbalances. Moreover, all empirical studies on 
this area have focused on the impact of total external debt stock on growth of real GDP per 
capita, controlling for the traditional factors that appear in all growth regression in the framework 
of the augmented Solow model.  
 
The critical innovation of this paper is the empirical exploration on the impacts of external debt 
on growth once total debt stock is decomposed according to source and maturity structures. The 
premise is that total debt stock is uninformative. The empirical findings in this paper suggest: 
First, it is the short term and not the long term component of the total external debt that retards 
growth. Second, it is interest payments and not total debt service that represent the actual (net) 
cost of foreign debt. Third, it is the public and publicly guaranteed debt and not the private non-
guaranteed debt that penalizes long-term growth. Fourth, it seems that, while loans from IDA 
(International Development Association) have a favorable impact on growth, loans from the IMF 
are bound to be insignificant at best and counter productive at the worst,  possibly reflecting the 
failure of the IMF adjustment program in developing countries in general and Sub-Saharan Africa 
in particular. This helps explain, despite long years of adjustment and foreign aid, the translation 
of the debt crisis into a growth crisis in the past two decades in Africa. Fifth, while concessional 
debt is positively associated with growth (though not significant), the unconcessional part of the 
external debt is harmful to long-term growth for developing countries. Sixth, while bilateral debt 
failed to help countries achieve accelerated growth, the external debt component from multilateral 
sources seem to be more productive for growth. Finally, in the framework of panel data 
estimation, I use cross-section pooled time series, random effects and fixed effects models, where 
debt dummies are included to control for indebtedness heterogeneity and country dummies to 
control for country-specific effects. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
„On average, real per capita GDP did not grow in Africa over the 1965-90 period, while in East Asia and 
the Pacific, per capita GDP growth was over 5 percent and Latin America grew at least 2 percent per year“ , 
Easterly, et al.,  1997, p. 1203)  
 
It is now apparent that less developed countries (LDCs) in general and Sub-Saharan 
African countries (SSA) in particular have been marginalized and bypassed by the 
process of globalization. The deterioration in income per capita growth for SSA is 
remarkable. As was discussed in chapter 1 (table 3) of this dissertation, the growth in real 
per capita for SSA has been worsening from decade to decade, and becoming worst in the 
last two decades. What is crucial here to reiterate is that the growth rate of income per 
capita for SSA during the periods 1970-2000 and 1980-2000 were indeed negative. This 
is in contrast to a positive growth rate of income per capita for other developed and 
developing regions. Moreover, many empirical studies (including chapter one of this 
dissertation) show the phenomenon of divergence in real per capita growth across the 
world economy at large, hence the poor getting poorer while the rich getting richer, 
eventually increasing the dispersion of income per capita across countries and over time. 
Such empirical studies also point out that the degree of divergence in real income per 
capita was stronger in the 1980s and 1990s than the 1960s and part of the 1970s.  
 
This question has drawn the attention of many economists across the globe. The poor 
performance SSA has been explained from various fronts. The potential factors range 
from bad policies and external shocks (Hadjimichael and Ghura, 1995; and Rodrik, 1999, 
among others), to ethnic fractionalization (Easterly and Levine, 2000), to gender 
inequality in education (Klasen, 2002), and to geographic location (Sachs and Warner, 
1998), among others.  
 
While the findings of the aforementioned studies yield fruitful results in explaining 
Africa’ s marginalization and divergence, they turn out to be insufficient when it comes to 
explaining why the rate of divergence of SSA was in particular so dramatic in the 1980s 
and 1990s compared with the 1960s and in part the 1970s. Said differently, though the 
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issues of policy, education, geography and ethnicity are important determinants of long-
term growth, they fail to provide adequate explanations for why growth rate differences 
across countries were so dramatic in the 1980s and 1990s compared to earlier decades. In 
this context, there is widespread consensus that the 1980s have been considered by many 
as the „lost decade”  for Africa and Latin America in terms of growth and development. 
Singer (1990, in: Healey, 1995), for example, expresses Sub-Saharan Africa as the region 
that is converging to acquire the character of  a marginalized ‘Fourth World’ , 
increasingly recognized as requiring special action and criteria. At the same time, the 
1980s had been far from favorable for Latin American countries.67 The prime suspects in 
this regard are external imbalances that in fact become cardinal issues in the entire 
developing world notably those in SSA. This issue becomes even more apparent given 
that 33 of the 41 countries characterized by the World Bank and IMF as heavily indebted 
poor countries (HIPCs) are located in Africa. Table (3.1) in Chapter 2 indicate that the 
growth rates of real income per capita for HIPCs were negative in the 1980s and 1980s 
compared to the previous two decades and other non-HIPCs developing countries. 
 
This dissertation will, therefore, focus on the extent to which external imbalances have 
accounted for growth-rate differences across the developing world in the past two 
decades. The remainder of the chapter is divided into 7 parts: Part two looks at the 
theoretical considerations of the external imbalances-growth nexus. This part also 
summarizes the formal model of the debt overhang hypothesis, and theoretically 
discusses other avenues through which high external debt may turn out to be more 
harmful than useful for long term growth. Part three presents the review of some of the 
relevant empirical literature. Part four discusses the empirical strategy that is employed in 
studying the impact of external imbalances on per capita income growth across the 
developing world and over time. It mainly examines the advantages of the panel data 
approach over the simple cross-section regression in studying growth rate differences 
                                                           
67
 „Not long ago, Latin American countries seemed to be condemned to a life of despair. During the 1980s, 
after the onset of the debt crisis, growth rates, which during the 1970s oscillated around 6% collapsed  to an 
average 1.8%. From the perspectives of the 1980s, even future growth prospects were clouded by a sharp 
drop in the share of capital formation from about 20% in the 1970s to about 16% in the years following 
1982“  (WEO, Oct. 1993, in: Kaminsky, et al. 1996, p. 1) 
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across countries and over time. Part five gives a short summary of the data and variables 
that are included in this study. Part six presents the regression results before part seven 
presents the conclusion and the possible policy implications of this study.  
 
2. The External Imbalances-Growth Nexus: A theoretical review 
 
 “ When economists consider the burden of the foreign debt, they usually think of the cost to the debtor 
country making a transfer to the rest of the world. The debt problem is measured simply as the discounted 
flow of resources that the debtor country must provide to its creditors. But over and above the transfer 
burden is enormous deadweight loss resulting from the way that the current debt overhang discourages 
investment in debtor countries”  (Sachs 1986, p. 413). 
 
 
The adverse impact of external debt on long run economic growth has now been 
acknowledged both by theoretical and empirical literatures. A case in point in this 
direction is the introduction by the international community of the heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPCs) initiative that came into effect in 1996. The external imbalances 
situation of poor and middle income countries is so alarming that the first HIPCs 
initiative known as “ HIPC-1”  was replaced within three years by “ HIPC-2” , the initiative 
that is more generous than its previous counterpart in providing more debt relief to fund-
starved nations. This obviously shows the full recognition by the international community 
of the adverse impact of HIPCs debt on their long term economic growth and overall 
development.  
 
In general, it is quite clear that LDCs have strong incentives to borrow from overseas in 
order to finance their domestic investment, which is indispensable if economic growth is 
to be achieved.68 Part of the reason is that since poor countries are far away from their 
steady states, any investment injection could lead them to have accelerated economic 
growth. Though this is generally true, it turns out that capital inflows in the form of 
external debt to LDCs enhance growth only to a certain point. Once debt grows bigger 
and unmanageable (unsustainable), it becomes a major destabilizing factor and a serious 
                                                           
68
 As many argue, the USA in the 19th Century, The Marshall Plan for a war-torn Germany and East Asian 
countries in recent periods are all cases in point where foreign capital was translated into long-run 
economic growth. 
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bottleneck to long-term economic growth. Moreover, as long as scarce resources are not 
wisely invested in projects that have the expected returns higher than the cost of foreign 
debt, they may endanger the long term growth prospect of  the country under 
consideration and lead to low economic growth, higher demand for external debt and 
more external imbalances.  
 
The external debt-growth literature points out various mechanisms through which debt is 
translated into sluggish economic growth. The first channel in this respect is the so-called 
debt overhang hypothesis. This theory suggests that once it becomes apparent that there is 
a real threat that the future total debt stock of a country will exceed the country’ s 
repayment potential, the expected debt service will be an increasing function of the 
country’ s output level (Pattillo, et al. 2002, Claessens, et al, 1996, among others). 
Consequently, the expected rate of returns from productive investments in such an 
economy will be low since a significant portion of any subsequent economic progress 
will be eaten up by creditors. This will further reduce both domestic and foreign 
investments and eventually downsize economic growth (Krugman, 1988, Sachs, 1989, 
among others).  
 
The premise that debt to a certain limit, if wisely utilized and properly managed, plays a 
pivotal role in enhancing long-term economic growth but retards it if its level is 
increasing over time, is generally linked to the so-called the debt Laffer curve (see, figure 
(1)).69 The debt overhang problem is linked to the transfer of resources from capital 
scarce to capital surplus countries. In this respect, Krugman (1988) defined debt overhang 
as “ the presence of an existing inherited debt sufficiently large that creditors do not 
expect with confidence to be fully repaid”  (p.254). Claessens and Diwan (1990) argue 
that “ debt overhang is a situation in which the illiquidity effect, the disincentive effect, or 
both effects are strong enough to discourage growth in the absence of concessions by 
creditors”  (p. 31). This is also known as a “ narrow”  definition of the debt overhang, 
                                                           
69
 The debt Laffer curve argument (which was apparently introduced by Jefrrey Sachs) is derived from the 
tax Laffer curve hypothesis introduced by Arthur Laffer (1981), who argues that if personal tax rates were 
raised, they generate a dreadful impact on government tax revenue. The reason is that high tax rates either 
simply discourages investment or leads to tax evasion. 
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where the impact of a high external debt that is linked to the tax disincentives argument 
and where any success in indebted country’ s economic performance  is taxed away by 
creditors; ultimately, little is left over for domestic investment and subsequent growth 
(Hjertholm, 2001, among others). 
 
Figure (1) indicates that the optimum level of external debt that enhances growth is the 
debt level at D*. Any level to the right of D* is converted into sluggish economic growth. 
Although this provides a good insight into how high debt may turn out to be more 
harmful than helpful, the level of external debt possibly depends on other issues including 
the productivity of investment, the proportion of external debt that is devoted to boosting 
investment versus sustaining domestic consumption, and the level of capital flight that 
accompanies the mounting external debt. Moreover, it is hard to pinpoint the amount of 
external debt that is growth enhancing because countries vary in terms of their degree of 
political risk, institutions, and general macroeconomic management.70 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
                                                    
                       Figure (1): The debt Laffer curve 
                                                           
70
 There is, however, the rule of thumb, which signals the potential unfavorable impact of debt on growth. 
The rule of thumb ratios are: the ratio of the present value of total debt to exports is on the order of 200-250 
and when the ratio of debt service to exports is on the order of 20-25 percent (Claessens, et al , 1996, p. 29). 
Growth 
in  
income 
gy 
Debt D* 
Growth-
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region 
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2. 1.  A formal theoretical model of the debt overhang hypothesis 
 
All theoretical models of the debt overhang hypothesis start from the same assumption (a 
two period model) where a country is assumed to have carried over from the previous 
period some amount of external debt, D, which must be paid in the final period.71  
Repayment (R) is given by: 
 






−=
−
CYDR ,min , 
Where 
D = initial amount of debt, 
Y = output, and 
−
C  = fixed amount of output that the debtor country can always keep for consumption 
 
The model also assumes two states of nature: a favorable state (G) and an unfavorable 
one (B), where productivity is expected to be higher in the former and lower in the later 
states of nature, respectively. Assuming that Y is a function of investment carried out in 
the first period, given the state of nature: ( )IfY ss θ= , where, s stands either for G or B 
alternatively. The model also assumes that there is a physical upper limit to investment, 
−
I , and that there is no overlap of output as the two states are so different, which implies 
that  ( )0fIf GB θθ 




 −
. Then, a country experiences a debt overhang if 
−
− CYD B  
because there are not enough resources to be surrendered for fully servicing the 
contractual debt obligation in a bad state (B). The debt overhang, therefore, creates a 
disincentive effect on domestic investment.  
 
                                                           
71
 This paper follows the debt overhang hypothesis model by Borensztein	 			
 	
Agenor and Montiel (1996)	   	!!	  " 
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If we have the situation whereby
−−
−− CYDCy GB  , then debt is serviced in full 
during favorable time. In contrast, during unfavorable time, debt is serviced by only the 
amount that is left over from the available output after the fixed consumption is taken out. 
Following this model for the debtor country, the marginal return that it receives for every 
additional investment is I
G fpθ , where p is the probability of the occurrence of a 
favorable situation for higher productivity. In contrast, if debt overhang was not at stake, 
the expected marginal return out of every unit of investment would be substantially 
larger: .)1( IBIG fpfp θθ −+  The model also suggests that if 
−
− CYD G , the return to 
investment would be zero and therefore, a debtor country does not have any reason 
whatsoever to commit additional resources for boosting investment.72  
 
Apart from the debt overhang effect; there are several other avenues through which high 
external debt may impede economic growth. One way debt penalizes growth is through 
distortionary fiscal policy (crowding-out or liquidity effect). This is because once a 
country faces a large external debt, the only exit strategy of debt financing is through 
fiscal distortionary policies of any form (high tax rates, and cuts in productive 
investment, among other things).73 This simply drives an indebted country to get stuck in 
a low or negative growth, high debt trap situation (Dijkstra and Hermes, 2001).74 The 
fiscal impact could also be related to the crowding out effect of the external debt. The 
reason is that since high debt is accompanied by high debt service payments, it crowds 
out the public investment expenditure, thus reducing total investment directly and also 
indirectly by reducing complementary private expenditure (Diaz Alenjandro, 1984, 
among others).  
                                                           
72
 This is consistent with all the empirical and theoretical literatures on debt overhang (Deshpande, 1997), 
Claessens, et al. (1996), Elbadawi, et, al. (1997), among others. This is again linked to the moral hazard 
interpretation of the debt crisis in Third world countries in the 1980s and recent period (see, for example, 
Hofman and Reisen, 1990). 
73
 See Hjertholm (2001), Pattillo et al. (2001), Agenor and Montiel (1996) and Were (2001), among others, 
for a further discussion. 
74
 Debt overhang creates a disincentive environment for private investment that, through lower investment 
spending, leads to a slowdown in the ratio of economic growth, which further reduces future investment. 
As growth slows, the debt -to-income ratio also increases, reinforcing the disincentive effect (Seurieux and 
Samy, 2001). This is also consistent with the argument that links the impact of debt not only in punishing 
the volume of investment but also reducing its productivity and by creating poorer macroeconomic 
environment (Pattillo, et al. 2002).  
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Sachs (1986) argues in this line, where the debt overhang turns out to discourage private 
investments by the public sector even beyond its direct budgetary burden. This is 
because, as Sachs (1986, p. 416) argues, “ a fragile government riding the storm of a 
downward spiral of living standards cannot shift spending from current consumption to 
investment without justifying the shift politically on the grounds that the citizens in the 
country will soon be much better off by the virtue of investment” . Similarly, Claessens 
and Diwan (1990) argue that after years of austerity measures and low output, indebted 
countries’  governments cannot afford to divert resources towards investment by lowering 
consumption and therefore, funds that could have been used for public investment are 
committed instead for debt servicing purposes.  
 
 Following Classens and Diwan (1990), high external debt may depress capital formation 
and economic growth through illiquidity effect as limited resources should be distributed 
among consumption, investment and external transfers to service existing debt. Reduction 
in investment should obviously be interpreted broadly to encompass both physical and 
human capital accumulation, which ultimately undermines growth and development.75  
 
A recent UNCTAD’ s study on the impact of external debt on investment argues in this 
direction. Countries with a debt to GDP ratio of more than 80 indicated lower levels of 
investment and export performance than those with debt to GDP ratio of lower than 80. 
The study identifies three factors that explain how a high level of external debt may 
reduce the efficiency of economic returns (UNCTAD, 2001, p. 121-122). First, external 
indebtedness drives countries into conflict, since it is accompanied by stabilization 
measures that reduce public expenditure, among other things. Second, similar to other 
research, this study also concludes that high external debt punishes growth via low 
investment as a large proportion of resources are committed for debt servicing purposes. 
Finally, the study also identifies that external debt can have perverse effects on aid flows 
                                                           
75
 Following Sachs (1989), though the continuation of debt servicing by debtor countries prevented 
potential global banking crisis, but this has not produced any reverse in economic growth collapse in debtor 
nations. 
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because when aid flows are directly linked to the level of external debt, the diversion of 
aid directly or indirectly to service external debt reduces its development effectiveness. 
 
Others argue that high debt service also leads to import compression, including imports 
of technological goods that are vital for the export sector to remain alive. Part of the 
reason, as Serieux and Samy (2001) argue, is that for an indebted country with 
inconvertible domestic currency, higher debt service payments, given vulnerable export 
earnings and absence of non-debt creating capital inflows, would mean a serious cut back 
in imports and leads to import compression either through price rationing (devaluation of 
the domestic currency) or non-price rationing (import restriction, for example). The joint 
effect may drive indebted poor countries to deep deindustrialization.  
 
Another channel debt may get translated into sluggish growth is via its destabilizing 
effect. High external debt may create uncertainty and overall macroeconomic instability. 
This stems partly from the reluctant of policy makers in indebted countries to exercise 
growth-enhancing policies because they are aware that the larger proportion of the yields 
will be shared with the creditors. In this regard Edwards (1986) concludes that “ the level 
of the country risk premium increases with the level of foreign indebtedness (i.e., the 
debt-GNP ratio)”  (p.570). This reluctance may also retard growth because the 
government of an indebted country would not have access to domestic and international 
capital markets, making fiscal policy incapable of serving as an automatic stabilization 
instrument. The investment under uncertainty literature argues in this direction. Even if a 
debtor country demonstrates an improvement in its economic fundamentals, since the 
sustainability of such policies is questioned, this may punish current and future 
investments. Under such circumstances, as Servein, (1997, in: Dijkstra, et al. 2001), 
argues, the larger part of such investments would likely be in trading activities with quick 
returns, rather than long-term, high-risk, irreversible investments.76 This, indeed, 
                                                           
76
 Dijkstra and Hermes (2001, p. 1) hypothesize that “ it is the problem of the uncertainty of debt-service 
payment, rather than the level of the external debt as such- that may compromise the economic growth of 
heavily indebted countries. Deshpande (1997) argues that “ in countries with a debt overhang, the pressure 
of debt repayment not only dominates policies which affect investment but also shape expectation (p. 
180)” . 
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confirms the current situation of HIPCs, where most of these countries are virtually cut 
off from the international financial markets. 
 
2.2. Capital flight, external debt and growth 
 
“ LDC (Less developed country) capital outflows have to be tackled as part of the solution to the debt 
problem, not as something that needs to be addressed only later. If capital flight is given a free ride in the 
caboose of LDC debt train, the train has little hope of making the station”  (Morgan Guaranty (1986): in: 
Lesssard and Williamson, 1987, p. 244). 
 
Another way excessive external debt may trigger growth is via capital flight. As 
Alejandro (1984, p. 345) correctly puts it, one of the concerns of Latin America during 
1980-89 could have been that “ the public debt was financing not bad investment projects 
nor unsustainable consumption but private capital flight” . While enormous amount of 
capital is flowing to developing countries in the form of external debt, paradoxically, at 
the same time huge amounts of resources are leaving these countries in the form of 
capital flight. From the perspectives of economic theory, the outflow of capital from 
capital poor to capital rich countries is rather anomalous and unjustified. The reality 
shows, however, that capital flight has become a series development bottleneck to 
enormous number of countries not only in Africa but also in Latin America.”   
 
The economic literature advances several reasons that explain why this have materialized. 
One of the fundamental causes of capital flight is macroeconomic instability (high 
inflation rate accompanied by low real interest rates (financial repression), high 
government budget deficit, among others). Other causes include high tax rates and other 
forms of fiscal policy distortions and asymmetries in incentives and information between 
foreign and domestic investors.77 It appears that, in the context of poor countries, 
however, political instability and overall private-property insecurity are the main driving 
forces of capital flight.78  
                                                           
77
 While investment that favor more foreign relative to domestic investors provokes capital flight, 
differences in the availability of information between foreign and domestic investors may cause  difference 
perception about the the prospect of the economy in the future.  
78
 See, Erbe, 1985; Cuddington, 1986; Ajayi, 1997, Schneider, 1991; Williamson, 1987; Dooley, et al, 
1994; among others, for a broader discussion on the causes of capital flight.  
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In the same fashion, Schneider (1991) argues that excessive supply of external debt is an 
important cause of capital flight for two reasons: First, large supply of credit to a country 
with a poor growth strategy may only overvaluate the domestic currency and helps 
citizens keep their wealth in foreign accounts by providing them with high foreign 
exchanges. Second, the correlation may go the other way around, where the flight capital 
may also be converted into foreign debt in such a way that some local capitalists reduce 
risks by investing in their own country behind the mask of external debt. 
 
Other economists advance a different relationship between external debt and capital flight 
(Boyce, 1992; in: Ajayi, 1997). The first relationship is in terms of macroeconomic 
theory, where it is generally believed that, if resources held abroad were used at home for 
increasing investment that would increase the availability of  foreign exchange, this 
would enable countries to invest and grow faster. In this context, others also argue that in 
the absence of capital flight the external debt of poor countries would have been much 
lower than with capital flight.79The second approach is a causal relationship between 
external debt and capital flight, which is classified into four categories (Ajayi, 1997,in: 
Menbere, 2000): 
 
• debt-driven capital flight, where capital flight takes place as the results of 
subsequent distortions due to high external debt. Some of the reasons for this are 
associated with the expectation of currency devaluation, fiscal crisis, and 
avoidance of expropriation risk, among other distortions. 
• debt-fuelled capital flight, where the availability of foreign exchange, which 
mainly comes through foreign borrowing, facilitates capital flight, which 
otherwise could not be possible.  
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 Following Erbe (1985), at the end of 1982, while the government had a serious problem of paying its 
debt service which stood at around USD 4.5 billion, the fabulous wealth of Mobutu (former President of 
Zaire) and his clan amounted between USD 4 and 6 billion invested in Swiss accounts and real estate (p. 
268). Another example comes from Latin America, where different estimates puts the regions capital flight 
to be USD 50 billion (1978-82) or even as high as USD 120-130 billion (1975-83), while the region’ s total 
external debt in 1983 was USD 350 billion (Erbe, 1985, p. 268). ).Moreover, Boyce and Ndikuman (2001) 
for 25 low-income Sub-Saharan countries find out that, while the accumulated capital flight in 1996 totaled 
more than 285 billion USD, the accumulated external debt stock  in the same year was 178 USD, making 
the region as they call it, a ‘net creditor’  to the rest of the world 
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• flight-driven external borrowing, where as the result of capital flight, which dries 
up domestic resources, a gap between savings and investment rises and that this 
gap should be financed though overseas borrowing, and finally, 
• flight-fuelled external debt, a situation where domestic currency leaves the 
country but re-enters in the form of foreign currency. This is often called as 
„round tripping“  or „ back -to -back loans“ . 
 
In this respect, Boyce (1992, in Chipalkatti, et al. (2001) analyzing the Philippines 
experience during the periods 1962 to 1986 concludes that “ external debt did not simply 
scare-off domestic capital…nor did capital flight create a vacuum into which external 
capital was pulled; rather the same capital; circulated in both direction through the 
revolving door”  (p. 36). 
 
In addition, when a country is undergoing a high external debt service burden, both 
domestic and foreign investors will become suspicious of the government’ s possible 
appropriation of their wealth for debt servicing purposes.80 Under such circumstances, the 
straightforward means to escape such a threat is to place private capital out of the country 
when a country’ s debt is mounting. One indication of this phenomenon is that capital 
flight has become more significant in the 1980s relative to its level in the previous 
decades (Deshpande, 1997, p. 172). This obviously worsens the overall economic 
environment and leads to further economic retardation. Eaton (1998) argues that capital 
flight largely escapes taxation by the borrowing-country governments and generates 
concern about the prospects for future debt servicing. This may call for additional foreign 
debt to finance older debt.  
 
From the discussions so far, it is possible to formulate a hypothesis on the reverse 
causality between capital flight and external debt. As shown in figure (2) below, the first 
reverse causality may go from external debt to capital flight and to sluggish growth. If 
                                                           
80
 Sachs (1986) stresses that a country that is already suffering from the consequences of a debt overhang, 
„the private sector well understands that the public sector is starved for funds, no abstute wealtholder now 
leaves any sign of wealth lying to advertise a ready sources of revenues for the fiscal authorities. Wealth-
holders then hold their assets outside of their country to avoid taxation with the result that new private 
savings simply spillover into capital flight, rather than into real new investment“  (p. 417). 
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there is high external debt, this may be accompanied by high debt service payments, and 
as the result of the debt overhang and other impediments linked to high external debt, this 
may be translated into low levels of imports and investments. All this ultimately leads to 
low economic growth. The second reverse causality shows that as the result of huge 
capital outflows in the form of capital flight, there are no resources available to finance 
imports and domestic investment, which may lead to external debt that again demands for 
being serviced, and ultimately gives rise to slow progress in economic growth. 
Nevertheless, the debate in this direction is not without dispute.81 
 
Moreover, capital flight may directly undermine economic growth via several channels 
(See, Erbe, 1985; Cuddington, 1986; Ajayi, 1997, Schneider, 1991; Williamson, 1987; 
Dooley et al, 1994). First, capital flight retards growth by eroding the domestic tax base. 
Capital that is held abroad illegally cannot contribute to domestic economic growth as it 
is beyond the reach of tax authorities of the countries of origin. Second, capital flight may 
hinder growth by increasing the marginal cost of foreign debt. The central argument here 
is that if capital held abroad by citizens was legally recognized by creditors, this would 
serve as collateral and the marginal cost of foreign debt would have been much lower as 
creditors could seize that in case of default by a borrowing country. Third, capital flight 
may negatively contribute to growth by exacerbating the balances of payments problems. 
Finally, capital flight may reduce growth by destabilizing the financial system as sudden 
outflows of large resources would call for adjustment in interest and exchange rates 
policies. 
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The discussion in this context is not only widespread but also heterogeneous. Despite the evident 
existence of such two-way flows of resources (capital inflows in the form of foreign debt and capital 
outflow in the form of capital flight), there is an argument that capital flight is a reaction to the 
unsustainable levels of external debt rather than its cause. For example, Dornbusch (1987), argues that 
„capital flight is a caboose, not a locomotive of financial repression and economic underdevelopment at the 
root than the cause of the debt crisis“ . Similarly, Sachs (1986), argues that „capital flight is a symptom of 
debt overhang, and not a cause as it initially was when it reflected the conversion of domestic assets into 
foreign financial assets in anticipation of devaluation of overvalued exchange rates“ . 
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Figure (2): the reverse causality of external debt, capital flight, and growth  
Source: Menbere (2000, p. 113) 
 
2.3. The external imbalances-growth nexus: An extended empirical 
examination  
 
Although all the above arguments are generally valid, one has to extend the debate on the 
negative impact of external debt on growth further. In most growth regression, growth is 
negatively related to high past external debt while it is positively related to current debt 
ratio. The negative coefficient on past debt stock is interpreted as an indication of the 
debt overhang, where the economy of an indebted country is on the wrong side of the 
debt Laffer curve in figure (2). However, there are several caveats that need to be 
explored. First, total external debt masks much important information that does not allow 
one to fully explore the accountability of debt on growth. In this context, taking total debt 
stock as a regressor might give rise to misleading results and conclusion, for various 
reasons:  
• Total debt stock ignores to take into account the maturity structure of external 
debt (short term vs. long term). Total debt stock neglects the source structure of 
external debt (multilateral vs. bilateral).  
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• Total debt stock fails to provide any information about the concessionality of 
external debt. This is important given the absence of data on the present value of 
the external debt of developing countries. 
• Total external debt stock masks the scarce resources that are channeled towards 
loss-making state enterprises versus the more profitable private sector. 
 
These and other concerns may lead to an alternative way of empirically investigating the 
links between external debt and economic growth. This paper, therefore, argues that 
instead of taking total debt stock as an explanatory variable, it may be more informative 
if it was decomposed according to maturity and source structures and the terms of 
concessionality.  In this respect, the central argument rests on the following hypotheses:  
 
(A). External debt that has a long term maturity, provided that it is invested efficiently, 
should induce growth, while the component of total debt that is of short term nature is 
unproductive and therefore leads to a slowdown in economic growth.82 I advance at least 
three arguments. One is linked to the nature of short term debt in developing countries, 
which is often borrowed at higher interest rates in order to finance old debt with lower 
interest rates. This is notoriously known as ‘circular financing’ . The second argument is 
linked to the phenomenon of capital flight that has been discussed earlier. While the 
external debt of developing countries was accumulated at a record pace, this has been 
often accompanied by capital flight. The argument here include that the very root cause 
and means of capital flight is short term capital movements. In addition, short term 
capital flows tend to appreciate the domestic currency and serves as an international tax 
on exports, which leads to the further worsening of the current account balance, and 
ultimately leads to further borrowing causing a sort of vicious circle situation. Last, short 
term capital flows are the favorable breeding place for corruption and a convenient means 
of wealth-building for government officials in most poor countries.  
                                                           
82
 As McFadden, et al (1985, in, Smith, et al (1985, p. 181) point out, the relative growth of short-term debt 
suggests a growing vulnerability of developing countries to the potential unwillingness of creditors to 
extend short-term lines of credit. Similarly, McFadden, et al (1985, in Smith, et al, 1985, p. 186) concludes 
that „falling maturities on long-term debt and an increasing share of short-term debt presummably reflect 
a diminished supply of new credit, imposition of more conditionality, or shifts away from traditional 
suppliers of long-term credit toward less-preferred sources“ . 
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(B). An alternative way of looking at the external debt issues is to decompose it 
according to debt sources. This helps to figure out the extent to which the sources of 
external debt matter for growth: private vs. public, bilateral vs. multilateral and loans 
from IDA, IBRD and IMF. The justification for such classifications is linked to the cost 
of borrowing and the conditions that accompany such debt inflows. Since private non-
guaranteed debts are expected to be invested in productive investments, their contribution 
to growth should be in a positive direction.83While one would expect loans from IDA 
(International Development Association) to induce growth (since they bear very low 
interest rates), the loans from the IMF might be unequivocal at best and counter-
productive at worst. Part of the justification is that these loans are highly linked to policy 
prescription, and the experiences of many African countries in the past two decades 
indicate that these policies were not highly effective.84 The impact of loans from IBRD 
(International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) is not apriori clear at least for 
two reasons: Such loans are offered at market terms, and therefore are more expensive for 
poor countries. Consequently, many poor countries are not the beneficiaries of these 
loans.  
 
(C). Finally, despite the persisting measurement problem, this paper makes an attempt to 
explain the impact of capital flight on growth.  
 
2. 4. The Augmented Solow model: Revisiting Hadjimiachael and Ghura 
(1995) 
 
Though the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) (MRW) augmented Solow model remain 
valid in this analysis, I will use in this case the model introduced by Hadjimichael, et al 
                                                           
83
 Alejandro (1984), for example, argues that private non-guaranteed debt is supposed to to finance 
profitable investments and therefore, it imopses least risk on debt servicing payments. Similarly, Serieux 
(2001, p. 314) argues that when most of a debeleoping country’ s external debt is public and publicly 
guaranteed debt (consisting mostly of central government and its loss-making state-owned corporations) its 
social and economic condtions can negatively affect growth through budgetary policies, external accounts 
effects, and debt overhang effects. 
84
 A broader analysis about the structural adjustment program and the causes of its success or failires are 
beyond the objective of this paper. For a broader discussion on the impact of the strucural adjustment 
programme and the role of IMF, see, Stglitz (2001). 
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(1995). The reason is that in the MRW model, policies and others factors that affect the 
level of technology in an economy are not directly captured by the model. This deficit 
(gap) has been filled by Hadjimichael and Ghura (1995) and I will summarize their model 
because it is very relevant to developing countries. 
 
The model assumes a Cobb Douglas production function of the following form: 
 
βαβα −−
=
1
0 )()()( LAKAKAAY lhhpp                                  (1) 
 
Where: Y = real output; L = labor; Kp and Kh are the physical and human capital stock, 
respectively; A0 = an overall index of technology and efficiency in the economy; and Ap, 
Ah, and AL are the physical and human capital-augmenting and labor-augmenting 
technology respectively. They then defined: 
 
)1/(1
0 )( βαβα −−= hpL AAAAA                                                  (2) 
 
Rewriting equation (1a): 
 
βαβα −−
=
1).( LAKKY hp                                                   (3) 
 
Where A = encompasses all the factor-augmenting and the economic-wide levels of 
technology and efficiency. 
 
Labor and labor-augmenting technology are assumed to grow according to the following 
functions, 
 
nteLL 0=                                                                              (4) 
and  
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0
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                                                                      (5) 
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n = exogenous rate of the labor force 
t = time index 
g = exogenous rate of technological progress 
X = which is the critical innovation of the model, represents a vector of policy and other 
factors that determine the level of technology and efficiency in the economy 
θ = is a vector of coefficients related to these policies and other variables. 
 
They then assume that Sp and Sh be the fraction of income invested in physical and 
human capital, respectively; and depreciate at the same rate, δ. Thus, physical and human 
capitals are accumulated according to the following functions: 
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Then taking kp  and kh be the stock of physical and human capital in terms of effective 
labor units: 
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Rewriting the production function in terms quantities per effective labor unit gives: 
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dk )( δ++−=                               (7´) 
 
In the steady state, the levels of physical and human capital per effective labor are 
constant (this is similar to MRW, 1992). Thus, setting (6´) and (7´) to zero and solving 
the resulting equation, they obtain: 
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Substituting (8a) and (8b) into (3´) and taking natural logarithms, they arrived at the 
steady state output per effective labor unit, which is approximated as follows: 
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Where )( βαξ +=  
    
They derived an empirical counterpart for equation (9) by taking the natural logarithm of 
y = Y/A.L, and substituting for A from equation (5): 
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The terms ξ/1-ξ, α/1-ξ, and β/1-ξ are the elasticities of per capita income with respect to 
population growth, and the fraction of income invested in physical and human capital, 
respectively. This model predicts that the sum of the elasticities with respect to Sp and Sh 
is equal to that on (n+g+δ). 
 
Following MRW (1992), the transition of actual output per effective labor unit to its 
steady state level is approximated by: 
 
[ ])ln()ln()ln( * yy
dt
yd
−= λ                                                                         (11) 
 
Where )1)(( ξδλ −++= gn is the speed of convergence, y is the actual output per 
effective labor unit. 
 
Equation (11) implies that: 
 
)ln()ln()1)ln( 0* yeyey tt λλ +−=                                                         (12) 
 
 
Subtracting y(0) from both sides of (12) and substituting ln(y*) from equation (10) gives: 
 






	












++−+





−
+






−
+++





−
−
−=−
)ln()ln()ln(
1
)ln(
1
)ln(
1)1()ln()ln(
00
0
AgtyxS
Sgn
eyy
h
p
t
θξ
β
ξ
αδξ
ξ
λ
       (13) 
 
Where, T is the length of time under consideration. Finally, they provide for an empirical 
counterpart of equation (13) for i-th developing country under consideration as follows: 
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Where, 
 
LGDPG = the difference in the level of log of real GDP per capita, 
LGDPI = log of initial real GDP per capita, 
( )δ++ gnln
 = log of the growth rate of the population and the depreciation rate, 
Ln(GCF) = log of gross domestic investment to GDP ratio, 
Ln(HCI) = log of initial human capital accumulation index, 
/
itx = is a vector of debt variables of individual i in time t, 
−
γ
 = is the unknown parameter vector of the regressors, and  
Ui, Vi, and iε    are country-specific, time-specific and overall error terms. 
TT /).1ln( 0βλ +−=  = the speed of convergence 
 
 
3. A Summary of previous empirical studies
 
 
 
Although there are many theoretical studies on the impact of debt on economic growth, 
there are relatively few empirical studies on this issue. Moreover, the existing empirical 
results generated mixed results. Claessens (1990), using a cross-section pooled 
regression, data for 29 developing countries, and the December 1986, 1987, and 1988 
secondary market prices of the bank debt of these countries finds out that only Bolivia, 
Sudan, Peru, Zambia, and Nicaragua are on the wrong side of the debt Laffer curve. 
Cohen (1993) finds no evidence for the general existence of a debt overhang using data 
for a sample of 81 LDCs. He argues, that “ the analysis of the correlation between the 
stock of the debt and investment is not the most appropriate way to analyzes whether the 
 202 
debt overhang holds true”  (p. 438).85Yet for the Latin American countries he shows that 
high debt had a negative impact on growth. Cohen (1997) concludes, however, that debt 
overhang is a series growth bottleneck for SSA. Deshpande (1997) shows that debt 
overhang might exist for 13 Severely indebted countries.  
 
Elbadawi, et al (1997) is one of the first series empirical studies who looked into the 
impact of debt on growth of GDP per capita. Using a random effects model and fixed 
effects model, during the period 1960-94 and 99 developing countries, this paper 
discovers that while past accumulated external debt hampers growth, in contrast, the 
current debt ratio stimulates growth. They also apply both random and fixed effects 
models, their models more inclined to the fixed effects one. Were (2001) also found an 
evidence for a debt overhang effect on the Kenyan economy during the time period 1970-
95. He concludes that debt negatively impacts both on growth and private investment. 
Other evidence of the debt overhang effect on growth is the study by Chowdhury (2001). 
Taking data for 35 HIPC countries and 25 low and middle-income countries in the period 
1982-99 with three years averages, he finds that there is a negative impact of debt and 
debt service payments on growth of GDP per capita. 
 
An empirical investigation by Pattillo, et al (2002) on 93 countries during the period 
1969-98 to figure out the extent of external debt on growth yields sound results. Like in 
Chowdhury, they use three-year averages to net out short run fluctuations while 
maintaining the ability to utilize the time series dimension of the data. The results 
indicate that while the total debt to exports ratio negatively impacts on growth of GDP 
per capita, the total debt service to exports ratio has been weakly correlated with growth. 
Their results also suggest that the average impact of debt becomes negative at about 160-
170 percent of exports or 35-40 percent of GDP. In addition, their study indicate that for 
a country with average indebtedness, doubling the debt ratio would reduce growth of per 
capita by half to a full percentage point. The results also imply that differential in GDP 
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 Cohen (1993, p. 438) adds that if a debtor country is large and does not expect to (be compelled to) 
service its debt, then obviously investment should not be crowded. Moreover, even assuming that such 
a country continues to service part of its debt the impact of debt on investment would depend on the 
efficiency of the rescheduling strategy. 
 203 
per capita growth between countries with external indebtedness (as NPV) below 100% 
exports seems to be in excess of 2% per annum. Finally, their results also suggest that 
high debt reduces growth mainly by lowering the efficiency of investment rather than its 
volume. Ajayi (1997) shows that debt and capital flight jointly negatively impact on GDP 
growth on the Kenyan economy. His results are not very comparable to other studies as 
his dependent variable is GDP growth rather than per capita GDP, and he applied that to 
a single country. Moreover, his empirical specifications are not clear. 
 
 
 
4. Specification of the empirical model and data description 
 
4.1. The advantages of a panel data over a simple cross-sectional approach 
 
It has become almost a tradition to use a cross-country framework to discuss the factors 
that account for growth-rate differences across countries. Though this strategy has 
produced quite useful initial results, it suffers from several drawbacks, which may distort 
the outcomes of any empirical analysis.  
 
Studies identify at least three problems for a single cross-section regression (Islam, 1995; 
Hoeffler, 2000; Pattillo, et al (2001: 
 
The first problem is linked to the so-called omitted variable bias. The single cross-
country regression assumes that countries have identical production function, hence this 
strategy does not allow for heterogeneity, for example, in the initial level of technology 
across countries. Following Islam (1995, p. 1128), the country-specific aspect of the 
production function that is ignored could, however, be correlated with some of the 
covariates and this may lead to omitted variable bias. The second problem, as Hoeffler, 
2000 argues, is that limiting the time series to a single cross-section regression would 
mean that not all available information is utilized. The third problem is linked to a single 
cross-section regression is the problem of reverse causality (endogeneity), where one or 
more of the explanatory variables may happen to be correlated with each other. 
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In this respect, the panel data approach is thought to be a remedy. Following Islam 
(1995), the panel data approach is a compromise that solves the conflict between 
endogenous growth theorists and neoclassical growth economists who advocate the 
Solow-Cass-Koopmans model. In this constant conflict regarding the determinants of 
long-run growth, while the empirical finding of convergence has been associated with the 
Solow-Cass-Koopmans model, its absence has been interpreted as a proof for the validity 
of the endogenous growth model. This ongoing controversy gave rise to the concept of a 
conditional convergence. The panel data approach allows for differences in the 
production function in the form of unobservable individual “ country effects” , which, to a 
great extent, helps to minimize the omitted variable bias that would otherwise generate 
distorted results.86  
 
Moreover, as Islam (1995, p. 1128) argues, one of the major advantages of a panel data 
approach is that it allows researchers to distinguish the impact of ‘capital deepening’  
versus technological and institutional differences in the process of convergence. Part of 
the reason is that variations in technology and institutional parameters could influence the 
standard determinants of growth more effectively. Following Islam (1995), if there had 
been no technological and institutional differences across countries, the rate convergence 
would have been much faster. Furthermore, one of the advantages of a panel data 
approach is that it allows to control for time-specific effects as the worldwide conditions 
for growth may not be equally advantageous for all countries over time (Chowdhury, 
2001, p.6).87  In addition, a panel data approach allows one to increase the number of 
observations and by doing so increases the degrees of freedom, which may generate more 
plausible results. Therefore, following Islam (1995) a panel data framework creates a 
bridge between development economics and neoclassical empirics of work.  
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 For a broad discussion of the panel data approach, see Greene (2000), Tsangarides (2000), Islam (1995), 
Hoeffler (2001); Caselli, et al (1996), among others. 
87
 A similar argument has been advanced by Pattillo et al (2001), who pointed out that the time series 
dimension of the data is important, as an understanding of how debt affects economic growth over time (the 
within country variability of panel data) is at least as important as understanding how countries with 
different levels of debt experienced different growth patterns (the between-country variability of panel 
data). 
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There is, however, an ongoing debate about whether it is the random effects model or the 
fixed effects one that is more appropriate to employ in international growth comparison. 
Some argue that a random effects model may be more advantageous relative to a fixed 
effects one on the grounds that the fixed effects model destroys all variations across 
countries once country-specific effects are incorporated (Quah, 1996). Similarly, 
Elbadawi, et al (1997) argue that one advantage of a random effects model is that it 
enables one to estimate variables that are constant over time, and hence no information is 
lost. In other words, the random effects model captures all the information on all the 
individual units and all the variables, even those that do not vary over time (p. 56). 
 
 
4.2. A Formal specification of the empirical model 
 
The fixed effects model may be expressed as follows (see, Greene, 2003, among others): 
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Where,  
individuals: i = 1, ...... n,  
time            t = 1,......., T,             and  
χ/it  =   (χit1   χit2 ....χitk) 
• “ i” , indicates that a variable may vary over individuals,  
• “ t”  indicates that it may vary over time 
• Yit : = endogenous variable of individual i in period t 
• χ/it = is a vector of K regressors of individual i in time period t 
• µit = is the error term of individual i in time period t and is made up by two terms: 
a random component that varies over individuals and time (εit), which is iid 
(identically and independently distributed) and unknown individual-specific 
constant referred to as fixed effect (αi), which does not change over time. 
• 
 
β
  is the unknown parameter vector of the regressors 
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Assumptions about the error terms and the fixed effects 
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5. Data description and samples 
 
Any empirical research on developing countries almost always suffers from at least two 
problems. One problem is the absence of long period data for the vast majority of LDCs. 
The second problem is the reliability of the existing data since most developing countries 
data record is highly limited, which implies that the results of such analyses should 
always be interpreted with caution. Fortunately, the debt data are, exceptionally, among 
the most reliable ones, since they are recorded both by creditors and debtors. The most 
problematic data sources are the government budget deficit, private investment, and 
capital flight. Since data on private investment is missing for many of the countries under 
investigation (where the problem becomes even more serious in the last period, 1994-99), 
measuring the disincentive effects of the debt overhang was not possible.  
 
The data comprises of 60 developing countries (the only criteria being data availability) 
and the time period considered is 1982-99 with three periods and five-year interval panel. 
The reason for beginning from 1982 and not earlier is linked to data problem for many 
developing countries in the early 1980s. For time-specific effects, the whole period is 
broken into the period of growing external debt (1982-87), the period of stagnating 
external debt (1988-93), and the period of declining external debt and the periods of 
financial crises (1994-99).This classification is almost consistent with that of Easterly’ s 
(2002). The data sources are Global Development Finance 2000 (CD ROM) and World 
Development Indicators 2001 (CD ROM).  
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In order not to lose too many countries, I take the closest period indicator for some 
countries if data for a particular year was missing. Debt, capital flight, investment, and 
total government consumption were all deflated either by GDP or export to overcome the 
variation in country sizes. Most of the debt variables are deflated by export rather than by 
GDP for two years (Eaton, 1981): First, exports are the major foreign-exchange revenue 
for developing countries and therefore capture the impact of debt on foreign resource 
transfers. Second, data on exports are by far more reliable than that of GDP. Probably for 
the same reasons, Pattillo, et al (2002) also scaled debt variables by exports rather than by 
GDP.  
 
Tables (1) and (2) present lists of the countries according to regional and indebtedness 
classifications, respectively. Table (3) contains the variables that are incorporated in the 
regression, their definitions, sources and expected signs of the corresponding coefficients. 
Table (4) indicates descriptive statistics. All debt variables (except the average total 
external debt to GDP ratio (TEDX), are initial values to minimize endogeneity problem. 
While all debt variables are scaled by exports, concessional, nonconcessional and private 
non-guaranteed and public and publicly guaranteed debts are all deflated by GDP. The 
reason for doing so is that, while the coefficients carried the same signs when deflated by 
exports their significances were ambiguous both in the fixed effects and random effects 
models. 
 
One of the basic problems in debt analysis is the absence of data on the net present value 
(NPV) of external debt. In this respect, IMF (2003, p. 19) points out that “ debt-stock 
indicators based on the NPV are more meaningful than those based on face value for the 
purpose of measuring and comparing the streams of future debt payments” . This may also 
imply that the actual impact of the debt overhang may be biased if one uses total debt 
stock rather than NPV of the external debt. Unfortunately, the Global Development 
Finance, 2000 (CD-ROM) does not provide such information, and it was not possible to 
obtain such data from other sources. To iron this constraint out, I always include either 
total debt service payments to exports ratio or interest payments to exports ratio together 
with other debt stock indicators. This is also important because, as Claessens, et al (1997, 
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p. 247) argue, “ to separate the debt overhang effect from the crowding out effect of debt, 
both the contemporaneous debt service and a variable capturing the burden of future debt 
service (such as the debt stock or present value of future debt service) should be 
incorporated into the regression” .  
 
6. Regression results and the policy implications of this study 
 
 
Two kinds of strategies are employed to empirically investigate the issue of external 
debt’ s accountability on growth. The first one is the fixed effects versus the random 
effects approach. To distinguish which of the two models is more appropriate, the 
Hausman test is used (see, the value for Chi2 at the end of each table). For regression 
results where the Chi2 is close to zero, the fixed effects model is chosen, and the random 
effects otherwise. The results of the random and fixed effects models are presented in 
tables (5) to (10). In each table, columns (1) to (5) stand for the random effects model 
results while the last three columns (6) to (8) represent for the fixed effects model. I will 
turn to the results in just a moment. The second strategy is to use a cross-section pooled 
regression, which allows one to control for time-specific and indebtedness factors. The 
results are presented in tables (11) to (16). Table (17) provides the effects of each debt 
variable on growth, and the correlation matrices are presented in tables (18) to (23).  
 
In all the regressions, except the capital flight and debt variables, other covariates that 
always appear in the augmented Solow growth framework are added. The government 
behavior is captured by total general government consumption (GGC). Though the 
budget deficit would be a better indicator, this was not materialized due to lack of data. 
The percentage change in the consumer price index (CPI) is included to capture the 
impact of macroeconomic instability on growth. The percentage change in the terms of 
trade (TOTG) is included to control for the exogenous shocks resulting from changes in 
export prices and other patterns of international trade, which give rise to welfare gain or 
loss. Apart from education, population and labor force growth, the percentage of time a 
country was at violent crisis (VIOL) is added to control for the impact of political 
instability on growth.  
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Moreover, the growth in the volume of exports is included for various reasons. One 
reason is because developing nations are dependent on their export revenue for growth. 
Second, since most poor nations’  export revenues are vulnerable to changes both in 
external and internal factors, this may affect growth of real GDP per capita. Finally, as 
Hadjimichael, et al (1995), and Ghura, et al (1999), who also included the growth in the 
volume of exports in their growth regressions, argue, the growth of exports is an indirect 
measure of “ export-oriented trade policies” . As they point out, “ such policies are 
conducive to faster growth because they promote competition, encourage learning-by-
doing, improve access to trade opportunities, raise the efficiency of resource allocations, 
and enhance positive externalities resulting from access to improved technology” (p. 
7).Although this is generally true, one should be careful of interpreting the results as 
endogeneity (reverse causality) may turn out to be a serious issue. I, therefore, run 
regressions with and without this variable. As shall be discussed later, the subsequent 
drop in the R2 whenever the export growth is removed from the equation is remarkable, 
and in fact, most covariates turn out to be insignificant in regressions where export 
growth is dropped.  
 
Now, turning to the results themselves, in table (5), I present the regression results that 
are similar to other previous empirical studies to make my own work comparable. The 
results indicate that past accumulated debt is negatively related to growth of real GDP per 
capita, suggesting the existence of a debt overhang phenomenon across developing 
countries, controlling for other variables, though the significance disappears once export 
growth is excluded. Other studies also found an inverse relation between past 
accumulated debt and growth of real GDP per capita, which include (Elbadawi, et al 
1997; Mbawa, 2001; Pattillo, et al 2002; Were, 2001). In contrast to other studies, this 
paper does not show a significant (though a positive) relation between current debt ratio 
and growth of real GDP per capita. Similarly, like in other studies, I have not found a 
statistically significant negative relationship between total debt service ratio and growth 
of real GDP per capita, though this variable always bears the expected sign. I, therefore, 
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alternatively use interest payments as a proxy for the actual cost of foreign debt, even 
though these have not been statistically significant.  
 
The growth rate of exports that I incorporated as a proxy both for openness and a key 
source of foreign exchange has been strongly significant, indicating that countries with 
strong export performance have also enjoyed enormous economic growth, though this 
may also be an indication of endogeneity problem. For instance, past accumulated debt 
negatively impacts on growth only after controlling for the growth rate of exports. This is 
true both for the fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) models. I, therefore, run a 
separate regression with and without export growth. The drop in the R2 is quite dramatic 
when the growth in the volume of exports is taken out from the regression. The variables 
CPI and GGC included to control for macroeconomic instability and the fiscal behavior 
of a government, indicate that while inflation discourages growth (though not 
significant), government consumption (GGC) hinder growth only when the growth of 
exports is excluded as a regressor. In contrast, while the TOT, included to control for 
exogenous shocks, negatively impacts on growth through the loss of the purchasing 
power of exports, it becomes statistically insignificant once the growth rate of exports is 
removed from the regression.  
 
Apart from the level of investment that induces growth both in the RE and FE models, 
the impact of other traditional determinants of growth that appear in the framework of the 
Solow model has remained unequivocal. The growth rate of the population has a negative 
impact on growth both in the RE model and FE model, though it is insignificant in the 
later model. The growth of the labor force plays a significant positive role in growth in 
the RE while it turns insignificant in the FE model. The secondary school enrollment 
used as a proxy for human capital accumulation has no significant impact on growth, 
although it has the expected sign (except columns 3 and 4 of the RE models). This 
however, should not be interpreted to mean that schooling contributes negatively to 
growth. Rather, it may be due largely to the fact that education may be correlated with 
other regressors or measured with errors. The violent crisis incorporated as a proxy for 
political instability indicates that it harms growth of real GDP per capita. CFLGDP used 
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to capture the impact of capital flight on growth of real GDP per capita, indicates that its 
retards growth both in the RE and FE, despite the fact it is not statistically significant. 
This, to a large extent could be due to measurement errors and correlation between other 
regressors, although I used initial values. The dummy for HIPCs has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient, suggesting that the HIPCs countries grew slower than 
those of no-HIPCs counterparts. Nevertheless, the R2 has changed very marginally when 
HIPCs dummy is added or removed. 
 
The time period dummies also suggest that the periods 1988-93 and 1994-99 were worse 
in terms of growth relative to the first period 1982-87. Hence, countries received 
resources in the first period, during which they experienced economic growth, while debt 
service stepped in the second and third periods, which penalizes growth, either through 
the debt overhang effect or liquidity effect or both. Moreover, the worsening situation of 
economic growth in the third period might also suggest that the financial crisis in Latin 
America, and especially in Asia, dramatically slowed down the then miraculously 
growing East Asian countries. Controlling for debt variables, log of initial income per 
capita, and other variables, there was evidence for conditional convergence across 
developing countries both in RE and FE models as indicated by a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between GDP per capita growth (LGDPG) and log of its initial level 
(LGDPI). 
 
Turning to the main focus of this paper, the regression results, once total external debt 
stock is decomposed, suggest several things. Table (6) presents the results of regression 
whereby total external debt is decomposed according to maturity structure. From the 
regression results, while the initial short term debt to export ratio (STDXI) component of 
the total debt stock (TED) negatively impacts on growth, the initial long term debt to 
exports ratio (LTDXI) component of TED induces economic growth. This is true both in 
the RE and FE models, despite the insignificance of LTDXI in the later once the export 
growth is included. While long term debt helps countries that are suffering from capital 
deficiency and therefore, are away from their steady states to finance their long term 
investment, short term borrowing turns out to be unproductive. The STDXI variable is 
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indeed the most robust debt variable which bears the expected signs in all the regressions. 
As was argued earlier, this in fact, indicates that short term debt ruins growth through 
various channels: First, countries often borrow short term debt at higher interest rates to 
finance their long term debt with lower interest rates leading to the so-called “ circular 
financing” . Second, short term capital inflows often have a speculative character and in 
the context of developing countries, they are often the root cause of capital flight. 
Thirdly, short term capital flows might serve as tax on exports through the appreciation 
of the domestic currency.  
 
The dummy for HIPCs has a negative and statistically significant coefficient in all 
regressions, again suggesting that this group of countries has done worse than than its 
non-HIPCs counterparts. This result then supports the recent heated debate about debt 
relief under HIPCs initiative. Debt relief for this group of countries might help them to 
reverse their sluggish growth performance.  
 
Table (7) presents the regression results after total debt stock is decomposed according to 
the type of debtors. The results seem to indicate that debts that were channeled to the 
private sector enduce economic growth, while the part of the external debt used to inject 
the public sector punishes economic growth. This is consistent with what Alejandro 
(1984) argues; that debt used to finance the private sector ends up financing profitable 
projects and hence would not impose a debt service burden while the opposite holds for 
the public sector. Table (8) presents the results of the regression once total debt stock is 
decomposed according to concessionality The results indicate that while the non-
concessional component of the external debt punishes economic growth (through a debt 
overhang and or liquidity effects), the concessional counterpart remains insignificant, 
though have the expected sign in the RE, but a wrong sign in the FE model.  
 
In table (9) I present the regression results when debt is decomposed into various other 
sources. Borrowing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to 
exports ratio (IBRDXI), is included to capture the impact of market based loans. Loans 
from International Development Association to exports ratio (IDAXI) is used as proxy 
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for foreign aid and partly concessional lending and loans from IMF to exports ratio 
(IMFXI) is included to capture loans in exchange for policy (which may also be an 
indirect measure of the impact the structural adjustment program).The results indicate 
that while both loans from the World Bank and IDA induce growth (the latter being 
highly significant in both RE and FE models, though it is insignificant in the FE model, 
when export growth is added), loans from the IMF retard growth probably indicating the 
failure of the IMF adjustment program in most developing countries, notably those in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
The attempt was to decompose total external debt into bilateral and multilateral sources 
to ascertain whether the kind of creditors matters for growth. The regression results in 
table (10) suggest that while BLATX has failed to contribute positively to growth, having 
either a negative or insignificant signs, loans from multilateral sources have a positive 
and statistically significant impact on growth, despite their insignificance in the FE model 
once export is removed from the equation. Since in this case, the Hausman test is in favor 
of the RE model, this may suggest several things. First, bilateral debt is strategically and 
politically driven rather than policy or poverty focused. Therefore, its impact on growth 
should be ambiguous at best. In contrast, MLATX should promote growth because it is to 
a large extent policy or poverty driven and is often accompanied by low interest rates.20  
 
The policy implications of this study 
 
The results in this work suggest four implications for policy-makers: First, it may be in 
the interest of the national governments in developing countries to promote the private 
sector and channel more resources into it, if long-run economic growth is to be achieved. 
In addition, this may call for the privatization of inefficient state parastatals that are 
deemed to be loss-making for longer years in developing countries. Second, the results 
also indicate that loans from the IMF have been miserably ineffective in terms of 
                                                           
20
 For the broader discussion on the debate of the impact of aid on economic growth, see, Burside and 
dollar (2000), Hansen and Tarp (2001), and Alesina and Dollar (1998). Alesina and Dollar (1998) in 
particular indicate that bilateral aid is directed towards countries that are strategically more significant than 
towards those that excercise democracy or other policies. 
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achieving long-term growth. Although most of the LDCs have been undergoing these 
tough structural adjustment programs, the results of the past two decades indicate that the 
adjustment efforts have not been translated into growth. The IMF, therefore, as many 
argue, needs to adopt more flexible and workable approaches that are relevant to the 
economic and institutional parameters of LDCs. Third, a clear negative impact on growth 
of short-tern capital inflows seem to suggest that there is an urgent need for the adoption 
of better strategies in channeling scarce resources into projects that generate higher rate 
of returns. Neglecting the problem of massive short term flows could keep poor nations 
in a ‘circular financing’  vicious circle situation. Moreover, to prevent capital outflows in 
the form of capital flight, developing countries’  policy makers need to exercise policies 
that lead to macroeconomic stability, sound debt management, property-right security, 
and transparency. Such polices may not only prevent capital flight but also may help 
achieve capital flight reversal. Finally, if the industrialized world was sincere in helping 
poor countries, there should be a shift from the current practice of foreign aid that is 
strategically and politically motivated towards an aid strategy that is aimed at poverty 
reduction and stabilization. Without genuine policy changes both in developing and 
developed countries, debt relief alone will not guarantee a sustainable global economic 
recovery in the decades ahead. 
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Table (1) 
List of Countries included in the regression according to their regions 
Africa  Latin America and Asia and the Pacific 
 the Caribbean  
Botswana Argentina Bangladesh 
Burkina Faso Belize India 
Cameroon Bolivia Indonesia 
Chad Brazil Jordan 
Congo, Rep. Chile Korea, Rep. 
Cote d'Ivoire Colombia Malaysia 
Ethiopia Costa Rica Pakistan 
Gabon Dominican Republic Papua New Guinea 
Gambia, The El Salvador Philippines 
Ghana Guatemala Sri Lanka 
Kenya Haiti Thailand 
Lesotho Honduras  
Madagascar Jamaica  
Malawi Mexico  
Mauritania Nicaragua  
Mauritius Panama  
Morocco Paraguay  
Mozambique Peru  
Niger Trinidad and Tobago  
Nigeria Uruguay  
Rwanda Venezuela, RB  
Senegal   
Sierra Leone   
Swaziland   
Togo   
Tunisia   
Uganda   
Zimbabwe   
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Table (2) 
List of countries included in the regression (according to their degree of indebtedness) 
Non-Heavily Indebted  Heavily Indebted Countries 
Countries (Non-HIPCs) (HIPCs) 
Argentina                       Morocco Bolivia 
Bangladesh                    Nigeria Burkina Faso 
Belize                             Pakistan Cameroon 
Botswana                       Panama Chad 
Brazil                             Papua New Guinea Congo, Rep. 
Chile                              Paraguay Cote d'Ivoire 
Colombia                       Peru Ethiopia 
Costa Rica                     Philippines Ghana 
Dominican Republic     Sri Lanka Honduras 
El Salvador                    Swaziland Kenya 
Gabon                            Thailand Madagascar 
Gambia, The                  Trinidad and Tobago Malawi 
Guatemala                     Tunisia Mauritania 
Haiti                               Uruguay Mozambique 
India                              Venezuela, RB Nicaragua 
Indonesia                       Zimbabwe Niger 
Jamaica Rwanda 
Jordan Senegal 
Korea, Rep. Sierra Leone 
Lesotho Togo 
Malaysia Uganda 
Mauritius  
Mexico  
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Table (3) 
Definitions and sources of the variables included in the regressiona 
Variable Definition Source Expected 
sign 
LGDPG Growth rate of log of real GDP per 
capita (PPP-adjusted and 
Calculated as: (Ln(GDPt/GDPt-
1)/N)*100, where N is number of 
years. 
World Bank World 
Development 
Indicators (WBWDI), 
2001(CD-ROM) 
Dependent 
variable 
LGDPI Log of Initial GDP per capita (PPP-
adjusted) 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(-) 
LGCF Log of average investment to GDP 
ratio 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(+) 
GGC Average general government  
consumption to GDP ratio 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(-) 
LEXG Log of export growth (constant 
1995 prices) 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(+) 
POPG The log of the growth rate of the 
population (ln(n+g+δ )) 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(-) 
LFG Log of the growth rate of the labor 
force 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(+) 
CPI The percentage change in the 
Consumer price index 
WBWDI, 2001 (CD-
ROM) 
(-) 
TOT The percentage change in the terms 
of trade 
Database for Global 
Development 
Network, The World 
Bank 
(+) 
LSCHLI Log of initial total secondary- 
school enrolments 
WBWDI, 2001(CD-
ROM) 
(+) 
CFLGDPI  Capital fight to GDP calculated 
using ‘sources-uses’  method: 
(change in debt + foreign direct 
investment)-(current account deficit 
+ change in reserves) 
WBWDI, 2001 and 
Global Development 
Finance (WBGDF) 
2000 
(CD-ROM) 
(-) 
TEDX Total external debt to GDP ratio  WBGDF, 2001 (+) 
TEDXL2 The square of initial TEDX  WBGDF, 2000 (-) 
STDXI Total short term debt to exports 
ratio (Short-term external debt is 
defined as debt that has an original 
maturity of one year or less.).  
WBGDF, 2000           
(CD-ROM) 
(-) 
LTDXI Long term debt to GDP ratio 
(Long-term external debt is defined 
as debt that has an original or 
extended maturity of more than one 
year and that is owed to 
WBGDF, 2000           
(CD-ROM) 
(+) 
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nonresidents and repayable in 
foreign currency, goods, or 
services.). 
TPDGDPI Total private non-guaranteed debt 
to GDP ratio (Private non-
guaranteed long-term debt 
outstanding and disbursed (LDOD) 
is an external obligation of a 
private debtor that is not guaranteed 
for repayment by a public entity). 
WBGDF,  2000 
 (CD-ROM) 
(+) 
PPGGDPI Total public and publicly 
guaranteed debt to GDP ratio 
(Public debt is an external 
obligation of a public debtor, 
including the national government, 
a political subdivision (or an 
agency of either), and autonomous 
public bodies. Publicly guaranteed 
debt is an external obligation of a 
private debtor that is guaranteed for 
repayment by a public entity) 
WBGDF 2000  
(CD-ROM) and  
 
WBWDI 2001 
(CD-ROM) 
(-) 
CONCGDPI Concessional debt to GDP ratio 
(Concessional debt is defined as 
loans with an original grant element 
of 25 percent or more.) 
WBGDF 2000 
 (CD-ROM) and  
WBWDI 2001 
(CD-ROM) 
(+) 
NCONCGDP
I 
Nonconcesional debt to GDP ratio Global Development 
Finance 2000 (CD-
ROM 
(-) 
BLTXI Bilateral debt to exports ratio 
(Public and publicly guaranteed 
bilateral debt includes loans from 
governments and their agencies 
(including central banks), loans 
from autonomous bodies, and direct 
loans from official export credit 
agencies)). 
WBGDF, 2000 
(CD-ROM) and  
 
WBWDI, 2001 
(CD-ROM) 
(-) 
MLTXI Multilateral debt to exports ratio 
(Public and publicly guaranteed 
multilateral loans include loans and 
credits from the World Bank, 
regional development banks, and 
other multilateral and 
intergovernmental agencies. 
Excluded are loans from funds 
administered by an international 
organization on behalf of a single 
WBGDF 2000 
(CD-ROM) and  
 
WBWDI, 2001  
(CD-ROM) 
(+) 
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donor government) 
IBRDXI Loans from the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and 
development to Exports ratio 
(IBRDX) and is  nonconcessional 
WBGDF 2000 
(CD-ROM) and  
WBWDI, 2001  
(CD-ROM) 
(?) 
IDAXI Loans from the International 
development association to Exports 
ratio (Public and publicly 
guaranteed debt outstanding from 
the International Development 
Association (IDA) is concessional.) 
WBGDF 2000 
(CD-ROM) and  
WBWDI, 2001  
(CD-ROM) 
(+) 
IMFXI Use of IMF credit to exports ratio WBGDF 2000 
(CD-ROM) and  
WBWDI, 2001  
(CD-ROM) 
(-) 
TDSXI Total debt service to exports ratio WBGDF 2000 
(CD-ROM) 
 
INTXI Interest payments to exports ratio WBGDF 2000 
(CD-ROM) 
 
HIPC  Heavily indebted poor country (=1 
if HIPC and 0, otherwise) 
 (-) 
VIOL The percentage of period a country 
is at violent conflict. 
The Stockholm 
international peace 
research institute 
(SIPRI) 
http://first.SIPRI.org 
(-) 
Period  
dummies 
1982-87, 1988-93, and 1994-99   
 
a. Note: all debt variables except (TEDX) are initial values to minimize possible endogeneity problem. 
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Table (4) 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
LGDPG 180 3.205 3.246 -10.387 14.152 
LGDPI 180 7.717 0.827 6.032 9.553 
CFLGDPI 180 5.244 15.831 -37.352 113.468 
LEXPG 180 0.184 0.244 -0.804 0.89 
TEDX 180 297.938 332.475 18 3000 
TDSXI 180 22.315 11.653 2.406 66.675 
GGC 180 15.826 5.919 0.786 36.374 
LGCF 180 3.133 0.381 1.954 4.198 
CPI 179 54.919 223.227 -2.739 1792.04 
TOT 180 -0.024 11.161 -34.148 114.325 
LPOP 180 1.936 0.687 0.261 4.801 
LFG 177 1.795 0.826 0.344 5.177 
LSCHLI 180 3.371 0.742 1.099 4.582 
INTXI 180 11.118 8.491 0.1 57.59 
STDXI 180 41.638 59.842 0 479 
LTDXI 180 303.85 380.996 25 2526 
TPDGDPI 180 3.809 7.985 0 72.879 
PPGGDPI 180 60.330 70.723 3.461 760.357 
BLATXI 179 111.662 219.714 1.595 1666.061 
MLATXI 179 87.651 162.688 0.753 1788.468 
IDAXI 179 39.908 107.650 0 1124.79 
IBRDXI 179 12.676 13.097 0 82.558 
IMFXI 180 15.586 23.671 0 160.712 
CONCGDPI 180 27.807 34.818 0.03 216.765 
NCONCGDPI 180 34.818 36.239 0.329 316.085 
VIOL 179 0.186 0.366 0 1 
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A. Random and Fixed effects models (1982-99)  
 
Table (5) 
The impact of past and current total external debt on growth of real GDP per capita of 
(controlling for other variables)(1982-99) 
 
                                 Random effects model                                   Fixed effects model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 2.987 
(1.05) 
6.619** 
(2.02) 
2.645 
(0.72) 
8.798** 
(2.02) 
5.822* 
(1.78) 
50.23*** 
(4.83)     
67.53*** 
(5.89) 
49.88*** 
(4.73) 
LGDPI -0.692* 
(-1.87) 
-1.02*** 
(-2.58) 
-0.811* 
(-1.68) 
-1.36*** 
(-2.66) 
-0.923** 
(-2.31) 
-7.127 
(-5.33)    
-9.88*** 
(-6.87) 
-6.96*** 
(-5.08) 
CFLGDPI -0.016 
(-1.29) 
-0.014 
(-1.12) 
-0.006 
(-0.39) 
-0.003 
(-0.20) 
-0.012 
(-0.99) 
-0.013 
(-1.01) 
-0.011 
(-0.69) 
-0.011 
(-0.84) 
LEXPG 7.309*** 
(9.87) 
7.086*** 
(9.59) 
  6.994*** 
(9.42) 
4.968**** 
(5.80) 
  5.054*** 
(5.85) 
TEDX2 -5.5e-07** 
(-1.99) 
-5.12e-07*  
(-1.87)   
-9.95e-08  
(-0.29)   
-5.36e-08 
(-0.16)    
-5.18e-07*   
(-1.90)  
-5.68e-07* 
(-1.91)    
-1.64e-07   
(-0.44) 
-6.6e-07**   
(-2.00)  
TEDX 0.001 
(1.13) 
0.01 
(1.38) 
0.0005 
(0.51) 
0.0009 
(0.86) 
0.001 
(1.46) 
0.002 
(1.33) 
0.002 
(1.26) 
0.001 
(0.91) 
TDSX -0.025 
(-1.40) 
-0.192 
(-1.05) 
-0.034 
(-1.45) 
-0.023 
(-1.02) 
 -0.065* 
(-1.91) 
-0.094** 
(-2.44) 
 
INTX     -0.036 
(-1.44) 
  -0.052 
(-1.30) 
GGC -0.021 
(-0.65) 
-0.019 
(-0.58) 
-0.095** 
(-2.26) 
-0.087** 
(-2.11) 
-0.026 
(-0.79) 
-0.091 
(-1.50) 
-0.099 
(-1.42) 
-0.095 
(-1.74) 
LGCF 2.145*** 
(3.64) 
1.891*** 
(3.17) 
3.395*** 
(4.57) 
2.916*** 
(3.90) 
1.940*** 
(3.31) 
2.195** 
(2.19) 
3.502*** 
(3.11) 
2.179** 
(2.15) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.45) 
-0.001 
(-1.50) 
-0.001 
(-1.07) 
-0.001 
(-1.14) 
-0.001 
(-1.54) 
-0.001 
(-1.19) 
-0.001 
(-0.83) 
-0.0009 
(-0.94) 
TOTG 0.026*** 
(2.83) 
0.027*** 
(2.92) 
0.006 
(0.55) 
0.008 
(0.71) 
0.027*** 
(2.94) 
0.208** 
(2.07) 
0.005 
(0.52) 
0.022** 
(2.19) 
POPG -1.47*** 
(-3.17) 
-1.32*** 
(-2.84) 
-1.62*** 
(-2.72) 
-1.36*** 
(-2.30) 
-1.29*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.678 
(-0.93) 
0.128 
(0.16) 
-0.739 
(-1.01) 
LFG 1.212** 
(2.46) 
1.142** 
(2.33) 
1.612*** 
(2.57) 
1.465** 
(2.38) 
1.125** 
(2.31) 
0.0461 
(0.73) 
0.060 
(0.08) 
0.480 
(0.75) 
SCHL 0.151 
(0.38) 
0.073 
(0.19) 
-0.0005 
(-0.00) 
-0.135 
(-0.26) 
0.064 
(0.17) 
1.112 
(0.92) 
1.121 
(0.81) 
0.664 
(0.56) 
VIOL -0.298 
(-0.62) 
-0.510 
(-1.05) 
-0.239 
(-0.38) 
-0.579 
(-0.93) 
-0.527 
(-1.11) 
-1.446* 
(-1.82) 
-1.697* 
(-1.85) 
-1.432* 
(-1.78) 
PD2 -1.025 
(-1.30) 
-1.003 
(-1.28) 
-0.632 
(-0.63) 
-0.624 
(-0.64) 
-1.091 
(-1.40) 
-0.372 
(-0.39) 
-0.178 
(-0.16) 
-0.217 
(-0.23) 
PD3 -3.23*** 
(-6.98) 
-2.99*** 
(-6.35) 
-3.36*** 
(-5.75) 
-2.94*** 
(-4.99) 
-3.11*** 
(-6.42) 
-0.591 
(-0.67) 
0.655 
(0.66) 
-0.437 
(-0.48) 
HIPC  -1.264** 
(-2.14) 
 -2.15*** 
(-2.83) 
-1.20** 
(-2.06) 
   
N 175 175 175 175 175 175  175 
R2 0.58 0.60 0.33 0.38 0.60 0.69 0.59 0.69 
Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
• The numbers in parentheses are t-Statistics (two-tailed). 
• *. Significance at 10% level. 
• **. Significance at 5% level. 
• ***. Significance at 1% level 
• Dependent variable is: log of the growth rate of GDP per capita and this applicable for all tables. 
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Table (6) 
 
The Impact of Short term and long term debt debts on growth of real GDP per capita 
(controlling for other variables) (1982-99) 
 
                                  Random effects model                         Fixed effects model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 2.359 
(0.88) 
5.425* 
(1.74) 
-0.401 
(-0.12) 
4.769 
(1.23) 
5.044 
(1.63) 
50.67*** 
(4.87) 
63.31*** 
(5.60) 
50.27*** 
(4.79) 
LGDPI -0.534 
(-1.53) 
-0.816** 
(-2.15) 
-0.352 
(-0.80) 
-0.825* 
(-1.74) 
-0.784** 
(-2.05) 
-6.54*** 
(-4.80) 
-8.47*** 
(-5.78) 
-6.43*** 
(-4.68) 
CFLGDPI -0.015 
(-1.23) 
-0.013 
(-1.05) 
-0.009 
(-0.63) 
-0.006 
(-0.42) 
-0.012 
(-1.02) 
-0.008 
(-0.62) 
-0.004 
(-0.25) 
-0.007 
(-0.57) 
LEXPG 6.473*** 
(8.81) 
6.29*** 
(8.58) 
  6.27*** 
(8.48) 
4.43*** 
(5.16) 
 4.55*** 
(5.25) 
STDXI -0.01*** 
(-4.05) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.02*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.01*** 
(-3.70) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.93) 
-0.02*** 
(-3.00) 
LTDXI 0.016** 
(2.35) 
0.001** 
(2.43) 
0.003*** 
(4.27) 
0.003*** 
(4.33) 
0.001** 
(2.39) 
0.002 
(1.40) 
0.003** 
(2.50) 
0.002 
(1.30) 
TDSX -0.018 
(-1.16) 
-0.012 
(-0.75) 
-0.033* 
(-1.68) 
-0.023 
(-1.13) 
 -0.031 
(-1.09) 
-0.058* 
(-1.84) 
 
INTX     -0.016 
(-0.67) 
  -0.011 
(-0.30) 
GGC -0.034 
(-1.13) 
-0.031 
(-1.01) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.904** 
(-2.43) 
-0.032 
(-1.04) 
-0.115* 
(-1.89) 
-0.136** 
(-2.01) 
-0.113* 
(-1.83) 
LGCF 1.903*** 
(3.45) 
1.688*** 
(3.01) 
2.961*** 
(4.43) 
2.574*** 
(3.80) 
1.738*** 
(3.14) 
1.649* 
(1.66) 
2.930*** 
(2.72) 
1.601 
(1.59) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-1.21) 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
-0.001 
(-1.36) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
-0.001 
(-1.29) 
-0.001 
(-1.34) 
-0.001 
(-1.20) 
TOTG 0.025*** 
(2.83) 
0.026*** 
(2.92) 
0.007 
(0.70) 
0.009 
(0.86) 
0.026*** 
(2.95) 
0.018* 
(1.82) 
0.002 
(0.27) 
0.018* 
(1.85) 
POPG -1.39*** 
(-3.15) 
-1.27*** 
(-2.87) 
-1.52*** 
(-2.78) 
-1.318** 
(-2.43) 
-1.25*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.791 
(-1.06) 
-0.417 
(-0.50) 
-0.858 
(-1.15) 
LFG 1.116** 
(2.35) 
1.062** 
(2.25) 
1.382*** 
(2.38) 
1.275** 
(2.23) 
1.051** 
(2.23) 
0.411 
(0.66) 
0.016 
(0.02) 
0.426 
(0.68) 
SCHL 0.409 
(1.09) 
0.332 
(0.88) 
0.449 
(0.95) 
0.313 
(0.66) 
0.302 
(0.81) 
0.364 
(0.30) 
0.177 
(0.13) 
0.094 
(0.08) 
VIOL -0.167 
(-0.37) 
-0.351 
(-0.76) 
-0.013 
(-0.02) 
-0.305 
(-0.53) 
-0.382 
(-0.84) 
-1.029 
(-1.28) 
-1.130 
(-1.26) 
-0.985 
(-1.22) 
PD2 -1.441* 
(-1.87) 
-1.393* 
(-1.82) 
-1.561* 
(-1.61) 
-1.445 
(-1.56) 
-1.410* 
(-1.84) 
-0.573 
(-0.59) 
-0.752 
(-0.70) 
-0.479 
(-0.49) 
PD3 -3.57*** 
(-7.75) 
-3.36*** 
(-7.14) 
-4.02*** 
(-7.24) 
-3.65*** 
(-6.45) 
-3.37*** 
(-6.98) 
-0.842 
(0.91) 
-0.218 
(-0.21) 
-0.688 
(-0.72) 
HIPC  -1.029* 
(-1.87) 
 -1.70*** 
(-2.50) 
-1.031* 
(-1.90) 
   
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.60 0.61 0.42 0.45 0.61 0.70 0.62 0.69 
Chi2 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.019    
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Table (7) 
 
The impact of private non-guaranteed debt (TPDGDP) and total public and publicly 
guaranteed debt (PPDGDP) on growth of real GDP per capita (controlling for other 
variables) (1982-99) 
 
                                      Random effects model                             Fixed effects model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 5.329** 
(1.98) 
8.513*** 
(2.65) 
-1.156** 
(-2.41) 
9.854** 
(2.43) 
7.814** 
(2.49) 
57.08*** 
(5.61) 
74.26*** 
(6.56) 
55.71*** 
(5.46) 
LGDPI -1.112*** 
(-2.96) 
-1.381*** 
(-3.44) 
4.399** 
(-2.41) 
-1.611*** 
(-3.17) 
-1.286*** 
(-3.21) 
-8.024*** 
(-6.21) 
-10.78*** 
(-7.71) 
-7.757*** 
(-6.00) 
CFLGDPI -0.017 
(-1.24) 
-0.016 
(-1.17) 
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
0.0006 
(0.04) 
-0.015 
(-1.12) 
-0.021 
(-1.32) 
-0.014 
(-0.74) 
-0.018 
(-1.14) 
LEXPG 7.044*** 
(9.85) 
6.878*** 
(9.61) 
  6.789*** 
(9.44) 
5.027*** 
(6.00) 
 5.078*** 
(6.01) 
TPDGDPI 0.047* 
(1.87) 
0.048* 
(1.90) 
0.039 
(1.21) 
0.040 
(1.25) 
0.049** 
(1.98) 
0.074* 
(1.82) 
0.044 
(0.94) 
0.069* 
(1.70) 
PPDGDPI -0.006** 
(-2.11) 
-0.005* 
(-1.70) 
-0.006 
(-1.63) 
0.004 
(-1.10) 
-0.005 
(-1.59) 
-0.009** 
(-2.31) 
-0.006 
-(.44) 
-0.009** 
(-2.39) 
TDSX -0.024 
(-1.37) 
-0.018 
(-1.02) 
-0.030 
(-1.37) 
-0.020 
(-0.90) 
 -0.045 
(-1.63) 
-0.067** 
(-2.11) 
 
INTX     -0.033 
(-1.33) 
  -0.037 
(-1.07) 
GGC -0.015 
(-0.49) 
-0.013 
(-0.42) 
-0.082** 
(-2.04) 
-0.075* 
(-1.89) 
-0.020 
(-0.61) 
-0.088 
(-1.43) 
-0.100 
(-1.41) 
-0.095 
(-1.50) 
LGCF 2.041*** 
(3.51) 
1.787*** 
(3.00) 
3.333*** 
(4.62) 
2.855*** 
(3.86) 
1.821*** 
(3.13) 
2.009** 
(2.00) 
3.441*** 
(3.04) 
2.043** 
(2.01) 
CPI -0.0008 
(-1.11) 
-0.0007 
(-1.04) 
-0.0007 
(-0.74) 
-0.0006 
(-0.64) 
-0.0008 
(-1.06) 
-0.0006 
(-0.75) 
-0.0001 
(-0.16) 
-0.0006 
(-0.79) 
TOTG 0.031*** 
(3.29) 
0.031*** 
(3.34) 
0.009 
(0.84) 
0.011 
(0.95) 
0.031*** 
(3.37) 
0.024** 
(2.47) 
0.007 
(0.71) 
0.025** 
(2.53) 
POPG -1.45*** 
(-3.16) 
-1.34*** 
(-2.90) 
-1.67*** 
(-2.87) 
-1.466** 
(-2.52) 
-1.30*** 
(-2.85) 
-0.751 
(-1.06) 
0.183 
(0.23 
-0.855 
(-1.21) 
LFG 1.348*** 
(2.76) 
1.286*** 
(2.64) 
1.796*** 
(2.91) 
1.661*** 
(2.72) 
1.265*** 
(2.61) 
0.714 
(1.14) 
0.188 
(0.26) 
0.743 
(1.18) 
SCHL 0.440 
(1.08) 
0.351 
(0.86) 
0.193 
(0.38) 
0.046 
(0.09) 
0.336 
(0.84) 
1.074 
(0.91) 
1.050 
(0.76) 
0.740 
(0.63) 
VIOL -0.374 
(-0.77) 
-0.529 
(-1.08) 
-0.346 
(-0.56) 
-0.607 
(-0.98) 
-0.541 
(-1.14) 
-1.205 
(-1.53) 
-1.633* 
(-1.80) 
-1.181 
(-1.49) 
PD2 -0.525 
(-0.67) 
-0.512 
(-0.66) 
-0.083 
(-0.08) 
-0.098 
(-0.10) 
-0.604 
(-0.77) 
0.767 
(0.81) 
0.753 
(0.69) 
0.796 
(0.83) 
PD3 -2.94*** 
(-6.30) 
-2.75*** 
(-5.83) 
-3.04*** 
(-5.17) 
-2.73*** 
(-4.60) 
-2.87*** 
(-5.87) 
0.301 
(0.37) 
1.558* 
(1.70) 
0.299 
(0.36) 
HIPC  -1.055* 
(-1.78) 
 -1.813** 
(-2.43) 
-1.011* 
(-1.73) 
   
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.59 0.60 0.33 0.37 0.60 0.70 0.59 0.69 
Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
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Table (8) 
 
The impact of total concessional  (CONCGDP) and total non-concessional 
(NCONCGDPI) debts on growth of real GDP per capita (controlling for other variables) 
(1982-99 
 
                                  Random effects model                          Fixed effects model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 2.394 
(0.87) 
5.348* 
(1.68) 
1.437 
(0.41) 
6.403 
(1.58) 
5.209* 
(1.66) 
54.87*** 
(5.25) 
72.96*** 
(6.41) 
53.68*** 
(5.14) 
LGDPI -0.696* 
(-1.85) 
-0.934** 
(-2.35) 
-0.758 
(-1.57) 
-1.153** 
(-2.29) 
-0.897** 
(-2.24) 
-7.778*** 
(-5.60) 
-10.63*** 
(-7.17) 
-7.514*** 
(-5.44) 
CFLGDPI -0.007 
(-0.57) 
-0.007 
(-0.54) 
0.010 
(0.61) 
0.009 
(0.61) 
-0..007 
(-0.53) 
-0.004 
(-0.26) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
LEXPG 6.877*** 
(9.57) 
6.723*** 
(9.37) 
  6.698*** 
(9.28) 
4.787*** 
(5.69) 
 4.849*** 
(5.73) 
CONCGDPI 0.006 
(0.90) 
0.008 
(1.17) 
0.008 
(0.92) 
0.012 
(1.30) 
0.008 
(1.18) 
-0.009 
(-0.72) 
-0.008 
(-0.54) 
-0.007 
(-0.54) 
NCONGDPI -0.01*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.013*** 
(-2.83) 
-0.017*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.015** 
(-2.61) 
-0.012*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.014* 
(-1.84) 
-0.011 
(-1.20) 
-0.016** 
(-2.12) 
TDSX -0.008 
(-0.47) 
-0.002 
(-0.14) 
-0.013 
(-0.62) 
-0.004 
(-0.19) 
 -0.032 
(-1.11) 
-0.058* 
(-1.77) 
 
INTX     -0.01 
(-0.42) 
  -0.021 
(-0.61) 
GGC -0.012 
(-0.39) 
-0.011 
(-0.37) 
-0.075* 
(-1.90) 
-0.071* 
(-1.82) 
-0.014 
(-0.45) 
-0.106* 
(-1.73) 
-0.113 
(-1.62) 
-0.107 
(-0.61) 
LGCF 2.127*** 
(3.77) 
1.867*** 
(3.22) 
3.310*** 
(4.79) 
2.871*** 
(4.00) 
1.858*** 
(3.26) 
2.389** 
(2.35) 
3.669*** 
(3.24) 
2.371** 
(2.32) 
CPI -0.0008 
(-1.13) 
-0.0008 
(-1.07) 
-0.0006 
(-0.69) 
-0.0005 
(-0.61) 
-0.0008 
(-1.08) 
-0.0006 
(-0.73) 
-0.0001 
(-0.17) 
-0.0006 
(-0.71) 
TOTG 0.026*** 
(2.77) 
0.026*** 
(2.82) 
0.006 
(0.53) 
0.007 
(0.61) 
0.026*** 
(2.81) 
0.024** 
(2.43) 
0.008 
(0.78) 
0.025** 
(2.48) 
POPG -1.38*** 
(-3.06) 
-1.27*** 
(-2.80) 
-1.63*** 
-(2.85) 
-1.424** 
(-2.50) 
-1.26*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.622 
(-0.86) 
0.229 
(0.28) 
-0.739 
(-1.03) 
LFG 1.176** 
(2.43) 
1.109** 
(2.30) 
1.658*** 
(2.74) 
1.518** 
(2.53) 
1.101** 
(2.29) 
0.601 
(0.95) 
0.139 
(0.19) 
0.619 
(0.97) 
SCHL 0.365 
(0.94) 
0.281 
(0.72) 
0.214 
(0.43) 
0.074 
(0.15) 
0.281 
(0.73) 
1.045 
(0.84) 
1.026 
(0.72) 
0.730 
(0.60) 
VIOL -0.345 
(-0.73) 
-0.489 
(-1.02) 
-0.335 
(-0.56) 
-0.568 
(-0.94) 
-0.469 
(-1.00) 
-1.357* 
(-1.71) 
-1.721* 
(-1.90) 
-1.306 
(-1.64) 
PD2 -0.981 
(-1.25) 
-0.997 
(-1.28) 
-0.471 
(-0.48) 
-0.529 
(-0.54) 
-1.041 
(-1.33) 
0.408 
(0.43) 
0.580 
(0.53) 
0.421 
(0.44) 
PD3 -3.323*** 
(-6.60) 
-3.182*** 
(-6.29) 
-3.449*** 
(-5.48) 
-3.207** 
(-2.38) 
-3.246*** 
(-6.24) 
0.108 
(0.12) 
1.467 
(1.48) 
0.075 
(0.08) 
HIPC  -1.033* 
(-1.79) 
 
-1.736*** 
(-2.38) 
-0.998* 
(-1.74) 
   
N 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.58 0.59 0.34 0.38 0.59 0.69 0.59 0.69 
Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
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Table (9) 
 
The impact of IBRD (IBRDX), International Development Association (IDAX), and IMF 
(IMFX) debts on growth of real GDP per capita (controlling for other variables) (1982-
99) 
 
                             Random effects model                              Fixed effects model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 4.672 
(1.52) 
8.27** 
(2.36) 
1.668 
(0.44) 
7.420*** 
(1.73) 
4.234 
(1.41) 
51.87*** 
(4.89) 
62.14*** 
(5.36) 
50.49*** 
(4.70) 
LGDPI -0.719* 
(-1.90) 
-1.041** 
(-2.56) 
-0.464 
(-0.99) 
-0.982** 
(-1.95) 
-0.644* 
(-1.71) 
-6.97*** 
(-5.02) 
-8.75*** 
(-5.86) 
-6.62*** 
(-4.70) 
CFLGDPI -0.019* 
(-1.60) 
-0.015 
(-1.30) 
-0.004 
(-0.33) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
-0.017 
(-1.43) 
-0.013 
(-0.98) 
-0.008 
(-0.55) 
-0.012 
(-0.87) 
LEXPG 6.641*** 
(8.42) 
6.429*** 
(8.17) 
  6.544*** 
(8.26) 
4.503*** 
(5.01) 
 4.632*** 
(5.09) 
IBRDXI 0.003 
(0.18) 
0.007 
(0.41) 
0.040** 
(1.97) 
0.044** 
(2.19) 
0.003 
(0.20) 
0.022 
(0.90) 
0.057** 
(2.10) 
0.013 
(0.54) 
IDAXI 0.005** 
(2.31) 
0.004** 
(2.27) 
0.011*** 
(4.66) 
0.010*** 
(4.50) 
 0.003 
(1.18) 
0.006** 
(2.11) 
0.003 
(1.15) 
IMFXI -0.016 
(-1.58) 
-0.014 
(-1.44) 
-0.006 
(-0.54) 
-0.005 
(-0.38) 
-0.017* 
(-1.72) 
-0.031* 
(-1.95) 
-0.021 
(-1.17) 
-0.031* 
(-1.86) 
TDSX -0.023 
(-1.27) 
-0.017 
(-0.94) 
-0.051** 
(-2.26) 
-0.040* 
(-1.78) 
 -0.060** 
(-2.05) 
-0.091*** 
(-2.86) 
 
INTX     -0.043* 
(-1.73) 
  -0.047 
(-1.32) 
GGC -0.018 
(-0.56) 
-0.015 
(-0.48) 
-0.079** 
(-1.98) 
-0.072* 
(-1.82) 
-0.027 
(-0.82) 
-0.060 
(-1.01) 
-0.102 
(-1.55) 
-0.063 
(-1.01) 
LGCF 1.916*** 
(3.15) 
1.668*** 
(2.71) 
3.284*** 
(4.57) 
2.858*** 
(3.94) 
1.929*** 
(3.23) 
1.548 
(1.48) 
3.093*** 
(2.77) 
1.509 
(1.42) 
CPI -0.001 
(1.43) 
-0.001 
(-1.40) 
-0.001* 
(-1.64) 
-0.001 
(-1.58) 
-0.001 
(-1.45) 
-0.001 
(-1.02) 
-0.001 
(-1.09) 
-0.001 
(-0.91) 
TOTG 0.026*** 
(2.77) 
0.026*** 
(2.84) 
0.005 
(0.49) 
0.006 
(0.62) 
0.026*** 
(2.82) 
0.021** 
(2.13) 
0.006 
(0.59) 
0.023** 
(2.27) 
POPG -1.516*** 
(-3.28) 
-1.387*** 
(-2.99) 
-1.794*** 
(-3.17) 
-1.575*** 
(-2.80) 
-1.458*** 
(-3.18) 
-0.843 
(-1.09) 
-0.463 
(-0.54) 
-0.978 
(-1.26) 
LFG 0.884* 
(1.77) 
0.838* 
(1.69) 
0.975 
(1.61) 
0.894 
(1.51) 
0.859* 
(1.73) 
0.343 
(0.53) 
-0.026 
(-0.04) 
0.368 
(0.57) 
SCHL 0.296 
(0.74) 
0.186 
(0.46) 
0.140 
(0.28) 
-0.033 
(-0.07) 
0.281 
(0.71) 
1.095 
(0.89) 
1.133 
(0.83) 
0.581 
(0.48) 
VIOL -0.065 
(-0.14) 
-0.308 
(-0.62) 
-0.239 
(-0.40) 
-0.592 
(-0.92) 
-0.097 
(-0.20) 
-0.762 
(-0.92) 
-1.312 
(-1.43) 
-0.709 
(-0.84) 
PD2 -1.643** 
(-1.97) 
-1.597* 
(-1.93) 
-2.141** 
(-2.14) 
-2.045** 
(-2.08) 
-1.738** 
(-2.09) 
-0.848 
(-0.83) 
-1.219 
(-1.08) 
-0.716 
(-0.69) 
PD3 -3.729*** 
(-7.25) 
-3.495*** 
(-6.69) 
-4.556*** 
(-.7.56) 
-4.136*** 
(-6.74) 
-3.848*** 
(-7.38) 
-1.151 
(-1.18) 
-0.727 
(-0.68) 
-1.065 
(-1.05) 
HIPC  -1.194** 
(-2.05) 
 
-1.887*** 
(-2.62)
 
    
N 176 175 175 175 175 176 175 175 
R2 0.60 0.61 0.45 0.48 0.60 0.69 0.62 0.69 
Chi2 0.014 0.42 0.12 0.000 0.000    
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Table (10) 
 
The impact of total bilateral (BLATX), and total multilateral (MLATX) debts on growth 
of real GDP per capita (controlling for other variables) (1982-99) 
 
                                Random effects model                             Fixed effects model 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CONST 3.148 
(1.13) 
6.684** 
(2.06) 
0.539 
(0.16) 
6.298 
(1.57) 
6.097* 
(1.90) 
51.71*** 
(4.78) 
63.07*** 
(5.32) 
50.85*** 
(4.66) 
LGDPI -0.669* 
(-1.81) 
-0.986** 
(-2.48) 
-0.512 
(-1.10) 
-1.023** 
(-2.06) 
-0.910** 
(-2.28) 
-7.213*** 
(-5.05) 
-8.955*** 
(-5.76) 
-6.997*** 
(-4.82) 
CFLGDPI -0.017 
(-1.32) 
-0.014 
(-1.15) 
-0.008 
(-0.55) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
-0.013 
(-1.05) 
-0.017 
(-1.26) 
-0.013 
(-0.86) 
-0.015 
(-1.12) 
LEXPG 6.699*** 
(8.60) 
6.484*** 
(8.35) 
  6.415*** 
(8.21) 
4.635*** 
(5.16) 
 4.723*** 
(5.20) 
BLAXI -0.0008 
(-0.84) 
-0.0005 
(-0.52) 
0.0001 
(0.08) 
0.0005 
(0.46) 
-0.0004 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.72) 
0.0005 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.90) 
MLAXI 0.002* 
(1.84) 
0.002* 
(1.82) 
0.006*** 
(4.09) 
0.006*** 
(3.96) 
0.002* 
(1.78) 
0.001 
(0.74) 
0.003* 
(1.69) 
0.001 
(0.73) 
TDSX -0.022 
(-1.36) 
-0.015 
(-0.90) 
-0.037* 
(-1.80) 
-0.025 
(-1.22) 
 -0.045 
(-1.51) 
-0.077** 
(-2.37) 
 
INTX     -0.029 
(-1.22) 
  -0.035 
(-0.96) 
GGC -0.013 
(-0.42) 
-0.011 
(-0.34) 
-0.072* 
(-1.82) 
-0.065* 
(-1.65) 
-0.017 
(-0.52) 
-0.058 
(-0.98) 
-0.084 
(-1.26) 
-0.063 
(-1.01) 
LGCF 2.178*** 
(3.75) 
1.911*** 
(3.24) 
3.447*** 
(4.96) 
2.975*** 
(4.22) 
1.941*** 
(3.35) 
1.931* 
(1.90) 
3.172*** 
(2.87) 
1.938* 
(1.89) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.41) 
-0.001 
(-1.38) 
-0.001 
(-1.40) 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
-0.0004 
(-0.49) 
-0.0005 
(-0.51) 
-0.0004 
(-0.44) 
TOTG 0.025*** 
(2.71) 
0.026*** 
(2.81) 
0.006 
(0.57) 
0.008 
(0.74) 
0.026*** 
(2.83) 
0.022** 
(2.23) 
0.008 
(0.78) 
0.023** 
(2.30) 
POPG -1.512*** 
(-3.25) 
-1.369*** 
(-2.93) 
-1.744*** 
(-3.05) 
-1.505*** 
(-2.65) 
-1.334*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.629 
(-0.80) 
-0.281 
(-0.32) 
-0.728 
(-0.93) 
LFG 0.984** 
(1.96) 
0.927* 
(1.86) 
1.039* 
(1.70) 
0.941 
(1.57) 
0.918* 
(1.85) 
0.280 
(0.43) 
-0.145 
(-0.20) 
0.306 
(0.46) 
SCHL 0.224 
(0.57) 
0.143 
(0.36) 
0.256 
(0.52) 
0.113 
(0.23) 
0.136 
(0.35) 
1.043 
(0.84) 
0.998 
(0.72) 
0.670 
(0.55) 
VIOL -0.183 
(-0.38) 
-0.392 
(-0.81) 
-0.067 
(-0.11) 
-0.382 
(-0.64) 
-0.407 
(-0.86) 
-1.256 
(-1.55) 
-1.483* 
(-1.64) 
-1.233 
(-1.51) 
PD2 -1.407* 
(-1.73) 
-1.366* 
(-1.69) 
-1.740* 
(-1.77) 
-1.661* 
(-1.72) 
-1.428* 
(-1.77) 
-0.433 
(-0.42) 
-0.764 
(-0.66) 
-0.356 
(-0.34) 
PD3 -3.603*** 
(-7.12) 
-3.368*** 
(-6.56) 
-4.298*** 
(-7.16) 
-3.883*** 
(-6.38) 
-3.463*** 
(-6.62) 
-0.526 
(-0.52) 
-0.161 
(-0.14) 
-0.456 
(-0.43) 
HIPC  -1.205** 
(-2.08) 
 -1.932*** 
(-2.67) 
-1.154** 
(-2.01) 
 
  
N 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 175 
R2 0.58 0.60 0.42 0.45 0.60 0.68 0.60 0.68 
Chi2 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.20    
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B. Cross-section pooled time series (1982-99)  
 
Table (11) 
 
The impact of past and current total external debt on growth of real GDP per capita of 
(controlling for other variables)(1982-99) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 2.351 
(0.87) 
5.440* 
(1.76) 
1.704 
(0.50) 
6.734* 
(1.74) 
4.830 
(1.56) 
LGDPI -0.589* 
(-1.71) 
-0.869** 
(-2.36) 
-0.598 
(-1.37) 
-1.051** 
(-2.28) 
-0.791** 
(-2.12) 
LEXPG 7.385*** 
(9.84) 
-0.015 
(-1.19) 
  7.079*** 
(9.2) 
CFLGDPI -0.017 
(-1.37) 
7.189*** 
(9.59) 
-0.007 
(-0.48) 
-0.004 
(-0.28) 
-0.013 
(-1.06) 
TEDX2 -5.37e-07* 
(-1.91)    
-5.04e-07*    
(-1.81) 
-9.21e-08    
(-0.26) 
-5.84e-08    
(-0.17) 
-5.13e-07*    
(-1.85) 
TEDX 0.001 
(1.05) 
0.001 
(1.27) 
0.0003 
(0.31) 
0.0006 
(0.62) 
0.001 
(1.37) 
TDSXI -0.023 
(-1.40) 
-0.017 
(-1.04) 
-0.029 
(-1.35) 
-0.0191 
(-0.89) 
 
INTXI     -0.036 
(-1.48) 
GGC -0.015 
(-0.49) 
-0.013 
(-0.42) 
-0.085** 
(-2.21) 
-0.078** 
(-2.06) 
-0.021 
(-0.66) 
LGCF 2.196*** 
(3.90) 
1.967*** 
(3.45) 
3.443*** 
(4.95) 
3.019*** 
(4.30) 
1.998*** 
(3.55) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.43) 
-0.001 
(-1.48) 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
TOTG 0.026*** 
(2.71) 
0.026*** 
(2.81) 
0.005 
(0.46) 
0.007 
(0.64) 
0.026*** 
(2.84) 
POPG -1.466*** 
(-3.25) 
-1.133*** 
(-2.95) 
-1.772*** 
(-3.11) 
-1.541*** 
(-2.72) 
-1.290*** 
(-2.87) 
LFG 1.153** 
(2.38) 
1.089** 
(2.26) 
1.633*** 
(2.68) 
1.508** 
(2.51) 
1.074** 
(2.24) 
LSCHL 0.048 
(0.13) 
-0.018 
(-0.05) 
-0.250 
(-0.54) 
-0.346 
(-0.76) 
-0.007 
(-0.02) 
VIOL -0.182 
(-0.40) 
-0.378 
(-0.82) 
-0.023 
(-0.04) 
-0.348 
(-0.60) 
-0.406 
(-0.90) 
PD2 -0.182 
(-1.40) 
-1.081 
(-1.39) 
-0.574 
(-0.58) 
-0.573 
(-0.59) 
-1.167 
(-1.50) 
PD3 -3.233*** 
(-6.84) 
-3.023*** 
(-6.31) 
-3.369*** 
(-5.64) 
-3.023*** 
(-5.02) 
-3.145*** 
(-6.40) 
HIPC  -1.092** 
(-2.01) 
 -1.768*** 
(-2.62) 
-1.048* 
(-1.93) 
N 175 175 175 175 175 
R2 0.61 0.62 0.38 0.40 0.63 
 
 
 234 
Table (12) 
 
The impact of short term and long term debt on growth of real GDP per capita 
(controlling for other variables) (1982-99) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 2.074 
(0.81) 
4.807 
(1.62) 
-0.796 
(-0.26) 
3.617 
(1.01) 
4.506 
(1.51) 
LGDPI -0.489 
(-1.47) 
-0.739** 
(-2.05) 
-0.257 
(-0.63) 
-0.658 
(-1.52) 
4.506 
(1.51) 
LEXPG 6.521*** 
(8.82) 
6.362*** 
(8.61) 
  6.326*** 
(8.49) 
CFLGDPI -0.016 
(-1.29) 
-0.014 
(-1.11) 
-0.011 
(-0.74) 
-0.008 
(-0.53) 
-0.013 
(-1.07) 
STDXI -0.014*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.89) 
-0.018*** 
(-4.51) 
-0.017*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.013*** 
(-3.73) 
LTDXI 0.001** 
(2.32) 
0.001** 
(2.40) 
0.003*** 
(4.15) 
0.003*** 
(4.21) 
0.001** 
(2.36) 
TDSXI -0.018 
(-1.18) 
-0.012 
(-0.77) 
-0.013* 
(1.66) 
-0.021 
(-1.10) 
 
INTXI     -0.016 
(-0.73) 
GGC -0.031 
(-1.04) 
-0.027 
(-0.91) 
-0.091*** 
(-2.59) 
-0.082** 
(-2.38) 
-0.029 
(-0.98) 
LGCF 1.937*** 
(3.61) 
1.739*** 
(3.20) 
2.994*** 
(4.70) 
2.641*** 
(4.09) 
1.780*** 
(3.31) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.13) 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
-0.001 
(-1.27) 
-0.001 
(-1.25) 
-0.001 
(-1.14) 
TOTG 0.025*** 
(2.78) 
0.026*** 
(2.87) 
0.007 
(0.65) 
0.008 
(0.82) 
0.026*** 
(2.90) 
POPG -1.388*** 
(-3.20) 
-1.277*** 
(-2.93) 
-1.601*** 
(-3.04) 
-1.418*** 
(-2.70) 
-1.252*** 
(-2.88) 
LFG 1.082** 
(2.31) 
1.030** 
(2.21) 
1.401** 
(2.47) 
1.310** 
(2.33) 
1.021** 
(2.19) 
LSCHL 0.354 
(0.98) 
0.280 
(0.78) 
0.298 
(0.68) 
0.185 
(0.42) 
0.262 
(0.73) 
VIOL -0.113 
(-0.26) 
-0.282 
(-0.63) 
0.103 
(0.19) 
-0.171 
(-0.32) 
-0.322 
(-0.74) 
PD2 -1.478* 
(-1.93) 
-1.441* 
(-1.89) 
-1.453 
(-1.56) 
-1.395 
(-1.52) 
-1.457* 
(-1.90) 
PD3 -3.560*** 
(-7.66) 
-3.371*** 
(-7.11) 
-3.968*** 
(-7.05) 
-3.654*** 
(-6.40) 
-3.385*** 
(-6.98) 
HIPC  -0.932* 
(-1.79) 
 -1.467** 
(-2.36) 
-0.944* 
(-1.82) 
N 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.64 0.65 0.47 0.49 0.65 
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Table (13) 
 
The impact of private non-guaranteed debt (TPDGDP) and total public and publicly 
guaranteed debt (PPDGDP) on growth of real GDP per capita (controlling for other 
variables) (1982-99) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 4.471* 
(1.77) 
7.109** 
(2.39) 
3.446 
(1.08) 
9.917** 
(2.12) 
6.607** 
(2.26) 
LGDPI -0.969*** 
(-2.79) 
-1.185*** 
(-3.21) 
-0.963** 
(-2.20) 
-1.328*** 
(-2.87) 
-1.115*** 
(-2.99) 
LEXPG 7.089*** 
(9.77) 
6.948*** 
(9.56) 
  6.841*** 
(9.39) 
CFLGDPI -0.017 
(-1.27) 
-0.016 
(-1.19) 
-0.0004 
(-0.02) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
-0.157 
(-1.14) 
TPDGDPI 0.044* 
(1.84) 
0.044* 
(1.86) 
0.04 
(1.31) 
0.041 
(1.34) 
0.047** 
(1.97) 
PPGGDPI -0.006** 
(-2.07) 
-0.005* 
(-1.67) 
-0.006* 
(-1.77) 
-0.005 
(-1.27) 
-0.005 
(-1.54) 
TDSXI -0.023 
(-1.39) 
-0.017 
(-1.05) 
-0.028 
(-1.36) 
-0.019 
(-0.91)- 
 
INTXI     -0.035 
(-1.43) 
GGC -0.009 
(-0.31) 
-0.007 
(-0.26) 
-0.072* 
(-1.90) 
0.066* 
(-1.79) 
-0.015 
(-0.50) 
LGCF 2.107*** 
(3.82) 
1.884*** 
(3.34) 
3.359*** 
(4.97) 
2.942*** 
(4.24) 
1.898*** 
(3.43) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.11) 
-0.001 
(-1.06) 
-0.001 
(-0.83) 
-0.0007 
(-0.77) 
-0.001 
(-1.06) 
TOTG 0.030*** 
(3.82) 
0.030*** 
(3.23) 
0.01 
(0.80) 
0.011 
(0.93) 
0.031*** 
(3.26) 
POPG -1.431*** 
(-3.23) 
-1.332*** 
(-3.0) 
-1.785*** 
(-3.21) 
-1.607*** 
(-2.89) 
-1.292*** 
(-2.92) 
LFG 1.261*** 
(2.64) 
1.204** 
(2.53) 
1.807*** 
(3.02) 
1.693*** 
(2.85) 
1.187** 
(2.50) 
LSCHL 0.314 
(0.84) 
0.235 
(0.63) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.112 
(-0.24) 
0.244 
(0.66) 
VIOL -0.260 
(-0.57) 
-0.399 
(-0.86) 
-0.169 
(-0.29) 
-0.406 
(-0.70) 
-0.421 
(-0.94) 
PD2 -0.663 
(-0.85) 
-0.665 
(-0.86) 
-0.064 
(-0.07) 
-0.087 
(-0.09) 
-0.750 
(-0.97) 
PD3 -2.966*** 
(-6.25) 
-2.822*** 
(-5.88) 
-3.067*** 
(-5.12) 
-2.822*** 
(-4.69) 
-2.944*** 
(-5.95) 
HIPC  -0.891* 
(-1.65) 
 -1.498** 
(-2.23) 
-0.863 
(-1.61) 
N 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.62 0.63 0.40 0.42 0.63 
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Table (14) 
 
The impact of total concessional  (CONCGDP) and total non-concessional 
(NCONCGDPI) debts on growth of real GDP per capita (controlling for other variables) 
(1982-99) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 2.018 
(0.75) 
4.831 
(1.57) 
0.924 
(0.28) 
5.391 
(1.41) 
4.740 
(1.56) 
LGDPI -0.633* 
(-1.75) 
-0.853** 
(-2.25) 
-0.644 
(-1.42) 
-0.990** 
(-2.10) 
-0.819** 
(-2.13) 
LEXPG 6.993*** 
(9.55) 
   6.802*** 
(9.25) 
CFLGDPI -0.01 
(-0.76) 
-0.01 
(-0.73) 
0.008 
(0.47) 
0.008 
(0.48) 
-0.009 
(-0.72) 
CONCGDPI 0.003 
(0.51) 
0.006 
(0.85) 
0.003 
(0.42) 
0.007 
(0.84) 
0.006 
(0.85) 
NCONCGDPI -0.014** 
(-2.41) 
-0.012** 
(-2.17) 
-0.017** 
(-2.35) 
-0.015** 
(-2.04) 
-0.012** 
(-2.01) 
TDSXI -0.009 
(-0.59) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
-0.014 
(-0.69) 
-0.004 
(-0.24) 
 
INTXI     -0.013 
(-0.57) 
GGC -0.01 
(-0.34) 
-0.009 
(-0.32) 
-0.069* 
(-1.82) 
-0.665* 
(-1.76) 
-0.013 
(-0.44) 
LGCF 2.226*** 
(4.03) 
1.962*** 
(3.46) 
3.457*** 
(5.15) 
3.000*** 
(4.34) 
1.946*** 
(3.48) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.29) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
-0.0008 
(-0.93) 
-0.0008 
(-0.88) 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
TOTG 0.025*** 
(2.64) 
0.025*** 
(2.68) 
0.005 
(0.43) 
0.006 
(0.52) 
0.025*** 
(2.69) 
POPG -1.347*** 
(-3.01) 
-1.236*** 
(-2.76) 
-1.685*** 
(-3.02) 
-1.499*** 
(-2.70) 
-1.227*** 
(-2.75) 
LFG 1.103** 
(2.29) 
1.034** 
(2.15) 
1.647*** 
(2.75) 
1.521*** 
(2.56) 
1.029** 
(2.15) 
LSCHL 0.226 
(0.61) 
0.146 
(0.39) 
-0.023 
(-0.05) 
-0.142 
(-0.31) 
0.150 
(0.41) 
VIOL -0.272 
(-0.59) 
-0.413 
(-0.88) 
-0.202 
(-0.35) 
-0.425 
(-0.73) 
-0.398 
(-0.87) 
PD2 -1.037 
(-1.31) 
-1.066 
(-1.36) 
-0.413 
(-0.42) 
-0.480 
(-0.49) 
-1.115 
(-1.41) 
PD3 -3.271*** 
(-6.40) 
-3.147*** 
(-6.15) 
-3.365*** 
(-5.27) 
-3.166*** 
(-4.98) 
-3.222*** 
(-6.12) 
HIPC  -1.001* 
(-1.82) 
 -1.576** 
(-2.32) 
-0.972* 
(-1.78) 
N 176 176 176 176 176 
R2 0.62 0.63 0.40 0.42 0.63 
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Table (15) 
The impact of IBRD (IBRDX), International Development Association (IDAX), and IMF 
(IMFX) debts on growth of real GDP per capita (controlling for other variables) (1982-
99) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 3.648 
(1.25) 
6.758** 
(2.05) 
-0.261 
(-0.08) 
4.662 
(1.19) 
3.455 
(1.21) 
LGDPI -0.620* 
(-1.74) 
-0.893** 
(-2.36) 
-0.246 
(-0.58) 
-0.680 
(-1.50) 
-0.564 
(-1.58) 
LEXPG 6.775*** 
(8.51) 
6.580*** 
(8.27) 
  6.655*** 
(8.34) 
CFLGDPI -0.022* 
(-1.83) 
-0.017 
(-1.46) 
-0.007 
(-0.53) 
-0.001 
(-.12) 
-0.019 
(-1.58) 
IBRDXI 0.007 
(0.05) 
0.004 
(0.27) 
0.031 
(1.62) 
0.036* 
(1.86) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
IDAXI 0.004** 
(2.18) 
0.004** 
(2.16) 
0.010*** 
(4.30) 
0.01*** 
(4.20) 
0.004** 
(2.17) 
IMFXI -0.014 
(-1.43) 
-0.012 
(-1.29) 
-0.003 
(-0.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.015 
(-1.60) 
TDSXI -0.021 
(-1.17) 
-0.015 
(-0.84) 
-0.043** 
(-2.03) 
-0.033 
(-1.57) 
 
INTXI     -0.041* 
(-1.70) 
GGC -0.014 
(-0.45) 
-0.011 
(-0.35) 
-0.068* 
(-1.83) 
-0.061* 
(-1.67) 
-0.023 
(-0.73) 
LGCF 2.026*** 
(3.49) 
1.797*** 
(3.06) 
3.421*** 
(5.09) 
3.009*** 
(4.42) 
2.01*** 
(3.49) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.44) 
-0.001 
(-1.42) 
-0.001* 
(-1.71) 
-0.001* 
(-1.68) 
-0.001 
(-1.44) 
TOTG 0.025*** 
(2.67) 
0.026*** 
(2.74) 
0.004 
(0.36) 
0.005 
(0.52) 
0.026*** 
(2.72) 
POPG -1.474*** 
(-3.29) 
-1.353*** 
(-3.02) 
-1.822*** 
(-3.39) 
-1.623*** 
(-3.04) 
-1.420*** 
(-3.18) 
LFG 0.847* 
(1.72) 
0.803 
(1.64) 
1.035* 
(1.74) 
0.958 
(1.64) 
0.822* 
(1.67) 
LSCHL 0.213 
(0.57) 
0.115 
(0.31) 
-0.04 
(-0.11) 
-0.187 
(-0.42) 
0.217 
(0.58) 
VIOL 0.011 
(0.02) 
-0.215 
(-0.46) 
0.0009 
(0.00) 
-0.345 
(-0.61) 
-0.026 
(-0.06) 
PD2 -1.646** 
(-1.98) 
-1.618** 
(-1.96) 
-1.933* 
(-1.93) 
-1.876* 
(-1.90) 
-1.756** 
(-2.11) 
PD3 -3.668*** 
(-7.03) 
-3.471*** 
(-6.59) 
-4.423*** 
(-7.14) 
-4.087*** 
(-6.56) 
-3.801*** 
(-7.22) 
HIPC  -1.054** 
(-1.96) 
 -1.611*** 
(-2.53) 
 
N 175 175 175 175 175 
R2 0.62 0.63 0.44 0.47 0.62 
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Table (16) 
The impact of  total bilateral (BLATX), and total multilateral (MLATX) debts on growth 
of real GDP per capita (controlling for other variables) (1982-99) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
CONSTANT 2.583 
(0.97) 
5.701* 
(1.86) 
-0.555 
(-0.17) 
4.358 
(1.18) 
5.265* 
(1.72) 
LGDPI -0.591* 
(-1.69) 
-0.868** 
(-2.33) 
-0.344 
(-0.82) 
-0.781* 
(-1.75) 
-0.808** 
(-2.14) 
LEXPG 6.803*** 
(8.68) 
6.605*** 
(8.44) 
  6.519*** 
(8.30) 
CFLGDPI -0.018 
(-1.39) 
-0.015 
(-1.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.006 
(-0.41) 
-0.014 
(-1.10) 
BLATXI -0.0008 
(-0.85) 
-0.0005 
(-0.54) 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
0.0003 
(0.29) 
-0.004 
(-0.80) 
MLATXI 0.002* 
(1.74) 
0.002 
(1.74) 
0.006*** 
(3.79) 
0.005*** 
(3.73) 
0.002* 
(1.70) 
TDSXI -0.022 
(-1.35) 
-0.014 
(-0.89) 
-0.032* 
(-1.66) 
-0.021 
(-1.06) 
 
INTXI     -0.029 
(-1.25) 
GGC -0.011 
(-0.34) 
-0.007 
(-0.25) 
-0.066* 
(-1.77) 
-0.059* 
(-1.61) 
-0.014 
(-0.45) 
LGCF 2.227*** 
(3.98) 
1.981*** 
(3.49) 
3.525*** 
(5.40) 
3.090*** 
(4.65) 
1.995*** 
(3.56) 
CPI -0.001 
(-1.45) 
-0.001 
(-1.44) 
-0.001 
(-1.54) 
-0.001 
(-1.51) 
-0.001 
(-1.44) 
TOTG 0.025*** 
(2.61) 
0.025*** 
(2.71) 
0.004 
(0.40) 
0.006 
(0.59) 
0.026*** 
(2.74) 
POPG -1.487*** 
(-3.29) 
-1.352*** 
(-2.98) 
-1.793*** 
(-3.28) 
-1.572 
(-2.89) 
-1.318*** 
(-2.92) 
LFG 0.949* 
(1.92) 
0.893* 
(1.82) 
1.093* 
(1.83) 
1.001* 
(1.70) 
0.886* 
(1.81) 
LSCHL 0.146 
(0.39) 
0.073 
(0.20) 
0.047 
(0.11) 
-0.059 
(-0.14) 
0.08 
(0.22) 
VIOL -0.100 
(-0.22) 
-0.297 
(-0.64) 
0.135 
(0.24) 
-0.178 
(-0.32) 
-0.319 
(-0.70) 
PD2 -1.441* 
(-1.78) 
-1.412* 
(-1.76) 
-1.603 
(-1.63) 
-1.552 
(-1.61) 
-1.042* 
(-1.93) 
PD3 -3.578*** 
(-7.01) 
-3.371*** 
(-6.54) 
-4.202*** 
(-6.87) 
-3.857*** 
(-6.26) 
-3.468*** 
(-6.61) 
HIPC  -1.082** 
(-2.00) 
 -1.657*** 
(-2.57) 
-1.042* 
(-1.93) 
N 175 185 175 175 175 
R2 0.61 0.62 0.43 0.45 0.62 
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Table (17) 
Impacts of debt, capital flight, and terms of trade variables on growth-rate differences 
(1982-99) 
  
Differences in each variable between HIPCs 
and Non-HIPCs 
Effects of each variable on the growth 
rate difference (%) b 
Variables 1982-87 1988-93 1994-99 1982-87 1988-93 1994-99 
LGDPG 2.62 2.97 0.50      
CFLGDPNI -0.44 8.41 19.13 0.48 3.06 21.04 
TEDXL2 36950 584087 867519 2.44 38.61 57.34 
TOT 0.96 2.78 3.92 2.11 6.12 0.09 
INTXI 1.28 3.43 3.61 6.67 7.54 7.94 
STDXI 0.90 32.85 47.43 1.54 55.84 80.63 
LTDXI 122.86 384.54 561.78 24.57 76.91 112.36 
TPDGDPI 0.91 0.08 2.92 6.26 0.57 20.14 
PPGGDPI 19.22 42.46 111.38 17.30 38.21 100.24 
BLAXI 65.86 246.75 259.05 6.59 24.67 25.90 
MLAX 34.29 99.86 239.28 3.43 9.99 23.93 
IBRDXI 2.20 4.54 -2.22 2.86 5.91 0.67 
IDAXI 16.88 53.24 155.20 5.06 15.97 46.56 
IMFXI 14.31 12.86 22.62 24.32 21.86 38.45 
CONCGDPI 13.02 30.76 72.13 9.11 21.53 50.49 
NONCONGI 6.64 10.00 31.12 10.63 16.00 49.79 
 
b. Effeects are calculated as :differences of each debt variable between HIPCs and non-HIPCs multiplied by 
coefficients of debt variables in column 8 of the fixed effects model (%). 
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Table (18) 
Correlation Matrix (total debt stock and other covariates) 
Variable lgdpg lgdpi cflgdpi lexpg Tedx2 tedx tdsx ggc lgcf cpi tot popg lgf lschl viol 
lgdpg 1.00               
lgdpi 0.019 
(0.79) 
1.00              
cflgdpi -0.142 
(0.05) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
1.00             
lepg 0.509 
(0.000) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
1.00            
tdx2 -0.134 
(0.07) 
-0.125 
(0.09) 
0.468* 
(0.000) 
0.017* 
(0.019) 
1.00           
tedx -0.187* 
(0.01) 
-0.379* 
(0.000) 
0.414* 
(0.000) 
-0.05 
(0.504) 
0.66* 
(0.000) 
1.00          
tdsx 0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.047 
(0.52) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.055 
(0.45) 
0.152* 
(0.04) 
0.38* 
(0.000) 
1.00         
ggc -.015 
(0.83) 
-0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.053 
(0.47) 
-0.151* 
(0.04) 
0.014 
(0.85) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
-0.168* 
(0.023) 
1.00        
lgcf 0.326* 
(0.000) 
0.391* 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.717) 
0.255* 
(0.000) 
-0.057 
(0.44) 
-
0.354* 
(0.000) 
-0.262* 
(0.000) 
-0.023* 
(0.001) 
1.00       
cpi -0.121 
(0.105) 
0.124 
(0.09) 
0.145 
(0.05) 
0.013 
(0.86) 
0.287* 
(0.000) 
0.411* 
(0.000) 
0.185 
(0.012) 
-0.092 
(0.217) 
-0.097 
(0.21) 
1.00      
tot 0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
0.011 
(0.88) 
-0.190* 
(0.01) 
-0.038* 
(0.613) 
0.003 
(0.95) 
-0.022 
(0.76) 
0.039 
(0.596) 
-0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.05 
(0.506) 
1.00     
popg -0.156* 
(0.035) 
-0.454* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.046 
(0.53) 
0.046 
(0.41) 
0.158* 
(0.03) 
-0.073 
(0.32) 
0.270* 
(0.000) 
-
0.172* 
(0.020) 
-0.090 
(0.215) 
-0.061 
(0.414) 
1.00    
lfg 0.145 
(0.05) 
-0.05 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
0.062 
(0.40) 
0.02 
(0.79) 
-0.065 
(0.38) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
0.132 
(0.08) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.446* 
(0.000) 
1.00   
lschl 0.108 
(0.14) 
0.761* 
(0.00) 
-0.09 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.25) 
-0.098 
(0.19) 
-
0.309* 
(0.000) 
0.05 
(0.50) 
-0.024 
(0.74) 
0.471* 
(0.000) 
0.131 
(0.92) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
-
0.450* 
(0.000) 
-
0.042 
(0.57) 
1.00  
viol 0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.97) 
0.025 
(0.73) 
-0.046 
(0.53) 
0.005 
(0.94) 
0.153* 
(0.03) 
-0.08 
(0.27) 
-0.016 
(0.83) 
-0.078 
(0.29) 
0.064 
(0.39) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.03 
(0.67) 
-0.079 
(0.29) 
1.00 
 
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors for all the correlation matrices.  
*. Refers to significance at 5% level, and is applicable for all the correlation matrices. 
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Table (19) 
Correlation matrix (Concessional and non-concessional debts and other covariates) 
Variable lgdpg lgdpi cflgdpi lexpg concgdpi nconcgdpi tdsx ggc lgcf cpi tot popg lgf lschl viol 
lgdpg 1.00               
lgdpi 0.019 
(0.79) 
1.00              
cflgdpi -0.142 
(0.05) 
-0.155 
(0.03) 
1.00             
lexpg 0.509* 
(0.000) 
0.090 
(0.22) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
1.00            
concgdpi -0.171* 
(0.02) 
-0.447* 
(0.000) 
0.523* 
(0.000) 
0.003 
(0.63) 
1.00           
nconcgdpi -0.209* 
(0.004) 
0.028 
(0.70) 
0.476* 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.65) 
0.397* 
(0.000) 
1.00          
tdsx -0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.047 
(0.51) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.055 
(0.45) 
-0.025 
(0.731) 
0.235* 
(0.001) 
1.00         
ggc -0.015 
(0.83) 
-0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.053 
(0.47) 
-0.151* 
(0.04) 
0.116 
(0.11) 
0.120 
(0.10) 
-0.168* 
(0.02) 
1.00        
lgcf 0.326* 
(0.000) 
0.391* 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.71) 
0.255* 
(0.000) 
-0.051 
(0.49) 
0.115 
(0.12) 
-0.262* 
(0.000) 
0.233* 
(0.000) 
1.00       
cpi -0.121 
(0.10) 
0.124 
(0.09) 
0.145 
(0.05) 
0.013 
(0.86) 
0.000 
(0.99) 
0.22* 
(0.003) 
0.185* 
(0.01) 
-0.092 
(0.21) 
-0.093 
(-0.21) 
1.00      
tot 0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
0.011 
(0.88) 
-0.190* 
(0.01) 
0.106 
(0.15) 
-0.032 
(0.67) 
-0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.039 
(0.59) 
-0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.050 
(-0.5) 
1.00     
popg -0.156* 
(0.03) 
-0.454* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.046 
(0.53) 
0.298* 
(0.000) 
0.058 
(0.43) 
-0.073 
(0.32) 
0.27* 
(0.000) 
-0.172* 
(0.02) 
-0.093 
(0.21) 
0.061 
(0.41) 
1.00    
lfg 0.145 
(0.05) 
-0.059 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.014 
(0.84) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.132 
(0.08) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.446 
(0.00) 
1.00   
lschl 0.108 
(0.14) 
0.761* 
(0.000) 
-0.095 
(0.20) 
0.084 
(0.25) 
-0.352* 
(0.000) 
0.167* 
(0.025) 
0.05 
(0.50) 
-0.024 
(0.74) 
0.471* 
(0.000) 
0.131 
(0.08) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
-0.45* 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.57) 
1.00  
viol 0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.97) 
0.025 
(0.73) 
-0.045 
(0.54) 
-0.121 
(0.10) 
0.153* 
(0.03) 
-0.082 
(0.27) 
-0.016 
(0.83) 
-0.078 
(0.29) 
0.064 
(0.39) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.031 
(0.67) 
-0.08 
(0.29) 
1.00 
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Table (20) 
Correlation Matrix (Tpotal private non-gauanteed and public and publicly guaranteed debts and other covariates) 
Variable lgdpg lgdpi cflgdpi lexpg tpdgdpi ppggdpi tdsx ggc lgcf cpi tot popg lgf lschl viol 
lgdpg 1.00               
lgdpi 0.019 
(0.79) 
1.00              
cflgdpi -0.142 
(0.03) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
1.00             
lexpg 0.509* 
(0.000) 
0.090 
(0.22) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
1.00            
tpdgdpi 0.091 
(0.22) 
0.048 
(0.54) 
0.254* 
(0.000) 
0.081 
(0.27) 
1.00           
ppdgdpi -0.230* 
(0.000) 
-0.206* 
(0.005) 
0.553* 
(0.000) 
0.056 
(0.45) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
1.00          
tdsx -0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.047 
(0.52) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.055 
(0.45) 
0.296* 
(0.000) 
0.103 
(0.16) 
1.00         
ggc -0.015 
(0.83) 
-0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.053 
(0.47) 
-0.151* 
(0.04) 
-0.048 
(0.51) 
0.107 
(0.152) 
-0.168* 
(0.02) 
1.00        
lgcf 0.326* 
(0.000) 
0.391* 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.71) 
0.255* 
(0.000) 
0.031 
(0.67) 
0.031 
(0.59) 
-0.262* 
(0.000) 
-0.233* 
(0.001) 
1.00       
cpi -0.121 
(0.10) 
0.124 
(0.09) 
0.145 
(0.05) 
0.013 
(0.86) 
-0.026 
(0.72) 
0.142 
(0.05) 
0.185* 
(0.012) 
-0.092 
(0.21) 
-0.093 
(0.21) 
1.00      
tot 0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
0.011 
(0.88) 
-0.190* 
(0.01) 
-0.117 
(0.11) 
0.043 
(0.56) 
-0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.039 
(0.59) 
-0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.050 
(0.051) 
1.00     
popg -0.156* 
(0.03) 
-0.454* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.04 
(0.53) 
-0.08 
(0.25) 
0.191* 
(0.01) 
-0.073 
(0.32) 
0.270* 
(0.000) 
-0.172* 
(0.02) 
-0.093* 
(0.21) 
-0.061 
(0.41) 
1.00    
lfg 0.145 
(0.05) 
-0.059 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
0.032 
(0.66) 
0.089 
(0.23) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.132 
(0.08) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.446* 
(0.00) 
   
lschl 0.108 
(0.148) 
0.761* 
(0.000) 
-0.095 
(0.20) 
0.084 
(0.25)- 
0.057 
(0.44) 
-0.070 
(0.34) 
0.050 
(0.50) 
-0.024 
(0.74) 
0.471* 
(0.000) 
0.131 
(0.08) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.45* 
(0.00) 
-0.042 
(0.57) 
1.00  
viol 0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.97) 
0.025 
(0.73) 
-0.038 
(0.60) 
-0.093 
(0.211) 
0.153* 
(0.03) 
-0.082 
(0.27) 
-0.016 
(0.83) 
-0.078 
(0.29) 
0.064 
(0.39) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.031 
(0.67) 
-0.079 
(0.29) 
1.00 
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Table (21) 
Correlation matrix (short term (STD) and long term debts (LTD) to exports ratio and other covariates) 
Variable lgdpg lgdpi cflgdpi lexpg stdxi ltdxi tdsx ggc lgcf cpi tot popg lgf lschl viol 
lgdpg 1.00               
lgdpi 0.019 
(0.79) 
1.00              
cflgdpi -0.142 
(0.05) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
1.00             
lexpg 0.509* 
(0.000) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
1.00            
stdxi -0.25* 
(0.000) 
-0.015 
(0.84) 
0.389* 
(0.000) 
0.021 
(0.77) 
1.00           
ltdxii -0.083 
(0.26) 
-0.37* 
(0.000) 
0.52 
(0.000) 
0.215* 
(0.003) 
0.548* 
(0.000) 
1.00          
tdsx -0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.047 
(0.52) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.055 
(0.45) 
0.276* 
(0.000) 
0.206* 
(0.005) 
1.00         
ggc -0.015 
(0.83) 
-0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.053 
(0.47) 
-0.151* 
(0.04) 
-0.127 
(0.08) 
-0.078 
(0.29) 
-0.168 
(0.02) 
1.00        
lgcf 0.326* 
(0.000) 
0.391* 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.717) 
0.255* 
(0.000) 
-0.143 
(0.05) 
-0.209* 
(0.004) 
-0.262* 
(0.000) 
0.233* 
(0.001) 
1.00       
cpi -0.121 
(0.10) 
0.124 
(0.09) 
0.145 
(0.05) 
0.013 
(0.86) 
0.360* 
(0.000) 
0.281* 
(0.000) 
0.185* 
(0.01) 
-0.092 
(0.21) 
-0.093 
(0.21) 
1.00      
tot 0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
0.011 
(0.88) 
-0.190* 
(0.01) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
-0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.039 
(0.59) 
-0.019 
(0.79)- 
0.050 
(-0.5) 
1.00     
popg -0.156* 
(0.03) 
-0.454* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.046 
(0.53) 
-0.021 
(0.77) 
0.184* 
(0.01) 
-0.073 
(0.32) 
0.270 
(0.000) 
-0.172* 
(0.02) 
-0.093 
(0.215) 
-0.061 
(0.41) 
1.00    
lfg 0.145 
(0.05) 
-0.059 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
0.047 
(0.52) 
0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.132 
(0.08) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.446* 
(0.00) 
1.00   
lschl 0.108 
(0.148) 
0.761* 
(0.000) 
-0.095 
(0.20) 
0.084 
(0.25)- 
0.075 
(0.31) 
-0.318* 
(0.000) 
0.050 
(0.50) 
-0.024 
(0.74) 
0.471* 
(0.000) 
0.131 
(0.08) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.45* 
(0.00) 
-0.042 
(0.57) 
1.00  
viol 0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.97) 
0.025 
(0.73) 
-0.041 
(0.57) 
-0.018 
(0.81) 
0.153* 
(0.03) 
-0.082 
(0.27) 
-0.016 
(0.83) 
-0.078 
(0.29) 
0.064 
(0.39) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.031 
(0.67) 
-0.08 
(0.29) 
1.00 
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Table (22) 
Correlation matrix (debts from IBRD, IDA, and IMF, and other covariates)  
Variable lgdpg lgdpi cflgdpi lexpg ibrdx idax imfx tdsx ggc lgcf cpi tot popg lgf lschl 
lgdpg 1.00               
lgdpi 0.019 
(0.79) 
1.00              
cflgdpi -0.142 
(0.05) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
1.00             
lexpg 0.509* 
(0.000) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
1.00            
Ibrdx -0.083 
(0.26) 
0.112 
(0.13) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
0.063 
(0.39) 
1.00           
Idax 0.037 
(0.62) 
-0.382 
(0.000) 
0.199* 
(0.007) 
0.247* 
(0.000) 
-0.190 
(0.01) 
1.00          
imfx -0.100 
(0.16) 
-0.427* 
(0.000) 
0.111 
(0.138) 
0.057 
(0.44) 
-0.117 
(011) 
0.327* 
(0.000) 
1.00         
tdsx -0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.047 
(0.52) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.055 
(0.45) 
0.395* 
(0.000) 
-0.031 
(0.67) 
0.208* 
(0.004) 
1.00        
ggc -0.015 
(0.83) 
-0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.053 
(0.47) 
-0.151* 
(0.04) 
0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.138 
(0.06) 
-0.206* 
(0.005) 
-0.168* 
(0.02) 
1.00       
lgcf 0.326* 
(0.000) 
0.391* 
(0.000) 
0.027 
(0.71) 
0.255* 
(0.000) 
0.047 
(0.52) 
-0.251* 
(0.000) 
-0.421* 
(0.000) 
-0.262* 
(0.000) 
0.233* 
(0.001) 
1.00      
cpi -0.121 
(0.10) 
0.124 
(0.09) 
0.145 
(0.05) 
0.012 
(0.86) 
0.308* 
(0.000) 
-0.054* 
(0.000) 
0.074 
(0.32) 
0.185* 
(0.01) 
-0.092 
(0.21) 
-0.093 
(0.21) 
1.00     
tot 0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
0.011 
(0.88) 
-0.190* 
(0.01) 
0.041 
(0.58) 
0.015 
(0.84) 
0.032 
(0.66) 
-0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.039 
(0.59) 
-0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.050 
(0.50) 
1.00    
popg -0.156* 
(0.035) 
-0.454* 
(0.000) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.046 
(0.53) 
-0.007 
(0.92) 
0.349* 
(0.000) 
0.081 
(0.28) 
-0.073 
(0.32) 
0.270 
(0.000) 
-0.172* 
(0.02) 
-0.093 
(0.21) 
-0.061 
(0.41) 
1.00   
lfg 0.145 
(0.05) 
-0.059 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
-0.112 
(0.13) 
0.224* 
(0.002) 
-0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.132 
(0.08) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.446* 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
lschl 0.108 
(0.148) 
0.761* 
(0.000) 
-0.095 
(0.20) 
0.084 
(0.25)- 
0.234* 
(0.001) 
-0.421* 
(0.000) 
-0.328* 
(0.000) 
0.050 
(0.50) 
-0.024 
(0.74) 
0.471* 
(0.00) 
0.131 
(0.08) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.45* 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.57) 
1.00 
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Table (23) 
Correlation matrix (1982-99) for bilateral and multilateral debts and other variables (1982-99) 
Variable lgdpg lgdpi cflgdpi lexpg blatxi mlatxi tdsx ggc lgcf cpi tot popg lgf lschl viol 
lgdpg 1.00               
lgdpi 0.019 
(0.79) 
1.00              
cflgdpi -0.142 
(0.05) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
1.00             
lexpg 0.509* 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
1.00            
Blatx -0.137* 
(0.00) 
-0.313* 
(0.00) 
0.521 
(0.00) 
0.135* 
(0.00) 
1.00           
mlatx -0.002 
(0.97) 
-0.356* 
(0.00) 
0.230* 
(0.00) 
0.249* 
(0.00) 
0.337* 
(0.00) 
1.00          
tdsx -0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.047 
(0.52) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.055 
(0.45) 
0.159* 
(0.03) 
0.008 
(0.91) 
1.00         
ggc -0.015 
(0.83) 
-0.062 
(0.40) 
-0.053 
(0.47) 
-0.151* 
(0.04) 
0.019 
(0.79) 
-0.012* 
(0.13) 
-0.168 
(0.02) 
1.00        
lgcf 0.326* 
(0.00) 
0.391* 
(0.00) 
0.027 
(0.717) 
0.255* 
(0.00) 
-0.133 
(0.07) 
-0.247* 
(0.00) 
-0.262* 
(0.00) 
0.233* 
(0.001) 
1.00       
cpi -0.121 
(0.10) 
0.124 
(0.09) 
0.145 
(0.05) 
0.013 
(0.86) 
0.274* 
(0.00) 
0.021 
(0.78) 
0.185* 
(0.01) 
-0.092 
(0.21) 
-0.093 
(0.21) 
1.00      
tot 0.055 
(0.46) 
-0.006 
(0.93) 
0.011 
(0.88) 
-0.190* 
(0.01) 
-0.016 
(0.82) 
0.03 
(0.68) 
-0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.039 
(0.59) 
-0.019 
(0.79)- 
0.050 
(-0.5) 
1.00     
popg -0.156* 
(0.03) 
-0.454* 
(0.00) 
0.022 
(0.76) 
-0.046 
(0.53) 
0.119 
(0.11) 
0.365* 
(0.00) 
-0.073 
(0.32) 
0.270 
(0.00) 
-0.172* 
(0.02) 
-0.093 
(0.215) 
-0.061 
(0.41) 
1.00    
lfg 0.145 
(0.05) 
-0.059 
(0.43) 
0.052 
(0.48) 
0.062 
(0.41) 
-0.031 
(0.68) 
0.235* 
(0.001) 
-0.034 
(0.65) 
0.129 
(0.08) 
0.029 
(0.69) 
-0.132 
(0.08) 
0.054 
(0.47) 
0.446* 
(0.00) 
1.00   
lschl 0.108 
(0.148) 
0.761* 
(0.00) 
-0.095 
(0.20) 
0.084 
(0.25)- 
-0.231* 
(0.001) 
-0.395* 
(0.00) 
0.050 
(0.50) 
-0.024 
(0.74) 
0.471* 
(0.00) 
0.131 
(0.08) 
0.006 
(0.92) 
0.45* 
(0.00) 
-0.042 
(0.57) 
1.00  
viol 0.009 
(0.89) 
-0.155* 
(0.03) 
-0.002 
(0.97) 
0.025 
(0.73) 
-0.01 
(0.89) 
0.153* 
(0.03) 
0.153* 
(0.03) 
-0.082 
(0.27) 
-0.016 
(0.83) 
-0.078 
(0.29) 
0.064 
(0.39) 
0.004 
(0.94) 
0.031 
(0.67) 
-0.079 
(0.29) 
1.00 
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